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Continuously growing demand for electricity, driven by deregulated power markets, 
has forced power systems to operate closer to their security operation limits. 
Meanwhile, the increasing penetration of large scale renewable energy may impact 
the operation of power systems by bringing more uncertainties. Under these 
circumstances, Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS) is widely applied in 
modern power systems, which is composed of a number of phasor measurement units 
(PMUs) that can provide high resolution real–time measurements synchronized by 
global positioning systems (GPS). WAMS can be used to (1) effectively assess the 
vulnerability of power grids; (2) provide online dynamic security assessment (DSA) 
with high reliability; (3) intelligently control and prevent power systems from the risk 
of insecurity and instability; (4) accurately identify the parameters of power system 
models and provide adaptive corrective control schemes. 
Power system is a complex non-linear dynamic system. The key to power system 
vulnerability assessment is to find the vulnerable elements which could cause large-
area power outages under attacks. For the aspect of structural vulnerability assessment, 
several vulnerability indices i.e. structural vulnerability index (SVI), contingency 
vulnerability index (CVI) and operational vulnerability index (OVI) are proposed to 
evaluate the impact of distributed generation (DG) on power system vulnerability. 
The assessment shows that DG units are able to shorten the electrical distance 
between power sources and power loads, alleviate long-distance large-capacity 
transmission, improve the reliability of power system after contingencies, and 
increase transmission efficiency. For the aspect of dynamic vulnerability assessment, 
critical clearing time (CCT) is computed by screening of a number of contingencies in 
various operating conditions. By statistical analysis, vulnerable areas in terms of 
transient stability are identified. Furthermore, the result of CCT computation in 
different typical scenarios can evaluate the impact of wind power on power system 
transient stability. Other influencing factors to power system transient stability are 
also evaluated, e.g. power output of generators in central power plants (CPP), load 
consumption level and the power exchange in high voltage direct current (HVDC) 
links. Both structural and dynamic vulnerability assessment, aiming at providing an 
early awareness of power system insecurity, are conducted by simulations in the 
DIgSILENT model of western Danish power system. 
iii 
 
DSA is the assessment of the ability of a certain power system to withstand a 
defined set of contingencies and to survive in the transition to an acceptable steady-
state condition. Among pattern recognition techniques, decision trees (DT) using the 
algorithm of classification and regression trees (CART) is applied in DSA of western 
Danish power system. It not only provides the results of security assessment but also 
reveal the principles learned by DTs for security assessment. The systematic approach 
adopts new methodology that trains contingency-oriented DTs on daily basis using 
the database generated by importance sampling method. The number of time-domain 
simulations necessary for importance sampling is significantly reduced, so 
computation burden is highly reduced, which makes the online DSA possible for even 
considering large scale integration of uncertain power generation from windfarms and 
other DG units. 
Based on the result of DSA, intelligent contingency control scheme guided by 
paralleled DTs is able to draw the system from insecure zone to the secure zone. In 
this approach, two DTs work in tandem, i.e. Observation DT (ODT) and Prevention 
DT (PDT). Fed with real-time wide area measurements, ODT of measurable variables 
is employed for online DSA to identify potential security issues and PDT of 
controllable variables provides online decision support on preventive control 
strategies against those issues. Finally, optimization of preventive control is 
conducted to find the most economical trajectory of preventive control. The proposed 
approach is comprehensively verified by a number of credible contingencies in 
western Danish power systems with annual data of operating conditions. 
In order to prevent voltage collapse, the online identification of load characteristic 
using PMU measurement-based approach is proposed to evaluate the proximity to 
voltage instability. Based on different load characteristics, adaptive corrective control 
schemes were implemented. The method can correctly predict and prevent the voltage 







Den konstant stigende efterspørgsel efter elektricitet drevet af et liberaliseret 
elmarked, sætter større krav til at elnet fungerer nær dets sikkerhedskrav. Imellemtid 
skaber den stigende udbredelse af vedvarende energi i større skala usikkerhed ved  
driften af elnettet. 
Under disse omstændigheder er Wide Area Measurement System (WAMS) 
almindeligt anvendt i det moderne elnet, hvilket består af et antal Phasor measurement 
units (PMU), som kan give højopløsning realtidsmålinger der synkroniseres med 
global positioning system (GPS). WAMS kan bruges til: (1) effektivt at vurdere elnets 
sårbarhed; (2) give et dynamisk sikkerheds vurdering (DSA) med høj pålidelighed; (3) 
intelligent kontrollere og forhindre strømsystemer imod risikoen for usikkerhed og 
ustabilitet; (4) præcist identificere af elnets model parametre og levere adaptive 
korrigerende kontrol strategi. 
Elnet er et komplekst ikke-lineær dynamisk system. Nøglen til elnets 
sårbahedsvurdering er at finde de sårbare elementer, som kunne forårsage  strømsvigt 
for store områder under udfaldet. For strukturel sårbarhedsvurdering aspekt mange 
sårbarhed indeks, m.a.o. structural vulnerability index (SVI), contingency 
vulnerability index (CVI) og operational vulnerability index (OVI) for at evaluere 
påvirkningen af decentral produktion (DG) på elnet sårbarhed. Evalueringen viser, at 
DG-enheder er i stand til at; forkorte den elektriske afstand mellem strømkilder og 
belastninger, lette langdistance højkapacitet transmission, forbedre pålideligheden af 
elsystemet efter uventet begivenhed og samt øge overførings virkningsgrad. For en 
dynamisk sårbarhedsvurdering, critical clearing time (CCT) beregnes på baggrund af 
screening af en række uventet begivenheder under forskellige driftsbetingelser. Ved 
en statistisk analyse, sårbar områd i form af transient stabilitet er indentificeret. 
Desuden kan resultatet af CCT beregningen i forskellige scenarier evaluere effekten 
af vindkraft på elsystemet transient stabilitet. Andre indvirke faktorer som påvirker 
elsystemet’s transient stabilitet tages også med i betragtningen, f.eks. udgangseffekten 
på generatorer i central power plants (CPP), strømforbruget og at strømudvekslingen i 
højspænding jævnstrøm anlæg (HVDC). Både strukturelle og dynamiske 
sårbarhedsvurderinger stræber efter at give en tidlig bevidsthed om elsystemet 




DSA er vurdering af et bestemt elsystems evner til at modstå et sæt uforudsete 
forhold og kunne klare i overgangen til en acceptabel stabil tilstand. Blandt 
mønstergenkendelsesteknikker, decision trees (DT), ved hjælp af algoritmen af 
classification and regression trees (CART) er anvendt i DSA for det vestlige danske 
elsystem. Det handler ikke kun om at frembringe resultater af sikkerhedsvurderingen, 
men også afdække de principper lært af DTs for sikkerhedsvurderingen. Den 
systematiske tilgang adopterer en ny metode, der optræner uforusetlig orienteret DT 
på daglig basis som anvendt databasen der genereret af betydning sampling methoden. 
Antallet af tidsdomæne simuleringer som er nødvendige for betydning sampling er 
reduceres betydeligt, så beregnings kompleksiteten er stærkt reduceret, hvilket gør 
online DSA muligt for intergrere betænkelig større skala af uvis elproduktion fra 
vindmølleparker og andre DG enheder. 
Baseret på resultaterne fra DSA, er det intelligent uforudsete kontrolsystem styret 
af parallelkoblede DT i stand til at trække systemet fra usikre zone til den sikre zone. 
Ved denne tilgang arbejder to DT i tandem, dvs. Observation DT (ODT) og 
prevention DT (PDT). Fodret med realtid bred områd målinger, ODT af målbare 
variable er anvendt til online DSA for at identificere potentielle sikkerhedsproblemer 
og PDT af kontrollerbare variabler giver realtime beslutningsstøtte om forebyggende 
kontrol strategier mod disse problemstilling. Endelig er optimering af præventiv 
kontrol anvendt for at finde den mest økonomiske bane for forebyggende kontrol. Den 
foreslåede fremgangsmåde er grundigt kontrolleret af en række troværdige målinger 
af uventet begivenhed i vestdanske elsystemer med årlige data for driftsbetingelser. 
Med det formål at forhindre spændingssammenbrud, online identifikation af 
belastning karakteristisk anvendes PMU målingen tilgang og det foreslås at evaluere i 
nærhed af spændingsustabiliteten. Baseret på forskellige belastningskarakteristikaene 
blev adaptive korrigerende kontrol ordninger gennemført. Fremgangsmåden kan 
præcist forudsige og forhindre spændingssammenbrud, og minimere mængden af 
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1.1 Background and Motivations 
New challenges to power systems have been induced by the rapid increasing 
penetration of renewable energy resources and the changes of electricity generation 
style, such as photovoltaic (PV) system, wind farms and other distributed generation 
(DG) units, including combined heat and power (CHP) plants. In 2012, a total of 
about 45GW of new power capacity was constructed in the European Union (EU), in 
which solar PV systems accounted for 16.8GW (37%), wind power accounted for 
11.9GW (26%), followed by other types of generation. The renewable share of new 
power installations was 70% in 2012 [1]. The energy policies in many EU countries 
have set ambitious targets for the promotion of renewable energy. The European 
Wind Energy Association (EWEA) has planned to meet 23% European electricity 
with wind by 2030 [2]. 
Denmark stands in the leading position in developing wind power technologies. 
The total installed capacity of wind power in Denmark had reached 4348MW by July 
2013, including offshore wind farms with capacity of 908MW [1], [3]. 10.27TWh 
electricity had been generated from wind turbines in 2012, which supplied 30.0% of 
annual electricity consumption [4]. Denmark also has experienced a vast growth in the 
dispersed generation since 1980s. About 50% of the electricity production capacity is 
dispersed generation in Danish power system, mainly from CHP units and onshore 
wind turbines. 75% of the total wind capacity is installed in western Denmark [5]. 
The large scale wind farms and DG units would play significant roles as power 
source in modern power systems, which make the control and protection of power 
systems more complicated. According to recommendations in final reports on the 
blackouts in US and EU [6]-[8], the modern power systems should not only rely on 
local and independent control mechanisms, but also on wide-area and coordinated 
control schemes, should not only be protected by conventional protections based on 
localized information as the first defense line, but also by system-level protection 
schemes (SPS) as the second and the third defense lines. 
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High-resolution real-time wide-area measurements with synchronized time stamps 
are necessary for gathering not only local signals but also global signals with high 
accuracy and low time delay. With the development of measurement and 
communication technologies, wide area measurement systems (WAMS) have been 
widely applied in power systems worldwide in the last two decades, based on which, 
advanced emergency control and protection approaches have been being developed to 
handle the system faults and disturbances, improve the system stability, reduce the 
risk of cascading failures and blackouts, and realize power system quick restoration. 
Danish power system is endeavoring to sit in the front row and many activities 
based on WAMS have been implemented not only on laboratory scale but also as pilot 
projects on system scale, such as calculating short-circuit power of HVDC stations, 
monitoring low-frequency oscillations, early warning of instability and oscillations, 
logging the system events [9]. However, most of the applications are still in the 
“monitoring” stage, in which WAMS only serves as a redundant measurement system 
to provide the backup security schemes. There is an urgent need to provide online 
wide area control and protect schemes based on WAMS for Danish power system. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
This PhD project is the Working Package 4 (WP4) of the SEEMPS project — 
“Development of a Secure, Economic and Environmentally-friendly Modern Power 
System”. The aim of this working package is to develop adaptive and intelligent 
control and protection schemes based on WAMS to prevent instability, cascading 
failures and blackouts in power systems. Western Danish power system is the studied 
system throughout this project. 
Four milestones of this project are listed below, and each milestone has been 
achieved by the author’s publications as cited behind: 
• WP4.1 Study the dynamic and transient characteristics of the power system 
with large wind power and distributed generation [C3], [C5]; 
• WP4.2 Develop the multi-agent protection [C2], [J3] and intelligent 
contingency control system based on WAMS [J1], [C6], [J2]; 
• WP4.3 Explore overall power system quick recovery strategies based on wide 
area state estimation [C1], [J4]; 
• WP4.4 Evaluate and verify the developed protection system and contingency 
control strategies [C4], [C7]. 
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In this project, WAMS/PMU is proposed to (1) effectively assess the vulnerability 
of the power grid; (2) reliably provide the online dynamic security assessment (DSA) 
and predict the system security in case of disturbances; (3) intelligently control and 
protect power systems from the risk of insecurity and instability; (4) accurately 
identify the parameters of power system models. These are the main topics of this 
thesis. 
There are mainly two aspects of power system vulnerability assessment: structural 
vulnerability assessment and dynamic vulnerability assessment. For the aspect of 
structural vulnerability assessment, vulnerability indices are necessary to evaluate the 
impact of dispersed generation on power grid vulnerability. For the aspect of dynamic 
vulnerability assessment, a number of credible contingencies in various operating 
conditions (OC) should be screened to identify the vulnerable areas and evaluate the 
impact of wind power and other factors on system security and stability. Both 
structural vulnerability assessment and dynamic vulnerability assessment aim at 
providing an early awareness of power system insecurity. 
There are a number of methodologies for power system DSA. Among the 
methodologies based on pattern recognition algorithms, decision tree (DT) using the 
algorithm of classification and regression trees (CART) will be applied in the online 
DSA of western Danish power systems. The adopted methodology should be able to 
not only provide the security assessment for current OC but also reveal the principles 
learned by DTs. Fed with the online measurements from WAMS, the system security 
can be reliably predicted in case of credible contingencies in western Danish power 
system, such as single 3-phase short-circuit in the transmission lines or busbars or loss 
of single generation unit. 
Based on the online data from WAMS, a preventive control scheme for western 
Danish power system is necessary to draw the system from insecure region to the 
secure region. Then, the most economical control trajectory is significant for operators 
to implement the preventive control with the lowest cost. 
In order to prevent voltage collapse, online identification of load characteristics 
based on PMU measurement is useful to evaluate the proximity to voltage instability. 
Then based on different load characteristics, adaptive corrective control schemes will 
be implemented. The method should be capable of correctly predicting and preventing 
the voltage collapse with minimized load shedding. 
In order to emphasize the main topics of this project, the above main objectives of 
the PhD project will be presented in detail in the following chapters in the main part 
of the thesis. Other objectives, e.g. protection based on multi-agent concept and 
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practical test of PMU devices, will be covered in the attached published papers of the 
PhD candidate behind the main part of the thesis. 
1.3 Scopes and Limitations 
The scopes and limitations of this research are as follows: 
• During the simulation in DIgSILENT/PowerFactory, as for load flow 
calculation, AC load flow only with balanced, positive sequence is considered; 
unbalanced load flow is not considered. As for time-domain simulation, Root 
Mean Square (RMS) values (Electromechanical Transients) only with 
balanced, positive sequence components are considered, RMS values with 
unbalanced components and EMT values (Electromagnetic Transients) are not 
considered. 
• The original model of western Danish power system developed in DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory is provided by Danish TSO—Energinet.dk. Later, some of the 
important elements are replaced by more detailed models using typical data, 
e.g. offshore wind farms, LCC-HVDC links. 
• For wide-area control and protection schemes, the issues of bit error rate and 
communication delay of WAMS are not considered in the scope of this 
research. 
• During short-term time-domain simulations (within 10sec) for DSA, the wind 
speed of each wind turbine is assumed to be invariant. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This PhD dissertation contains eleven chapters and will be organized as five parts 
as follows: 
 Part I – Background, Objectives and State-of-the-art 
Chapter 1—Introduction: Provides the background, motivations and objectives of 
this project. Also the technical contributions and the limitations of the project are 
discussed. 
Chapter 2—State-of-the-art: Presents a comprehensive overview of phasor 
measurement unit (PMU) techniques, reviews the current applications of PMU all 
over the world, especially in Denmark, and analyzes the limitations of PMU. In 
addition, a literature survey of PMU applications in wide area monitoring, protection 
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and control (WAMPAC) is provided in terms of the classifications of power system 
stability issues. 
 Part II – Vulnerability Assessment of Power Systems 
Chapter 3—Introduction of Danish Power System: Discusses the Danish power 
system, focusing on the characteristics of current Danish power system and the 
challenges of future Danish power system. 
Chapter 4—Structural Vulnerability Assessment: Introduces some principles of 
complex network theory and proposes several vulnerability indices to assess the 
structural vulnerability of western Danish power system, especially explores the 
impact of DG units on the structural vulnerability of the power grid. 
Chapter 5—Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment: Describes the detailed models of 
onshore and offshore wind farms in DIgSILENT/PowerFactory, assesses the dynamic 
vulnerability of western Danish power system based on critical clearing time (CCT) 
screening in different positions, for various scenarios. Besides, the impacts of the 
main influencing factors on the dynamic vulnerability of power systems are 
investigated. 
 Part III – Dynamic Security Assessment and Corresponding Preventive Control 
Scheme 
Chapter 6—Introduction of Decision Tree Algorithms: Introduces the fundamental 
knowledge of decision tree algorithms and provides an overview on a variety of 
decision tree applications in the field of power systems. 
Chapter 7—Preventive Control Scheme Based on Decision Trees: Proposes a 
decision tree based systematic approach for the online dynamic security assessment 
and the corresponding preventive control scheme. With the help of WAMS, a novel 
approach employs two decision trees to work in tandem for the preventive control of 
western Danish power systems. Then, the optimal control trajectory is searched out 
taking into account the cost of generation rescheduling and the penalty on the 
violation of international power exchange. 
Chapter 8—Online Dynamic Security Assessment Based on Random Forest: 
Surveys the methodologies of dynamic security assessment and introduces the 
principles of random forest (RF) algorithm. A methodology that uses RF for online 
DSA is proposed, which can not only assess the security states of current operating 




Chapter 9—Case Study of Online DSA and Corresponding Preventive Control in 
Danish Power System: Verifies the proposed online dynamic security assessment and 
corresponding preventive control scheme by the case study of western Danish power 
system. 
 Part IV – Other Applications of PMU 
Chapter 10—Identification of Load Characteristic and the Corresponding Adaptive 
Corrective Scheme: Analyzes the relationship between load characteristic and the 
voltage collapse point and then develops an adaptive corrective scheme based on the 
identification of load characteristics using PMU measurements. 
 Part V – Conclusions and Perspectives 
Chapter 11—Conclusions and Future Work: Presents the main conclusions of the 
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2.1 Wide Area Measurement System 
In the past few decades, power systems have been deregulated, restructured and 
decentralized in order to increase their efficiency, to reduce the operational cost and to 
set free the consumers from their limitations of choosing electricity providers [1]. 
Additionally, renewable energy techniques are being rapidly developed worldwide 
and integrated to the power grids with a tremendous pace which bring more 
challenges in the operation, control and protection of power systems [2]-[4]. As one of 
the prospective solutions to these challenges, wide area measurement system (WAMS) 
becomes more and more prevalent for modern power systems. WAMS are synergistic 
combination of distributed measuring instruments, time-synchronization devices, 
automation equipments, monitoring equipments and communication employed to 
construct a system-wide strategy in order to better estimate, monitor, control and 
protect the power system intelligently and adaptively [5], [6]. Phasor measurement 
units (PMUs), are the distributed measuring devices commercially available and 
widely applied to power systems, which play an important role in WAMS 
In this chapter, the main techniques of PMU are firstly introduced followed by the 
state-of-the-art of PMU installation and application worldwide, especially in Denmark. 
Based on the author’s experience in the practical test of PMU devices, the potentials 
and limitations of PMU are presented [7]. Finally, a literature survey of PMU 
applications is provided in terms of the classification of power system stability issues. 
2.1.1 Phasor Measurement Units Techniques 
PMU is a device which measures the electrical variables of an electrical power grid 
using a common time source for the synchronization of those measured variables [8]. 
Currently, PMUs can be dedicated devices, or PMU function can also be incorporated 
into intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), such as digital protective relays, digital fault 
recorders, digital disturbance recorders and so on through the firmware upgrade [9]. 
The first PMU prototype was invented by A. G. Phake and J. S. Thorp et al. in 
Virginia Tech. in 1988, which was then applied to Bonneville Power Administration 
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(BPA) and American Electric Power (AEP), both belonging to the western system 
coordinating council (WECC) [10], [11]. These PMUs were tested and used by 
utilities for several years before the first commercial unit, Macrodyne 1690, 
introduced in 1991 [12]. The initial motivation of bringing PMU to BPA was due to 
the fact that the WECC faced the critical lack of dynamic information throughout 
1980s, so WECC was the first field test-bed for WAMS implementation [13]-[15].  
In 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) launched the WAMS project. The aim of this project was to reinforce 
the western system dynamic information network (WesDINet). Dynamic information 
provided by WesDINet has been very important and useful for understanding the 
blackouts. This dynamic information could also be used for the purpose of avoiding 
future disturbances. Furthermore, during the deregulation and restructuring process, 
information resources provided by this WAMS were utilized to maintain the system 
reliability [16]. 
Since 2000, more and more WAMSs have been developed over the world. More 
PMU models have become available with a wide range of options. Many novel 
applications have been developed for the analysis of recorded data as well as the real 
time display and alarming [17]. 
In 2002, US DOE initiated the Eastern Interconnection Phasor Project (EIPP), 
building on over a decade of experience in WECC. In 2007, North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) formally joined DOE in this effort, and expanded it 
to include all interconnections within North America. Hence, at this time, the EIPP 
was renamed as the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI) [18], [19]. 
Simultaneously, a more convenient frequency monitoring network (FNET) system 
based on frequency disturbance recorders (FDRs) installed at ordinary 120V outlets 
was developed to measure the power system frequency and voltage. Currently, the 
system is operated by the Center for Ultra-wide-area Resilient Electric Energy 
Transmission Networks (CURENT) located at University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 
USA [20]-[24]. 
A PMU can measure 50/60 Hz AC waveforms (voltage and current) typically at a 
rate of 48 or 96 samples per cycle. The analog AC waveform is digitized by Analog to 
Digital (A/D) converter for each phase. A phase-lock oscillator along with a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) reference source provides the needed high-speed 
synchronized sampling with 1 μs accuracy. The time tagged phasors can then be 
transmitted to a phasor data concentrator (PDC) or directly to the super phasor data 
concentrator (SPDC) in the control center with the rate up to 60 samples per second 
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[25], [26]. Fig. 2.1 shows the PMU module and the structure of WAMS [5], [18]. A 






Fig. 2.1 PMU module and wide area measurement system (WAMS). 
 
TABLE 2.1 LIST OF WAMS RELATED STANDARDS AS OF 2012 
Standard No. Name Statues 
IEEE 37.111-1999 COMTRADE Approved [29] 
IEEE 37.118-2005 Standard for synchrophasors for power systems Approved [30] 
IEEE 37.232-2007 
Recommended practice for naming time sequence data 
files 
Approved [31] 
IEEE 37.239-2010 COMFEDE Approved [32] 
IEEE PC37.238-2011
Standard profile for use of 1588, precision time 
protocols in power system applications 
Approved [33] 
NERC CIP 2-9, 
Version #5 
Cyber security standards transition guidance Approved [34] 
IEC 61850 (90-5), 
2012  
PMU logical node Approved [35] 
IEEE 37.118.1-2011 Synchrophasor measurement Approved [36] 
IEEE 37.118.2-2011 Synchrophasor communications Approved [37] 
IEC 61850 Substation automation Approved 
IEC 61970 Common information model Approved 
IEEE 1815-2010 
DNP standard for electric power system 
communications 
Approved [38] 
IETF RFC6272 Internet Protocol Standards for Smart Grid Approved [39] 
IEC 60255-24, Ed. 2 IEC version of COMTRADE In approval process
PC C37.244 
Guide for Phasor Data Concentrator Requirements for 
Power System Protection, Control and Monitoring 
In approval process
PC C37.242 
Guide for Phasor Data Concentrator Requirements for 
Power System Protection, Control and Monitoring 
In approval process
PC 37.240 
Standard for cyber security requirement for substation 





2.1.2 State-of-the-art of PMU applications 
During the last two decades, the installation of PMUs has increased considerably all 
over the world, because the need for the better estimation of the overall power 
systems’ state is recognized to be a significant factor to improve its resilience in face 
of catastrophic failures. However, in most countries, PMUs only take the 
responsibility of power systems monitoring, while the wide-area close-loop control 
and protection of power system are still in their infancy stage, albeit some of the 
advanced technologies have already been in the field-test stages. Table 2.2 gives a 
brief survey on the focuses of PMU applications around the world, i.e. North America, 
Continental Europe, Russia, Nordic countries and China [40]-[47]. 
TABLE 2.2 APPLICATIONS OF PMU ALL OVER THE WORLD 
Countries/Regions Applications 
North America 
 Analysis of  system oscillation modes (low frequency oscillations), 
generator performance and model validation, HVDC model validation, 
phase-angle alarm; 
 Dynamic data monitoring and analysis (angle, frequency, power flows);  
 Restoration: synchronization check, and black start; 
 Situational awareness for reducing blackouts, increasing power transfers 
monitoring, quick situation assessment, integrity protection scheme; 
 Disturbance analysis, dynamic analysis, postmortem analysis, data 
visualization using geographical maps; 
 State estimation; 
 Trending display of frequency, phase angle monitoring; 
 Evaluation of voltage and transient stability. 
Continental Europe 
 Voltage phase angle difference monitoring; 
 Line thermal monitoring (medium value between two substations); 
 Voltage stability monitoring (online P–V curves); 
 Online monitoring of system damping (online modal analysis with online 
parameter estimation). 
Russia 
 System performance monitoring and analysis; 
 Reference dynamic model (RDM) validation; 
 Validation test after the  disturbance of imbalance of active power; 
 Low-frequency (i.e. 0.02-0.2Hz) oscillation monitoring and damping; 
 Steady-state assessment and dynamic performance investigation for 
emergency control. 
Nordic Countries 
 Calculation of short-circuit power by HVDC lines by monitoring the 
margin to collapse; 
 Monitoring low-frequency oscillations in the grid by early warning of 
instability and oscillation in the grid; 
 Verification of power system simulation models by state estimation; 
 Logging the system events by optimization of the operation using the 
electronic registration; 
 Backup security scheme by redundant measuring systems. 
China 
 Dynamic analysis of the available transmission capability; 
 Wide-area data recording and playback; 
 Online frequency oscillation analysis; 
 Close-loop low-frequency identification and damping control system; 
 State estimation; 
 Security assessment; 




TABLE 2.3 DETAILS OF PMU INSTALLATION IN WESTERN DANISH POWER SYSTEM AS OF 2012. 
No. Bus (Voltage Channel) Bay (Current Channel) Status 
1 Vester Hassing 400 kV Nordjyllandsværket In operation
2 Vester Hassing 400 kV ZL1 (shunt reactor) In operation
3 Tjele 400 kV Askjær In operation
4 Fraugde 400 kV Pole 1 In operation
5 Kassø 400 kV Revsing In operation
6 Kassø 400 kV Flensburg In operation
7 Ensted 220 kV Flensburg In operation
8 Trige 220 kV Anholt windfarm Planned 
9 Anholt windfarm 220 kV Trige Planned 
10 Tjele 400 kV KT52 transfo. (Tjele 400/150kV) Planned 
11 Tjele 400 kV Pole 4 Planned 
12 Revsing 400 kV Tjele Planned 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 PMU placement in western Danish power system as of 2012. 
Danish power system is also making endeavor to sit in the front row and many 
activities have implemented not only on the laboratory scale but also as pilot project 
on the system scale [48], [49]. As shown in Fig. 2.2, by the year of 2012, 7 PMUs 
have been deployed for daily operation monitoring in western Danish power system, 
and 5 more PMUs will be implemented in the following years. According to system 
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plan, there will be more PMUs installed for higher observability in Danish power grid 
in the future. Table 2.3 lists the details of PMU placement in western Danish power 
system as of 2012. 
2.1.3 Limitations of Phasor Measurement Units 
 
Fig. 2.3 Hardware setup of the RTDS based PMU testing platform. 
In the author’s previous publication [C4], the laboratory test and performance 
analysis of MiCOM PMU P847-B from Alstom Grid is carried out using Real Time 
Digital Simulator (RTDS). The hardware setup of RTDS based PMU testing platform 
is shown in Fig. 2.3. Based on the steady state testing and dynamic testing of Alstom 
PMU, some limitations of PMUs can be summarized as follows: 
 Although the rate of reporting frames of PMU is much higher than that of 
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in SCADA systems, the rate of phasor frames is 
still limited to once per cycle of system frequency (50/60Hz). Therefore, some 
phenomenon with very short time constant or very fast dynamics, such as 
switching transient and traveling waves, can not be reported by PMU data. 
 Since PMUs only provide the measurements of fundamental frequency of 
positive sequence component of voltage and current curves as well as the 
negative sequence and zero sequence component, the usage is restricted in the 
applications of harmonic analysis and the related issues in power systems. 
 Even though PMUs give options in the configuration of its filtering windows, 
(5, 7 or 13 cycles for Alstom P847-B) during transient conditions after large 
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disturbances, waveforms of voltage and current would change significantly 
within one cycle. The calculated frequency and phasor are not standardized, 
which restricted the PMU in the primary protection of power systems. 
 PMUs have the best steady state performance, lowest total vector error (TVE) 
only in the nominal frequency (50/60Hz), so in the emergency condition with 
large frequency deviation, the PMU data is not highly accurate unless they are 
carefully compensated. 
 The current transformers and voltage transformers also bring some error to 
degrade the performance of measurements, so a carefully configuration of 
PMU is necessary before the commission in order to align the measured phasor 
with the real phasor for different operating conditions. 
 
2.2 Phasor Measurement Units Applications 
With the development of information communication technology (ICT), PMU and 
its associated WAMS technologies have become more and more matured in recent 
years, but their practical value is decided by the applications of the collected data. 
Many PMU applications have been developing quickly recently, such as power 
system state estimation [50], real-time congestion management [51], validation of 
system models [52], post-disturbance analysis [53], thermal monitoring [54] etc., 
however, the most fruitful and promising applications stay in the wide area 
monitoring, control and protection system (WAMPAC). 
2.2.1 Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control System 
Up to now, there is not a clear discrimination between wide area control and wide 
area protection. Different definitions of wide area control and wide are protection 
could be found in different sources. Hence, a suite of different systematic applications 
aimed at handling various wide area requirements can also be summarized by the 
concept of WAMPAC [27], [45], [55], [56]. However, a definition of wide area 
control system described below is employed in this thesis. Wide Area Control System 
(WACS) is defined as a systematic approach which is based on the analysis of wide 
area stability and security issues; after the recognition of an operating state prone to 
instability or insecurity, WACS influences the behavior of power system to follow a 
certain continuous trajectory to avoid instability and keep the power system within 
secure/stable boundaries. Usually, the response-based feedback control loop is 





Fig. 2.4 Wide area monitoring, protection and control system [14]. 
The overall power system stability problem can be classified into several sub-
categories, based on considerations regarding the physical natures, severity of 
disturbances, time spans etc.. In 2004, Kundur et al. provided the authoritative 
classification of power system stability problems, as shown in Fig. 2.5 [57]. A lot of 
discussion and research have been made in many publications and reports on building 
WAMPAC system for avoiding a specific stability problem, such as, frequency 
stability, voltage stability, transient stability and small signal stability. 
 
Fig. 2.5 Classification of the power system stability problems into sub-categories [57]. 
 
2.2.2 WAMPAC Applications in Frequency Stability 
Keeping frequency within the nominal operating range (ideally at nominal constant 
frequency, 50Hz or 60Hz) is a significant aspect for the proper operation of a power 
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system. In Denmark, the primary regulation must be supplied at a frequency deviation 
of up to ±200mHz relative to the reference frequency of 50Hz with a permitted dead-
band of only ±20mHz [58]. Ancillary services, such as primary reserves, secondary 
reserves (load frequency control) and tertiary reserves (manual reserves) are delivered 
to Danish power grid to maintain the frequency in different time-scale. The maximum 
acceptable frequency deviation for continuous operation of generators and other 
apparatus must be within 49.5Hz to 50.5Hz [59]. When the boundary is reached, unit 
protection may disconnect the power plants, which may make the situation even 
worse, because frequency may further decrease and it may result in the total collapse 
of the whole system. Therefore, some other emergency control schemes can be 
employed to prevent the blackouts, such as: 
 HVDC power transfer control; 
 Load shedding; 
 Controlled disconnection with neighboring systems to prevent the spread of 
frequency outrange; 
 Controlled islanding of local system into separate areas with balanced 
generation and load. 
For current common practice, most of these emergency frequency control actions 
are executed manually by the operators of power grids expect Automatic Under-
Frequency Load Shedding (AUFLS). They are triggered momentarily or after a time 
delay if the frequency drops below a predefined level and/or over a predefined rate of 
change [60]. The current AUFLS schemes in western Denmark (DK1) and eastern 
Denmark (DK2) are shown in Table 2.4 [61]. 
 
TABLE 2.4 AUTOMATIC UNDER-FREQUENCY LOAD SHEDDING SCHEME IN DENMARK 
Power Grid Configuration Total 
DK1 
10% of consumption, f<48.5Hz momentary, f<48.7Hz 20sec. 
10% of consumption, f<48.3Hz momentary, f<48.5Hz 20sec. 
10% of consumption, f<48.1Hz momentary, f<48.3Hz 20sec. 
10% of consumption, f<47.9Hz momentary, f<48.1Hz 20sec. 
10% of consumption, f<47.7Hz momentary, f<47.9Hz 20sec. 
Total 50% 
DK2 
15% of consumption, f<48.7Hz momentary, f<48.9Hz 20sec. 
25% of consumption, f<47.7Hz momentary, f<47.9Hz 20sec. 
Total 40% 
 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of AUFLSs is strongly dependent on the tuning and 
configuration based on the pre-study of the system, there is no on-line coordination 
between them. In addition, since AUFLSs are not capable of adapting to the current 
operating condition, and in Denmark, large amount of dispersed generation varies 
quite often, the disconnection of distribution feeders may deteriorate the frequency 
instability. The weakness of abovementioned emergency frequency control scheme 
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can be overcome by WAMPAC system, as described in [62]-[66]. Some of them have 
already been commissioned for operation. 
Hydro-Quebec’s defense plan commissioned an adaptive AUFLS system in 2000, 
called Remote Load Shedding System (RLSS) [62]. RLSS can calculate the power to 
be shed dependent on the severity of events in 735kV transmission network and send 
commands to Programmable Load Shedding Systems (PLSS) which is a device that 
executes the received load shedding commands in emergency scenarios and works as 
a back up for conventional local under-frequency load shedding (UFLS) relays. In 
[63], neural network algorithm is used to estimate the dynamic response of the power 
system for the UFLS. This information is then used to calculate an optimal amount of 
load to be shed. In [64], predictive control is applied in UFLS, which takes into 
account both frequency and voltage sensitivity/dependency of loads. Immediately 
after a disturbance, the load behavior and parameters are observed and then used in 
the predictive control of load shedding. In [65], a hierarchical scheme is proposed 
based on WAMS for the coordinated control of conventional synchronous generators, 
wind farms and FACTS to greatly improve the short-term frequency regulation 
capacity of power system with a large penetration of wind energy. In [66], a novel 
self-healing scheme for load curtailment in power system under critical contingencies 
is proposed considering both frequency and voltage response from WAMS. 
2.2.3 WAMPAC Applications in Voltage Stability 
Voltage stability refers to the ability of power systems to maintain steady voltage at 
all buses in the system after being subjected to a disturbance from a given initial 
operating condition [67]. Whilst, voltage collapse usually takes on the form of a 
dramatic drop of transmission system voltage, which is basically caused by an 
unavailability of reactive power support in some nodes of the network, where the 
voltage uncontrollably falls [68], [69]. Lack of reactive power may essentially have 
two origins. (1) Gradual increase of power demand where the reactive power cannot 
be met in some buses or (2) Sudden change of a network topology redirecting the 
power flows in such a way that the reactive power cannot be delivered to some buses. 
More advanced local approaches for detection and evaluation of voltage instability 
have been presented in [70]-[74]. The external grid in the supervised node is 
represented by Thevenin equivalent circuit and the load is modeled by impedance. 
The point of equal impedances between Thevenin equivalent circuit and load 
impedence is then representing a boundary between stable and unstable conditions. 
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Fig. 2.6 Time frame of voltage power stability problem [68]. 
However, the analyses of real voltage collapses have shown their wide area nature 
and that they can be sorted basically into two categories according to the speed of 
their evolution–––short-term voltage instability as well as mid-term and long-term 
voltage instability [67]-[69]. Short-term voltage instability is in the range of seconds 
(usually 1~3 sec) and the main role in the incidents is played by the dynamics of 
induction motors as a load, mainly from air conditioning system. The time scale of the 
mid-term and long-term voltage instability ranges from tens of seconds up to several 
minutes, even to several hours. It mainly involves impact of a topology change or 
gradual load increase, i.e. slow dynamics, as shown in Fig. 2.6 [68]. Therefore the 
major part of the research activities in this area has focused on the steady state aspects 
of voltage stability, i.e. finding the maximum load ability point of the P-V curve. This 
provides a basis for a number of indices from WAMS, expressing the proximity to the 
voltage collapse [75]-[78].  
The preliminary research of wide area control system against long-term voltage 
stability is based on SCADA system in southern Sweden [79]. Karlsson et al. 
implement the logical decision-making process and order specific automatic actions 
based on global data from distributed SCADA system to maintain the system voltage. 
Later, they propose a coordinated WAMPAC system against voltage collapse based 
on model-predictive control and heuristic tree search [80]. The simulation based on 
Nordic-32 test system shows that the coordinated scheme reduces the amount of 
required load shedding by 35% compared to the local scheme. 
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For short-term voltage stability issue, an idea of preventive analysis is proposed 
based on the regular on-line N-1 contingency analysis and applied immediately after 
the insecure operating condition is detected. In the voltage instability case, it means 
calculations of a minimal load shedding necessary to stabilize the power system 
subjected to any contingency from the selected range. Thus, an optimization problem 
can be formulated, where the objective function to be minimized is the amount of load 
shedding [81]. A step forward is Quasi Steady-State (QSS) approximation in [82]. 
This method consists of voltage stability evaluation based on the time-domain 
simulation with a simplified description of power system dynamics. 
In [83], a novel concept for monitoring voltage instability with the characteristics of 
voltage-sensitive loads as well as the reactive-power reserves of generators taken into 
account is presented. Based on the local measurements from PMU as well as system-
wide information on reactive-power reserves, the algorithm is adopted to determine 
the onset point of voltage collapse, suggests deploying control actions, such as load 
shedding, in case the stability margin is small and the reactive-power reserves are 
almost exhausted.  
Corsi et al. propose wide area voltage control based on a hierarchical structure [84]. 
Two additional higher levels – Secondary Voltage Regulation (SVR) and Tertiary 
Voltage Regulation (TVR) are adopted to enrich the primary voltage regulation (PVR). 
National TVR shall coordinate with SVRs which control the voltage of pilot buses 
assigned to each area. The implementation of SVRs is reported to be already finished 
in the Italian power system [85], [86]. 
In [14], Taylor et al. propose a wide area stability and voltage control system and 
implement it in Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). From the simulation result 
based on the archived data, it is concluded that the fuzzy-rule based WACS could 
have prevented the cascading failure in Aug. 10th, 1996 and the blackout event in Jun. 
14th 2004. 
In [87], [88], Glavic et al. deal with the early detection of impending voltage 
instability from the system states provided by PMUs. It performs efficient sensitivity 
trajectory analysis to identify when a combination of load powers has passed through 
a maximum. The proposed method is tested on Nordic-32 system. 
When power system is integrated with nonlinear model (e.g. over excitation limit) 
and dynamic model (e.g. dynamic load), it is difficult to exactly evaluate the voltage 
stability margin based on measurements from PMUs. Some advanced algorithms are 
adopted to assess the voltage stability margin considering complex power system 
models. In [89], artificial neural network is used to monitor voltage stability margin in 
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real time. In [90], the linear relationship between reactive power reserves and voltage 
stability margin is fitted out, which also realizes the early awareness of voltage 
instability based on PMUs. 
2.2.4 WAMPAC Applications in Transient Stability 
Transient stability involves a severe disturbance (typically 3-phase bolted short 
circuit) followed by trips of lines and transformers to clear the short circuit. After the 
disturbance, the response of power systems can be equivalent to the dynamics of a 
physical system, for example, ball-on-concave-surface (BOCS) mechanical system 
[91]. For transient instability cases, the power excited by the disturbance is then 
absorbed by rotors of generators, increasing their kinetic energy which results in the 
sudden acceleration of the rotors above the acceptable revolution, and eventually loss 
of synchronization. 
Therefore, the countermeasures taken against this scenario aim to either dissipate 
the undelivered power, (e.g. braking resistor, FACTS devices, HVDC control etc.) or 
reduce the mechanical power which accelerates the generators. (e.g. fast-valving, 
disconnection of generators, controlled islanding etc.) 
An application of traditional measure of transient angle instability – equal area 
criterion (EAC) (expressing a balance between the accelerating and decelerating 
energy), on emergency control is presented in [92]. The angles of the generators in the 
system are predicted approximately 200ms ahead. According to it, the generators are 
ranked and grouped into two categories. For the generators in the critical category, 
one-machine-infinite-bus (OMIB) equivalent is modeled and extended equal area 
criterion (EEAC) is applied to assess their stability. Pre-assigned corrective action is 
executed if an unstable generator is identified. In principle the similar algorithm is 
used for both off-line and on-line use [93], where the dynamic EEAC is employed for 
screening of the most severe contingencies that are then analyzed in detail. Simple 
rules derived from the classical relations of OMIB equivalent are proposed in [94]. 
The simulation results of Tokyo Interconnected Network show that the prediction of 
the loss of synchronism is 0.7s earlier, thus providing longer time for countermeasures. 
In [95], simulation results show how the blackout of power system in Taiwan on 
July 29th, 1999 could have been avoided employing WAMS system against transient 
instability. The proposed algorithm aims to the protection of (extra high voltage) EHV 
tie lines connecting the generation area in the south with the load area in the north. 
The line power flow limit was used to modify the EAC for stability of the generators 
in the south. 
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In [96], an algorithm is suggested, which does not require knowledge of the system 
and uses only the on-line PMU measurements of generator’s rotor angles and power 
mismatches to predict the transient angular stability of generators. It implies that it is 
not necessary for tuning procedure when this method is applied on another power 
system. Simulation tests on the 179-bus WSCC system have been carried out. 
In [97], Kamwa et al. propose a PMU placement method for efficient assessment of 
the dynamic performance of Hydro-Quebec system to maximize the information 
content of the captured signals. Later, in [98], they proposed the fuzzy logic based 
wide-area severity index (WASI) for classification learning in order to predict the 
transient stability of power systems by post-disturbance measurement from PMU. The 
proposed algorithm has been successfully tested on Hydro-Quebec power system. 
Many advanced machine learning algorithms based on PMU data, such as artificial 
neural network [99], decision trees [100], support vector machines [101], and 
reinforce learning method [102], are used to assess and protect against power system 
transient instability. Most of them consider N-1 contingencies. In [103], a real time 
stabilizing control approach for responding to N-k contingencies, with larger k, is 
developed utilizing WAMS. The controls can follow an optimal principle in driving 
the rotor angles to an acceptable equilibrium point, at the minimum cost, by predicting 
the state response trajectories. 
In [104], two systematic protection schemes for controlled islanding of Uruguayan 
electrical power system are proposed. Compared with the current utilities’ practical 
scheme, the necessary load shedding can be reduced by 18% if only local PMU 
measurements are used, and reduced by 30% if system-wide PMU measurements are 
used. 
2.2.5 WAMPAC Applications in Small Signal Stability 
Some power systems lack a “natural” damping of oscillations, which would be 
instable when subjected to any minor disturbance or sometimes even under normal 
operating conditions if there is no countermeasures to increase the damping [105], 
[106]. In [107], it is stated that the extension of the transmission capacity by adding 
new lines does not necessarily improve the damping significantly. 
A traditional way of damping the oscillation is to use Power System Stabilizer 
(PSS), which controls the output voltage of the generator. The coordinated tuning of 
PSSs is a complex task, since they should be robust—work in the wide range of 
operating conditions and provide the best possible performance [108]. 
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Research of Hydro-Quebec system by Kamwa et al. has done significant work in 
the field of damping of inter-area oscillations. In [109], two-loop PSSs are proposed. 
The speed sensitive local loop operating the usual way is extended with a global loop 
using PMU measurements from two suitably selected areas. Five control sites 
comprising of four generators and one synchronous condenser have been chosen for 
the implementation of the proposed method. The simulations results show that a 
significant improvement in the damping of inter-area oscillations has been achieved 
[110]. 
In [111], a damping control system based on WAMS for multiple HVDC links is 
proposed to enhance the damping of inter-area modes and to minimize the interactions 
between different control loops. According to the test on China Southern Power Grid 
(CSG), the damping ratio of inter-area oscillation can be enhanced to more than 10%, 
and the power transfer capability in CSG can be increased by more than 100MW 
during summer peak load. 
Various techniques aiming at the identification of oscillation modes from PMU 
measurements have been reported. For example, for the estimation of inter-area 
oscillation modes in Nordel grid, the PMU measurements from distribution network 
have been utilized [112]. However, the distribution network is probably not the best 
choice since the measurements contain quite a lot of noise and extraction of 
information about the two typical Nordel oscillation modes was difficult. The 
monitoring of frequency on the transmission level, triggered by disturbances, shows 
more promising results [113]. Continental Europe system is multiple times larger than 
Nordel system, so the recorded oscillations measured from transmission network have 
much lower frequency and the measurement noise is more easily filtered out. 
 
2.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the phasor measurement units (PMU) techniques are introduced 
followed by the state-of-the-art of PMU installation and implementation worldwide, 
especially in Denmark. Based on the author’s experience in the practical test of PMU 
devices, the potentials and limitations of PMU are presented. Furthermore, a literature 
survey of PMU applications in the monitoring, control and protection of power 
systems is presented. 
Although much progress of WAMS has been achieved in the past two decades or so, 
there is still a big gap between current research status and industrial applications in 
the proposed theories, algorithms, methodologies etc.. Many problems still need to be 
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solved. For most power systems, the reliability of system-wide approaches is still 
waiting for the validation, test and improvement of the close-loop applications in 
industry. 
Part of the content in this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Introduction of Danish Power System 
 
3.1 Characteristics of Current Danish Power System 
Danish power grid comprises two non-synchronous systems, i.e. western Danish 
power system (DK1) and eastern Danish power system (DK2). Western Danish power 
system in Jylland Peninsula and Fyn Island which is synchronous with the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) RG 
Continental Europe via Germany, while eastern Danish power system in Zealand 
Island which is synchronous to Nordic system via Sweden. Besides, another small 
island situated in Baltic Sea, i.e. Bornholm Island, is operated by a distribution system 
operator (DSO), Østkraft, at 60kV and connected to Swedish power system at 132kV 
[1], [2]. DK1 and DK2 are interconnected by Great Belt High Voltage Direct Current 
(HVDC) link. Key figures of Danish power system as of 2011 are given in Table 3.1 
[3], [4]. As can be seen, the ratio between installed wind power and consumption in 
DK1 is about twice higher than that in DK2. The geographical map of western and 
eastern Danish transmission systems in 2010 is shown in Appendix A [5]. 
TABLE 3.1 KEY FIGURES OF WESTERN AND EASTERN DANISH POWER SYSTEMS AS OF 2011 
Production and Load DK1 DK2 
Minimum Load (MW) 1400 900 
Maximum Load (MW) 3700 2700 
Capacity of Primary Power Stations (MW) 3400 3800 
Capacity of CHP Plants (MW) 1643 640 
Capacity of Wind Turbines (MW) 2840 960 
 
Denmark has abundant wind power resource. Onshore wind resources are highest 
in the western part of the country, and on the eastern islands with coastlines facing 
south or west. Additionally, the country has very large offshore wind resources, and 
large areas of sea territory with a shallow water depth of 5~15m, where sitting of 
offshore wind farms is most feasible. These offshore sites offer even higher wind 
speed, in the range of average 8.5~9.0m/s at 50m height [6]. 
Western Danish power system is operated at 400kV and 150kV at transmission 
level and 60/20/10/0.4kV at distribution level. The geographical map of western 
Danish transmission system in 2010 is shown in Fig. 3.1 [7], 6 central power plants 
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(CPPs) with 8 large synchronous generators are connected to the transmission system. 
A large number of onshore wind turbines and several offshore wind farms are 
integrated into the distribution system and transmission system respectively. 
 
Fig. 3.1 Geographical map of western Danish transmission system in 2010 [7]. 
3.1.1 High Penetration of Wind Power 
Past two decades has witnessed a massive expansion of wind power generation in 
Denmark. The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) has set ambitious target 
in developing the wind power generation [8]. Accordingly, Denmark, which currently 
produces about 30% of electricity from wind, plans to realize a 50% wind share of 
electricity production by 2025, especially, offshore wind farms [9]. As shown in Fig. 
3.2, by the end of 2011, the amount of wind generation capacity in Denmark 
approached 3927MW and the annual share of wind generation was 28.2%. The latest 
report comes out that the amount of wind power generation in Denmark increased to 
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4162MW and annual share of wind generation increased to 30.0%, in the year of 2012 
[10].  
 
Fig. 3.2 Installed wind capacity, annual wind generation and capacity factors in Denmark 
from 1977 to 2011. 
Two offshore wind farms Horns Rev 1 and Horns Rev 2 with capacities of 160MW 
and 209MW were commissioned in 2002 and 2009 respectively, while onshore wind 
farms with 2232MW capacity in total still composes major part of wind generation, 
which is distributed all over western Denmark. Anholt offshore wind farm with the 
capacity of 400MW is expected to be fully commissioned by the end of 2013. Table 
3.2 shows the capacity of generations and load in western Danish power system [11]. 
TABLE 3.2 SOME KEY FIGURES OF WESTERN DANISH POWER SYSTEMS IN 2011 
Production, Consumption and Power Exchange Power (MW) 
Capacity of Production, Total 7732 
Capacity of Central Power Plant  3147 
Capacity of Local CHP Capacity 2017 
Capacity of Onshore Wind Turbines 2232 
Capacity of Offshore Wind Farms 369 
Capacity of Other DGs 326 
Minimum Load 1306 
Maximum Load 3664 
Exchange Capacity Ex. (+)/ Im. (-) 3730/-3230 
Maximum Capacity to ENTSO-E Ex. (+)/ Im. (-) 1500/-950 
Maximum Capacity to Sweden Ex. (+)/ Im. (-) 740/-680 
Maximum Capacity to Norway Ex. (+)/ Im. (-) 1000/-1000 
Maximum Capacity to Eastern Denmark Ex. (+)/ Im. (-) 590/-600 
 
As a result, primarily Energinet.dk has to face the large technical challenges in 
managing and operating Danish power system with a significant penetration of wind 
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power. The following factors are some of the reasons that Danish power system is 
able to be operated in scenarios with such large amount of wind power. 
The interconnection of western Danish power system to external grid is so strong to 
overcome the wind power intermittences. In addition, the temporary fluctuation of 
wind energy can be compensated under the help of external grids. To the north, the 
western Danish power system is connected to Norway and Sweden via HVDC links. 
The capabilities of 3 HVDC links to Norway are 275MW, 275MW and 500MW, and 
the capabilities of 2 HVDC links to Sweden are 380MW and 360MW respectively. To 
the south, it is connected to the ENTSO-E synchronous area via two 400kV and two 
220kV AC transmission lines to Germany. To the east, the HVDC link—“Great Belt” 
with capacity of 600MW was commissioned in July 2010 interconnecting western 
Danish power system and eastern Danish power system. The abundance of hydro 
power generation in Norwegian and Swedish power systems can cooperate with the 
wind power generation in Denmark and Germany. Hence, the 400kV transmission 
system often acts as the power transmission corridor, which is subject to significant 
amount of active power transport. 
The reactive power generation and voltage control is mainly provided by large 
CPPs. Besides, two synchronous compensators at 150kV substations close at the 
connection points of HVDC links to Norway and Sweden, with capacity of 160MVA 
and 100MVA respectively are installed mainly for the secure operation of Line 
Commutated Converter (LCC-HVDC). Currently, the voltage regulation is maintained 
by the CPPs, while in the future, some large offshore power plants subjected to the 
new grid code will play part of the role in keeping voltage security and maintaining 
the power system stability. 
Another factor is the set-up and development of Nordic electricity market. 
Currently, the Nordic electricity market consists of three markets for operation: (1) the 
physical day-ahead (Elspot) trade; (2) the hour-ahead (Elbas) trade and (3) the real-
time market. Striving for competition among all generation companies and 
consumption companies provides another control mechanism to balance the power 
supply and demand [12]. 
3.1.2 Integration of Dispersed Generation 
Another major characteristic of Danish power system is the integration of large 
amount of Dispersed Generation (DG). Various types of renewable energy (RE) are 
being integrated into distribution systems, because the decentralized characteristics of 
these nature resources. Currently more than 40% of today’s installed capacity is from 
DG units, which are mostly connected to grid at the distribution level. Fig 3.3 
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showcases the evolvement of the Danish power system in the last 20 years, which has 
been developed from a conventional power system mainly based on centralized 
generation to a modernized power system with a large number of DG units [13]. 
Various types of DG are connected and expected to be connected to western Danish 
power system, some examples are: 
 Onshore wind turbines, ranging from 11kW to 2MW; 
 Gas-turbine CHP units, ranging from 7kW to 99MW; 
 Steam-turbine CHP units, ranging from 2MW to 19MW; 
 Coal-fired units, ranging from 18MW to 44MW; 
 Waste-fired units, ranging from 90kW to 26MW; 
 Future vehicle-to-grid (V2G) Electrical Vehicle converters. 
 
Fig. 3.3 Comparison of electrical power infrastructure in Danish grid in 1985 and 2009 [13]. 
 
3.2 Challenges of Future Danish Power System 
In February 2011, Danish government announced “Energy Strategy 2050” with the 
aim to be fully independent of fossil fuel by 2050 [14]. Accordingly, several major 
transformations have been experiencing in Danish power system, such as the 
integration of wind energy, the phasing out of central power plants, the reinforcement 
of international connections, as well as the undergrounding of transmission grid. 
3.2.1 Integration of Wind Energy 
Wind energy is being integrated into Danish power system at tremendous pace with 
promising plan to experience 100% fossil fuel free society by 2050. Danish 
government plans to realize a large share of electricity production with wind turbines, 
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especially, offshore wind farms. It can be observed from the geographical map of 
future Danish power system in 2030, shown in Fig. 3.4, several large offshore wind 
farms, e.g. Ringkøbing, Jamerbugten, Læsø Syd, are expected to be integrated to 
transmission system. According to the system plan, offshore wind farms are being 
added consistently to western Danish power system to achieve 3800MW offshore 
wind power in future [7]. The intermittent nature of wind not only increases the 
challenge of power balance in the system, but also threatens power system dynamic 
security, such as lack of inertia and voltage flicker. 
 
Fig. 3.4 Geographical map of future Danish transmission system in 2030 [7]. 
3.2.2 Phasing Out of Central Power Plants 
In order to keep the a reasonable installed capacity in the grid, the number of large 
central power plants (CPPs) which are currently responsible for primary control 
actions as well as reactive power and voltage control actions has to be reduced. 
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According to the system plan issued by Danish TSO, i.e. Energinet.dk, the number of 
large synchronous generators will reduce from eight to five in the next few years [7]. 
Currently, Danish transmission system operator (TSO) has declared three must-run 
central power plants (CPPs) in western and eastern Danish power system primarily to 
support ancillary services to ensure secure and stable operation, however in future, 
Danish TSO is planning to reduce these must run power plants even further. Due to 
the fluctuation of wind power and the different dynamic and transient characteristics 
between wind farms and conventional power plants, the operation, control and 
protection of Danish power system with a large amount of wind power need to be 
developed. The security and stability for power system operation should be 
maintained which is expected to be the potential challenges.  
3.2.3 Reinforcement of International Connections 
Currently, western Danish power system is connected to Norway and Sweden 
through classical LCC based HVDC links. A new voltage sources converter (VSC) 
based HVDC link of 700MW capacity to Norway is under construction and is 
expected to be commissioned soon. Albeit, VSC-HVDC interconnections could be 
used for dynamic support from technical point of view, however, due to current 
market regulations, these VSC-HVDC interconnections are not providing dynamic 
support to western Danish power grid. Besides, these regulations of Nordic market do 
not allow the change of power flow direction within each transaction hour, though 
reduction in power flow in predetermined direction is allowed on quarter hourly basis 
[15]. Another HVDC link—Cobra, interconnecting Denmark and Holland, with 
planned capacity of 600MW~700MW, are expected to be commissioned in 2018, 
which will help to balance the wind patterns and contribute to the integration of 
environmentally-friendly wind power into power systems for both countries. Besides, 
the cross border AC transmission lines to Germany has already been strengthened to 
(Export) 1780/ (Import) -1500MW. 
3.2.4 Under-grounding of Transmission Grid 
An adequate and robust electricity transmission grid is a precondition for realizing 
the objectives on the fully renewable energy dependent future power system. As a 
result, Danish government issued a plan in 2008 that they will completely change 
Danish electrical power transmission system [16]. It was decided that the entire grid 
with voltage below or equal to 150kV has to be under-grounded. All the existing 
overhead lines (OHL) are planed to be substituted by underground cables (UGC). 
Besides, all new 400kV connections are built by under-grounded cables [17]. The 
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transformation of under-grounding the power grid is expected to bring challenges to 
power system operation, control and protection [18], [19]. 
 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter describes the transmission power system in Denmark, which is the 
studied system throughout the thesis. Both the characteristics of current Danish power 
system and the challenges of future Danish power system are discussed. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Structural Vulnerability Assessment 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The networks of power systems, often called power grids, have been regarded as 
one of the most important infrastructures whose security should be paid more and 
more concern. However, in recent years, several large blackouts occurred in US and 
EU, which have resulted in direct loss up to billions of dollars [1]-[3]. These 
blackouts expose the potential problems of current analysis methods for power 
systems. So far, most work of power system analysis has focused on only one aspect 
of such blackouts, such as voltage stability analysis, transient stability analysis and 
frequency stability analysis. Although, these approaches have made impressive 
advances in the understanding of each aspect, it does not provide a framework for 
understanding the overall phenomena. Therefore, it is reasonable to go beyond these 
traditional deterministic bottom-up descriptions, instead to be in favor of statistical 
top-down approaches. The structural vulnerability is defined as the ability of a 
network continuing to provide key services during random failures or intentional 
attacks. Further technology, i.e. complex network theory, provides a feasible way to 
study the structural vulnerability of power grids, which has drawn the link between 
the topological structure and the vulnerability of networks in the statistical point of 
view [4]. 
The first systematic study about complex network theory appeared in late 1990s, 
aiming at studying the properties of large networks that behave as complex systems 
[5]-[8]. Complex network theory has received considerable attention recently since 
the investigation of the small-world networks [5] and the scale-free networks [7], as 
their characteristics have been discovered in many real networks including the power 
grids. Recently, with the considerable progress of its applications in many other fields, 
complex network theory also attracts more and more interest in assessing the 
structural vulnerability of power grids [9]-[14]. For example, the concept of global 
efficiency was widely used to assess the vulnerability or locate critical components 
for networked infrastructures [16]-[18]. Furthermore, the cascading failure model was 
also directly applied to power grids analysis [19]-[21]. These above studies have been 
providing a new direction for the analysis of power grids. 
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Although the complex network theory has made so much progress, few researchers 
have used it to explore the impact of large-scale dispersed generation (DG) to 
transmission system [22]. In case of Danish power system, a significant proportion of 
today’s installed capacity is dispersed generation (about 40% of total capacity), such 
as wind turbines and combined heat and power (CHP) units, which are mostly 
connected to the distribution system, as shown in Fig. 4.1 [23]. In the future, more and 
more onshore wind farms are expected to be connected to the distribution system with 
voltage below 100kV, i.e. 60/20/10/0.4kV. Compared with conventional power grid 
which is only supplied by centralized power plant (CPP), DG units mainly supply part 
of the local load, while contributing much less to remote loads. 
In Section 4.2, some principles of complex network theory are introduced and three 
vulnerability indices i.e. SVI, CVI and OVI are proposed to assess the structural 
vulnerability of power grids and to explore the impact of DG units on power grids. 
The result of structural vulnerability of western Danish power grid is presented in 
terms of aforementioned indices are presented in Section 4.3, followed by concluding 
comments in Section 4.4. 
 
Fig. 4.1. Production capacities at each voltage level in western Danish power system [23]. 
 
4.2 Vulnerability Assessment Indices 
4.2.1 Complex Network Theory 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, complex network theory has gained wide acceptance 
and has been successfully applied in the analysis of power systems. In the complex 
network theory, each bus of the power system which is connected with a power source 
or a power sink, can be modeled as a vertex (or node), and each transmission line and 
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transformer can be modeled as an edge (or line). Power flow is transmitted between 
the terminal buses of the edges in the forward or the reverse directions [24]. 
Therefore, the power grid can be abstracted as a directed and weighted graph, as 
expressed in (4.1), 
{ }=Y B,L, W     (4.1) 
where B (dim{B}=NB) is the set of vertices (or nodes) and L (dim{L}=NL) is the set 
of edges (or lines) with an associated set of weight W. Each vertex Bi is identified by i, 
and each edge Lij represents a connection going from vertex i to vertex j with 
associated weight wij [25]. 
Efficiency Index (EI), as defined in (4.2), has been widely applied to evaluate the 
transmission efficiency of a power grid [26]. 
,
1 1
g li jg l ij
EI
n n d∈ ∈
= 
V V
     (4.2) 
where ng and nl represent the number of the generator and the number of load 
respectively, Vg and Vl are the set of generators and the set of loads respectively, the 
geodesic distance dij (i∈Vg, j∈Vl) represents the least number of transmission lines or 
transformers in the shortest transmission path between a specific generator Gi and a 
specific load Lj. The statistical distribution of geodesic distance is usually adopted to 
measure the connectivity of a network. The lower number of dij means the lower 
distance or closer connectivity between sources and loads, which implies the higher 
efficiency of the power grid. 
4.2.2 Equivalent Impedance between Generation and Load 
In the fundamental theory of circuitry, Node-Current Equation is used to compute 
the voltage of the nodes and the current of branches in a network, as defined in (4.3). 
=ZI V      (4.3) 
where Z is the node impedance matrix, which can be written in the extended form as 
given in (4.4). 
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Equivalent impedance Zeqij between generation bus i and load bus j can represent 








Fig. 4.2  Equivalent impedance in the equivalent electrical circuit. 
Assuming a unit current is injected into bus i and withdrawn from bus j, while no 
other current is injected or withdrawn at other buses, as expressed in (4.5) and (4.6). 
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So equivalent impedance Zeqij can be calculated by the equation in (4.7), 
/1 ( ) ( ) 2ijeq ij i j ii ij ij jj ii ij jjZ V V V z z z z z z z= = − = − − − = − +   (4.7) 
where zij is the ith, jth element in the impedance matrix. 
4.2.3 Structural Vulnerability Index (SVI) 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, Efficiency Index (EI) in (4.2) adopts geodesic 
distance dij assuming that the electric power is only transmitted through the path with 
the least number of transmission elements, so dij does not represent any electrical 
characteristic of power grids. However, this assumption may be far away from the 
reality in power systems, in which the power flow from a specific generation at bus i 
to a specific load at bus j is distributed over all transmission lines or transformers as 
determined by the topology and the electrical performance of power grids. 
Besides, the capacity of generator and the load in (4.2) are not considered, which 
should act as the weight of the transmission relationship between generation i and 
load j.  
From the structural vulnerability point of view, the main factors of the power 
system vulnerability should be based on the inherent characteristics, such as the 
topological relationship, the impedance of transmission lines and transformers as well 
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as the capacity of generators and loads. The variation of power system operating 
conditions has little effect on the structural characteristics of power systems. Hence, 
this chapter proposes a novel structural vulnerability index (SVI) to evaluate the 
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where Pgi is the capacity of generation at node i, Plj is the maximum load at node j, 
and Zijeq is the electric distance (equivalent impedance) between node i and node j. 
Furthermore, compared with conventional power systems, the power system 
integrated with large amount of DG has relatively more generation capacity at the low 
voltage level. The DG units mainly supply the local load demand, contributing much 
less for remote loads. This characteristic has been taken in to account for SVI in (4.8), 
where Pgi/exp(Zeqij) approximately represents the transmission efficiency between 
generation bus i and load bus j, with generation capacity Pgi serving as the weighting 
factor. The transmission efficiency from the generation bus i to the load bus j is 
expressed as exponentially decrease with the increase of the equivalent impedance 
between them (Zeqij). In the case that DG unit and load are connected to the same node 
at the transmission level, Zeqij = 0 and 1/exp(Zeqij) =1, which means that DG has the 
highest priority to satisfy the local load demand. 
So SVI in (4.8) is more effective and more accurate than EI in (4.2) for evaluating 
transmission efficiency of power systems before and after integrated with DG units. 
The higher SVI means the higher the transmission efficiency. The evaluation of 
efficiency was widely adopted as an index to assess the structural vulnerability and to 
locate critical components of networked infrastructures. 
4.2.4 Contingency Vulnerability Index (CVI) 
Contingencies in the power system are most possibly faults followed by trips of 
transmission lines or transformers by protection devices. When contingencies take 
place in the power grid, the tripping of transmission lines or transformers possibly 
results in the severe deterioration in the transmission performance. The reason is that 
the deletion of the components increase the electrical distance between sources and 
loads. So, it is likely that SVI will be lower after the removal of transmission lines or 
transformers. 
Contingency Vulnerability Index (CVI) is used to evaluate the level of severity of a 
contingency as defined by (4.9), which is the reduction percentage of SVI related to 
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the network structure variation. Further, the decrease in the percentage of SVI in N-1 









= ×     (4.9) 
The higher CVI represents the contingency is more critical or the power system is 
more vulnerable after removal of this component. Therefore, operators from TSO 
should pay more attention on the contingencies in these identified transmission lines 
or transformers. 
4.2.5 Operational Vulnerability Index (OVI) 
Previous indices mainly focus on the structural characteristics of power grid, so the 
operating conditions (power flow) in the power grid are not considered, while 
Operational Vulnerability Index (OVI) is a proposed index based on operating 
conditions to evaluate the impact of DG integration on the operational vulnerability of 
power systems, as defined in (4.10). One of the significant impacts of DG integration 
on power grid is that it helps to reduce the long-distance large-capacity power 








     (4.10) 
In (4.10), pl represents the active power in the transmission line or transformers l, and 
the impedance zl is the weight of line l. The less value of OVI implies the less amount 
of the long-distance large-capacity transmission for active power and high 
transmission efficiency in the network. 
 
4.3 Structural Vulnerability Assessment of Danish Power System 
A 93-bus network that representing western Danish power system integrated with 
large amount of DG units is used to evaluate the effect of the DG integration to power 
system vulnerability, as shown in Fig. 4.3. The network has 124 components (edges) 
composed of 112 lines and 12 transformers. Almost every node in the distribution 
system underneath the transmission level is integrated with DG units, such as onshore 
wind farms, CHP plants, etc. Besides, 12 CPPs are connected to the transmission 
system. The test system is simulated by DIgSILENT/PowerFactory, in which the 
balanced positive sequence AC load flow is calculated by adjusting the power outputs 




Fig. 4.3.  Test power system. 
4.3.1 Vulnerability Assessment Considering Network Structure 
In order to evaluate the impact of DG penetration on the structural vulnerability of 
power systems, the share of DG output is gradually increased to replace the 
generation from CPPs. The load consumption in every load bus is the maximum load, 
remaining invariant before and after DG integration. 
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As shown in Fig. 4.4, with the increase of DG penetration level from 0% to 100%, 
the SVI linearly increases from 0.006 to 0.021, which means that the transmission 
efficiency improves with the increase of DG penetration level. 
 
Fig. 4.4. SVI with respect to DG penetration level. 
4.3.2 Vulnerability Assessment Considering Contingencies 
In order to evaluate the impact of DG on the ability of power system to resists the 
N-1 contingency, SVI is calculated before and after the removal of one component 
(transmission line or transformer). As shown in Fig. 4.5, the x-axis shows the 
reference number of components corresponding to every transformer and line in 
accordance with Fig. 4.3. It is obvious that SVI integrated with 100% DG is much 
higher than that without DG before and after N-1 contingency. Besides, the decrease 
of SVI after N-1 contingency with DG is generally lower than that of the case without 
DG integration, which indicates the power grid is stronger with DG integration 
regarding N-1 contingency than that without DG. This result also testifies that the 





Fig. 4.5.  SVI before and after N-1 contingencies. 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.4, CVI is adopted to evaluate the severity of N-1 
contingency. From another point of view, CVI helps to identify the vulnerable 
components of a power grid. As shown in Fig. 4.6, without DG integration, Line 71-
72, Line 42-50 and Line 16-11 are the 3 most vulnerable components in the power 
grid, which have been marked in the test power system in Fig. 4.3. The blue line in 
Fig. 4.6 shows that the severity of the contingencies in these 3 lines is evidently 
reduced because of DG integration, which means that the power system is more 
resistant to contingencies with DG integration. 
 
Fig. 4.6.  CVI with and without DG integration. 
Fig. 4.7 shows the descending order of CVI in accordance with Fig. 4.6. It is 
important to note here that, with DG integration, most of components have much 
lower CVI, but some components have higher CVI, which means the power grid is 
more vulnerable after contingency takes place at only a few points after DG 
52 
 
integration. The maximum values and mean values of CVI with and without DG 
integration are shown in Table 4.1. 
Rank of Components













Fig. 4.7  Descending sort of CVI. 
TABLE 4.1 STATISTICAL DATA OF CVI  
DG Integration level Maximum CVI Average of CVI 
0% DG Integration 19.71% 2.49% 
100% DG Integration 1.72% 0.38% 
 
Fig. 4.8 shows the descending order of CVI for the N-1 contingencies in 10 most 
critical components. It can be seen that, with DG integration, the vulnerable 
conponents in the power grid have been changed. 
 




4.3.3 Vulnerability Assessment Considering Power Grid Operation 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.5, one of the most significant impacts of DG 
integration on power grid operation is to reduce the long-distance large-capacity 
power transmission. OVI is another proposed index to evaluate the power 
transmission efficiency, meaning that the weighted average value of active power in 
all the lines and transformers with their impedance as weighting factors. The lower 
OVI implies that the less transmission distance of active power, lower power loss and 
higher efficiency of the network. In order to evaluate the impact of DG integration to 
power flow pattern, the overall load is invariant, and generation output from CPP is 
substituted by the increase of the DG penetration level. Fig. 4.9 shows the value of 
OVI with respect to different DG penetration levels. With the increase penetration 
level of DG from 0% to 100%, the OVI decreases from 126.66MW to 41.17MW. 
 
Fig. 4.9  OVI with respect to DG penetration level. 
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter proposed three vulnerability indices, i.e. structural vulnerability index 
(SVI), contingency vulnerability index (CVI) and operational vulnerability index 
(OVI). SVI is the index to evaluate the topological vulnerability of the whole power 
grid structure. CVI is the index to identify the vulnerable components in a power grid. 
OVI is the index related to the operating conditions of a power system which is based 
on power flow pattern. 
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In conclusion, DG units are able to improve the reliability of the power system, 
shorten the electrical distance between the sources and loads, alleviate the long-
distance large-capacity transmission, and increase the efficiency. 
The structural vulnerability assessment based on complex network theory is also 
able to provide a reference to optimize the network topology, and to guide the future 
planning of DG integration. Besides, in the case of power system emergency 
conditions, these vulnerability indices based on structural characteristics are able to 
help in preventing cascading failures and blackouts. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the recent years, the electrical generation from wind has received extensive 
attention and has been developing rapidly worldwide, due to the exhaustion of fossil 
fuel sources and the policy of greenhouse gas mitigation from power generation. 
However, many issues are raised when power system is integrated with large amount 
of wind power, in terms of power system operation, control and protection, etc. The 
issue of transient stability is becoming more and more important, since the wind 
power penetration is increasing rapidly, but the financial and regulatory conditions 
have forced electric utility to build power systems with less redundancy and operate 
them closer to security limits [1]. Hence, there are more and more challenges in the 
control and protection to maintain the security and stability of power system with 
large wind power penetration. 
Transient stability of a power system is the ability to maintain synchronous 
operation when power system is subjected to a large severe disturbance, such as a 3-
phase short circuit at the bus of an important generation plant, the loss of an important 
tie-line, or the loss of an important load, etc. [2], [3]. Typically, the time span to 
evaluate transient stability is short, within 10s. Critical clearing time (CCT) is widely 
used as an important index of transient stability which is defined as the maximum 
duration that a disturbance may sustain without losing the power system’s capability 
of recovering to a normal operating condition [2]. 
A considerable number of studies have been conducted on the impact of wind 
generation on power system transient stability. In [4], the author compared the effect 
of variable speed wind generator and that of conventional synchronous generator to 
voltage and transient stability and concluded that the modern wind power plants 
equipped with power electronic devices and low voltage ride through (LVRT) ability 
do not reduce the stability margin. In [5], the author analyzed transient and dynamic 
stability in a simple 3-machine network and concluded that the fixed speed induction 
generator (FSIG) based wind farms contributed to the system damping significantly 
but are vulnerable to network faults due to voltage stability issue. Doubly fed 
induction generator (DFIG) based wind farms can provide a superior transient 
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performance in terms of voltage recovery ability following the fault. In [6], [7], 
specific scenarios have been examined in eastern Danish power system, but they only 
considered the traditional FSIG-based wind generators. 
In this chapter, the detailed models of onshore and offshore wind farms are 
developed to evaluate the transient stability of western Danish power system. The 
CCT is calculated in terms of iterative time-domain simulation. From the results of 
CCT in different scenarios, the impacts of wind power and other influencing factors 
on power system transient stability are analyzed. 
In Section 5.2, detailed unit-specific models of onshore and offshore wind farms in 
DIgSILENT/PowerFactory are described. In Section 5.3, the dynamic vulnerability 
assessment of Danish power system is carried out by screening of CCT for faults in 
different positions, for four typical scenarios, and for different influencing factors. 
Finally, concluding remarks is given in Section 5.4. 
 
5.2 Modeling of Wind Farms 
5.2.1 Type A: Fixed Speed Induction Generators (FSIG) Based Wind Turbines 
Currently, most onshore wind turbines in Danish power system are equipped with 
FSIGs. These FSIGs based wind turbines can not control reactive power, so they are 
magnetized from the electricity grid and equipped with capacitor banks to compensate 
the reactive power. Fig. 5.1(a) and Fig. 5.1(b) show the control diagram of wind 
turbine model based on FSIG, which is represented by asynchronous generator model 
in DIgSILENT. Beside the generator model, wind turbine system contains 
aerodynamic model, shaft model, protection as well as emergency stop.  
The parameters of the wind turbines and FSIGs are selected to match the typical 
onshore wind farms, shown in Table 5.1, while the active and reactive power outputs 
as well as the inertia of each wind farm are different, according to the detailed data of 
installed wind farms in Denmark [8]. 
Generally, power systems with high wind penetration are usually subjected to 
voltage instability issue during and after the fault, because of the high reactive power 
absorption from the grid. Fig. 5.2 shows the model of FSIG. When there is a fault 
disturbance in power grid, the sharp voltage drop at the point of connection (POC) 
results in the imbalance between mechanical torque and electromagnetic torque. FSIG 
accelerates, so the absolute value of slip rate s increases. Meanwhile, the reduction of 
equivalent resistance Rr/s forces FSIG to absorb considerable reactive current passing 
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through the leakage reactance Xr, which exacerbates the voltage decrease. According 
to the Danish recommendation KR-111 before 2004, the protection relay should trip 
the wind farm when the voltage of POC Us is below 0.7pu for more than 0.5sec [9]. 
While for wind turbines commissioned after 2004, the new Danish grid code TF 3.2.6 
started to require the low voltage ride-through (LVRT) capability for a specific 




















































(a) Physical model  
 








TABLE 5.1 TYPICAL DATA OF ONSHORE WIND FARM BASED ON FSIG 
DATA OF FSIG AND WIND TURBINE VALUE 
Stator resistance Rs (pu) 0.00744 
Stator reactance Xs (pu) 0.09266 
Mag. reactance Xm (pu) 4.0252 
Rotor resistance Rr (pu) 0.00667 
Rotor reactance Xr (pu) 0.01168 
Pole pairs 2 
Turbine radius (m) 24 
Rated mechanical power (MW) 0.765 
Gear ratio 67.57 
 
5.2.2 Type C: Doubly-Fed Induction Generator (DFIG) Based Wind Farms 
Horn Rev 1 is the first large scale wind farm in the world. A total number of 80 
Vestas V80-2.0MW units with DFIG, capable of producing 160MW, were installed in 
2002. 
The wind farm has been represented by aggregated model of 80×2MW DFIGs in 
DIgSILENT. Fig. 5.3(a) and Fig 5.3(b) show the control diagram of DFIG wind farm, 
including the models of pitch control, aerodynamic, 2-mass shaft, MPPT control, 
speed control, over-frequency active power reduction control, power control, current 
control and protections (crowbar for over-current in rotor, tripping if over-speed and 

































































































































































































Fig. 5.3 Model of offshore wind farm Horns Rev 1 based on DFIG. 
The wind farm integration complies with the new Danish grid code that wind power 
plant must be able to withstand voltage drop to 20% of the nominal voltage in the 
point of connection (POC) over a period of minimum 0.5sec without disconnection. 
Besides, the wind power plant must have a control function capable of controlling the 
reactive power in Area B, as specified in Fig. 5.4 [11]. 
The large offshore wind farms, such as Horn Rev 1, can be required to support the 
frequency and voltage in the substation of PCC in the transmission system. However, 
during and after voltage dips, the controllability of voltage is limited due to the 
current rating of power converters of the wind turbines. 
 
Fig. 5.4 Requirements of (a) LVRT and (b) reactive power supply for wind power plants 
larger than 1.5MW.  
62 
 
5.2.3 Type D: Variable Speed with Full-Rated Converter (FRC) Based Wind Farms 
Horns Rev 2 is the wind farm with full-rated converter consisting of 91 Siemens 
Wind Power SWP 2.3-93 wind turbines with total generation capacity of 209MW. 
The detailed model of Horns Rev 2 is represented by aggregated model of 
93×2.3MW asynchronous generators and the models of generator side converter and 
grid side converter. The control diagram is shown in Fig. 5.5(a) and Fig 5.5(b), 
containing three main parts: generator model, generator side converter model and grid 
side converter model. The chopper is connected when the DC bus voltage is above 
1.2pu, while the protection and LVRT control module ensure the integration of Horns 
Rev 2 in accordance with current Danish grid code as well. 
The key parameters of offshore wind farms for Horns Rev 1 and Horns Rev 2 are 
shown in Table 5.2 [12]. 
TABLE 5.2 PARAMETERS OF OFFSHORE WIND FARMS IN HORNS REV 1 AND HORNS REV 2 
PARAMETERS OF WIND FARM HORNS REV 1 HORNS REV 2 
Turbine name V80-2.0 MW SWT-2.3-93 
Manufacture Vestas Siemens 
Rated power (MW) 2 2.3 
Number of turbines 80 91 
Total capacity (MW) 160 209.3 
Turbine diameter (m) 80 93 
Cut-in wind speed (m/s) 4 4 
Rated wind speed (m/s) 16 13-14 
Cut-out wind speed (m/s) 25 25 
Power Density(m^2/kW) 2.51 2.95 
Generator type 4 pole DFIG Asynchronous Gen 
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(b) DIgSILENT DSL model  
Fig. 5.5 Model of offshore wind farm Horns Rev 2 based on FRC. 
 
5.3 Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment of Danish Power System 
5.3.1 Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment Based on Critical Clearing Time 
CCT is an important index for transient stability, which is usually calculated by 
repeated time-domain simulations, more specifically, adjusting the fault duration time 
in time-domain simulations to find out the maximum duration of a short circuit that 
can maintain the synchronization of generators in the transmission power system. 
Critical fault screening (CFS) is to create short-circuits in every critical position in 
order to search out the vulnerable areas in terms of CCT. DIgSILENT Programming 
Language (DPL) is used for CFS in western Danish power system. For each 
transmission line, a 3-phase short circuit event is created at both terminals of 
transmission lines, since the most critical disturbance of N-1 contingency is the fault 
close to the buses. A switch event trips the faulted transmission line after the time 
duration of short-circuit. Bisection method is adopted to accelerate the process to find 
out CCT, which repeated searches the midpoint of fault duration between an adjacent 
stable case and unstable case. The accuracy of CCT is 0.001sec. 
The CCT is dependent on many factors, such as generators’ output level, the fault 
location and fault type, voltage and power flows before the disturbance. Therefore, 
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some scales are applied to tune the power production and power consumption to 
create different operating conditions (OCs). The basic OC is defined in Table 5.3, 
where the scales are defined as the percentage of the actual power with respect to their 
capacity. For example, 75% load level means the load consumption in the basic OC is 
75% of the peak value in every load bus; 50% CPP generation means the generation 
output of every CPP in the basic OC is 50% of its capacity; and +75% HVDC to 
Sweden means the HVDC links to Sweden in the basic OC are exporting 75% power 
with respected to the maximum capacity of this HVDC link. The surplus power is 
compensated by power exchange via 400kV and 220 kV OHLs to Germany. 
TABLE 5.3 SCALES OF THE BASIC OPERATING CONDITION (BASED ON POWER SYSTEM MODEL OF 2010) 
SCALE CAPACITY(MW) PERCENTAGE (%) POWER(MW) 
Load level 3664 75 2748 
CPP generation 3147 50 1573.5 
CHP generation 2017 50 1008.5 
Other dispersed generation 326 50 163 
Wind power generation (offshore) 369 80 295.2 
Wind power generation (onshore) 2232 50 1116 
HVDC to Sweden 740 +75(Export) +555 
HVDC to Eastern Denmark 600 +100(Export) +600 
HVDC to Norway 1000 -50(Import) -500 
 
 
Fig. 5.6 Result of critical fault screening in western Danish power grid. 
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Through critical fault screening, CCTs of faults at all the terminals of 400kV 
transmission lines of western Danish power system in the basic OC is calculated out, 
as shown in Fig. 5.6. Four vulnerable areas in terms of transient stability can be 
identified and highlighted by red circles, in which the CCTs are generally below 
700ms. Because these short-circuit locations are close to CPPs or central hub 
substations, the disturbances in these locations are easily to result in the out-of-step of 
the nearest generator. So it is reasonable to select 8 critical short-circuit locations to 
evaluate the impact of power flow pattern on transient stability, highlighted in Fig. 5.6. 
5.3.2 Four Typical Operating Conditions 
Fig. 5.7 shows the hourly wind power generation and total consumption of western 
Danish power system in the 2011 [13]. The jagged red line denotes that the load in 
working days is higher than that in holidays, but wind generation is changing 
irregularly. It can be noted that the wind power generation even exceeded the total 
load consumption in some short-term periods of 2011. 
 
Fig. 5.7 Hourly wind power generation and load of western Danish power system in 2011. 
In order to evaluate the impact of wind generation and load level on transient 
stability, 4 typical OCs are selected, high wind low load (HWLL), high wind high 
load (HWHL), low wind low load (LWLL) and low wind high load (LWHL). 
Wind power generation, load and exchange power with external grid in these 4 
typical OCs are shown as Fig. 5.8, where the percentages have the same respective 
basic values with Table 5.3. CCTs of the 4 typical OCs are calculated for the faults 
located in the 8 most critical positions, as shown in Table 5.4. CCTs are searched in 
the range between 0.1sec and 1.0sec. If the CCT of one contingency is below 0.1sec, 
































(b) High Wind High Load (HWHL) (9AM, Dec. 13th, 2011) 
 
 









(d) Low Wind High Load (HWHL) (8AM, Mar. 1st, 2011) 




Fig. 5.9 Critical clearing time of 4 typical operating conditions. 
TABLE 5.4 MOST CRITICAL N-1 CONTINGENCIES IN TERMS OF TRANSIENT STABILITY 










Results of CCTs in these 4 scenarios are shown in Fig. 5.9. One can get the 
conclusions that the most influential factor is the generation level of CPPs, since the 
higher load of CPPs implies the less reserve in these CPPs in emergency condition. 
Besides, if the power system is in low load scenarios, the transient stability is better 
because the loads of CPP are usually lower. Generally, when the wind power 
generation is high, the transient stability is better because wind power generation can 
replace part of power generation from CPPs and unburden the load of CPPs. 
5.3.3 Influencing Factors of Dynamic Security 
As mentioned earlier, the transient stability is highly dependent on the power flow 
pattern before the disturbance, and the power flow pattern can be decided by many 
influencing factors, such as the generation of CPPs, load consumption, wind 
generation as well as the power exchange with external grids. In order to evaluate the 
impact of these main factors on transient stability individually, the following 
configurations are necessary: 
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a) A fundamental scenario should be given, as shown in Table 5.5, where the 
basic values (i.e. capacities) of these percentages are the same with Table 
5.3. Then the main influencing factors are changed individually in order to 
analyze their respective impact. 
b) When considering the impacts of wind power generation and load 
consumption, we should not change the generation output of CPPs and 
power balance is kept by one external grid (i.e. ENTSO-E synchronous grid) 
as a Slack Bus. Since the generation output of CPPs is the most effective 
impact, the generation of CPP should be kept invariant while evaluating the 
respective impact of other impacts. 
TABLE 5.5 SCALES OF FUNDAMENTAL OPERATING CONDITION (BASED ON 2010 MODEL) 
SCALE CAPACITY(MW) PERCENTAGE (%) POWER(MW) 
Load level 3664 50 1832 
CPP generation 3147 80 2517.6 
CHP generation 2017 50 1008.5 
Other dispersed generation 326 50 163 
Wind power generation (offshore) 369 50 184.5 
Wind power generation (onshore) 2232 50 1116 
HVDC to Sweden 740 0 0 
HVDC to Eastern Denmark 600 0 0 
HVDC to Norway 1000 0 0 
 
The impact of generation output of CPPs on transient stability is shown as Fig. 5.10. 
CCTs of 8 most critical short-circuit events decrease with the increase of generation 
output of CPPs from 30% to 100%. That is because the heavier load of CPPs, the less 
reserve of generators when they are subjected to disturbances. The load of CPP is the 
most dominant impact on transient stability, as CCTs drop evidently from 0.95sec to 
0.1sec. 
 
Fig. 5.10 Critical clearing time w. r. t. the generation of central power plants. 
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The transient stability is also dependent on the load. With the increase of the load 
level in all load of western Denmark, the power import from HVAC connection of the 
ENTSO-E grid increases in order to keep the power balance. When the load varies 
from 30% to 130% (expected peak load in 2030), CCTs increase from minimum 
0.1sec to maximum 0.47sec regularly, as shown in Fig. 5.11. It is because more power 
consumption in the load contributes to the decelerating area of generators. 
 
Fig. 5.11 Critical clearing time w. r. t. the load level. 
 




Since the detailed model of onshore and offshore wind farms have been built, the 
impact of wind power generation on transient stability can be accurately evaluated. As 
shown in Fig. 5.12, when the generation outputs from CPPs are invariant, the increase 
of wind power generation deteriorates the transient stability. It can be concluded that 
the wind power penetration can not exceed 60% when the HVDC with Nordic 
countries are disconnected. 
HVDC links with emergency control usually improves the transient stability. 
Nevertheless, with the same control mechanism, the power exchange before the 
disturbance has different effect, mainly dependent on the fault position in the power 
grid. As shown in Fig. 5.13, when the short circuit points take place in the north part 
of Denmark (i.e. FER_400_NVV, FER_400_TRI and NVV_400_VHA), close to 
connection points of HVDC, the transient stability should be better if these HVDC 
links transfer more power before the disturbance, either import or export. However, 
when the short circuit points take place in the other part of Denmark, the transient 
stability improves with the increase of HVDC power output, from import 60% to 
export 60%, intuitively because the power output or power consumption can 
contribute to the decelerating area of generators [14], [15]. 
 
Fig. 5.13 Critical clearing time w. r. t. the power exchange of HVDC. 
 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter firstly described the modeling of Danish wind farms in DIgSILENT, 
both onshore and offshore wind farms with different types (FSIG, DFIG & FRC). 
Then, critical fault screening is conducted all across western Danish power system to 
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search out the vulnerable areas in terms of transient stability, and 8 most critical N-1 
contingencies are selected as the disturbances for examining the transient stability. 
Furthermore, 4 typical OCs in the year of 2011 are selected to evaluate the impact of 
wind generation level and load on transient stability. Finally, the dynamic security is 
assessed by calculating critical clearing time in a variety of power flow patterns. The 
influencing factors of transient stability are analyzed individually, such as the output 
of central power plants, load level, wind generation level and power exchange in 
HVDC links. 
In conclusion, the transient stability is highly dependent on the power flow pattern 
before the disturbance. The output of CPPs is the most dominant factor of transient 
stability. The higher load of CPPs means the less reserve and worse transient stability. 
Besides, under the same load of CPPs, the less load consumption and the more wind 
generation (especially FSIG-based) are generally harmful to transient stability. The 
impact of the transmission power in HVDC links on transient stability is highly 
dependent on the position of the disturbances. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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DYNAMIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT 







Introduction of Decision Tree Algorithms 
 
6.1 Introduction 
With the development of information and communication techniques (ICT), 
conventional power systems are being modernized with improved efficiency, 
reliability, economy and sustainability of generation and distribution of electricity. 
The huge volume of data in power systems motivates the adoption of data mining 
techniques in the emerging field of power system data analytics. As the mainstream of 
data mining algorithms applied to power systems, decision tree (DT), also named as 
classification and regression tree (CART), has gained increasing interests because of 
its high performance in terms of computation efficiency, uncertainty manageability, 
and interpretability. Currently, power system data are not only being gathered by 
architectural monitoring systems, e.g. WAMS, SCADA/EMS, FNET systems for 
online operation, control and protection, but also by a large number of distributed 
devices, e.g. smart-meters, fault recorders etc. for offline analysis and management. In 
addition, data from simulation, carried out by power system analysts are also playing 
an important role in the planning and operation of power systems. Therefore, modern 
power systems are enriched with huge quantity of online data, historical data, 
simulated data etc., ready for extraction, processing, analysis and exploration. 
Data mining techniques, involving methods of artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, statistics and database management, are computation processes of 
discovering the useful information of data patterns from large data sets. Compared 
with many other data mining techniques, especially those with “white box” nature, 
such as support vector machine (SVM) and artificial neural network (ANN), DT 
algorithms have gained increasing interests because it not only provides the insight 
information of data sets with low computation burden, but also reveals the principles 
for further interpretation. Besides, under the background that there are more and more 
uncertain factors in power systems, DT algorithms are capable of managing these 
uncertainties by statistical methods to increase reliability. 
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In this chapter, the fundamental knowledge of DT algorithms is introduced, 
followed by an overview on a variety of DT applications to power systems for better 
interfacing power systems with data analytics. 
 
6.2 Principles of Decision Trees 
Decision tree is a decision support tool which uses a binary structured tree graph or 
model to reveal the hidden relationship between inputs and outputs, and to predict the 
possible consequences of the output. The data mining algorithm used in DTs is 
classification and regression tree (CART), which was first developed by Breiman et al. 
in the 1980s [1]. It has been widely accepted and applied in many fields, e.g. signal 
processing, financial analysis, chemical constituent identification, medical diagnostics 
etc., and was firstly introduced into the field of power systems by Wehenkel et al. in 
1989 [2]-[5]. 
Fig. 6.1 shows the principle of data mining algorithms applied to power systems. 
Sufficient amount of data are collected from power systems, used as the learning 
database, including input variables as predictors and output variables as targets. Data 
mining engine plays a significant role to find out important patterns that are hidden in 
the learning database followed by the evaluation and interpretation of the created 
model. Thereafter, online data are obtained from the system and used as the input to 
predict the classification or the target values of the output. Finally, actions of control 
















Fig. 6.1 Principle of data mining algorithms applied to power systems. 
As illustrated in Fig. 6.2, given a set of attributes (i.e. A,B,C,…) as input predictors 
of case n, the target value (i.e. Discrete or Continuous) of the case can be predicted by 
dropping the case downward along a path of “if-then” questions from the root node to 
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a terminal node of a DT. The vector of predictors can be composed of both numerical 
variables (e.g. A) and categorical variables (e.g. B). Variables are called numerical 
variables if the predictors are real numbers, while called categorical variables if they 
take values in a finite set (e.g. S) which may not have any natural ordering. The DT is 
classification tree (CT) if the target is a discrete class, while it is regression tree (RT) 
if the target is a continuous value. Only CT is applied in the research of PART III, so 













(b) Regression Tree  
Fig. 6.2 A simple (a) classification tree and (b) regression tree. 
6.2.1 Splitting Rules 
A database composed of a number of cases is necessary for training the DTs. Each 
case in the database consists of a vector of predictors and a target, the predictors 
usually serve as the input attributes, and the target is the output. The cases in the 
database are divided into a learning set (LS) and a test set (TS). The LS is used to 
grow a series of DTs with increasing sizes, while the TS is used to evaluate their 
accuracies to decide the optimal one. As demonstrated by a 2-class problem in a 2-D 
space in Fig. 6.3, the training process of the DT is to iteratively split the dataset into 
two subsets. The fundamental idea to select each splitting rule is such that to make the 
cases in each of the divided subset as pure as possible. 
 
Fig. 6.3 Optimal splitting rules in 2-D space. 
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More generally, for a J class problem in the LS, let Nj be the number of cases of 
class j (j = 1,…, J). In a node t, the total number of cases in LS which xn∈t is denoted 
as N(t), and the number of class j cases in node t is denoted as Nj(t). The proportion of 
class j cases in LS falling into node t is Nj(t)/Nj. Therefore, for a given set of prior 
probabilities π(j) that class j will be presented in the new dataset, the joint probability 
that a case will both be class j and fall into node t can be defined by (6.1). 
( , ) ( ) ( )j jp j t j N t Nπ=     (6.1) 
Hence, the probability that any case falls in to node t is defined by (6.2). 
( ) ( , )jp t p j t=       (6.2) 
According to Bayesian theorem, the conditional probability that a case is class j given 
that it falls into node t is given by (6.3), 
( | ) ( , ) ( )p j t p j t p t=     (6.3) 
which satisfies the equation in (6.4). 
( | ) 1j p j t =      (6.4) 
Many impurity indices are adopted to find optimal splits of a DT, such as the GINI 
index and the Entropy index, as defined in (6.5) and (6.6), 
( ) ( | ) ( | )GINI
i j
I t p i t p j t
≠
=      (6.5) 
( ) ( | ) log ( | )Entropy
j
I t p j t p j t= −    (6.6) 
If a split δ of node t is predicted to send a proportion pL of the data cases to left 
descendant node tL and proportion pR to right descendant node tR, the decrease of 
impurity is defined by ΔI(δ,t), as given in (6.7). The optimal selection of splitting 
rules for each node can be calculated by repeated attempts to maximize the decrease 
of impurity index ΔI(δ, t) which is equivalent to select those splits that minimize the 
overall impurity of the whole tree I(T), as defined in (6.8), in which Tt are terminal 
nodes of the DT. 
[ ]{ }max. ( , ) max. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )L L R RI t I t p t I t p t I t p tδΔ = − −   (6.7) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t tt T t T
I T I t i t p t
∈ ∈
= =       (6.8) 
Initially, the stop-splitting rule was either that the improvement of splitting is below 
a threshold β or the number of cases in the terminal node is less than a given number 
NTt, as defined in (6.9) and (6.10). 




Δ ≤     (6.9) 
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( ) TtN t N≤      (6.10) 
6.2.2 Accuracy Evaluation 
The accuracy of DTs can be evaluated by internal test or external test. Internal test 
means using the TS selected from the same database to evaluate the accuracy, while 
external test is to test the accuracy of the created DT by using the cases of another 
independent dataset. There are 3 methods of internal test to estimate the accuracy of a 
DT. The first, overoptimistic, is the resubstitution estimates, which is computed using 
the same data as LS used to train the DT. The second is the test sample estimates. The 
cases in the database are randomly divided into a LS and TS. The LS is used to train 
the DT, while the TS is used to evaluate the accuracy of the created DT. The third, 
called as cross-validation, is parsimonious with data and preferred for databases with 
small sizes. The case in the database L are randomly divided to V subsets of equal size 
(i.e. L1, L2, …, LV). For every ith iteration (i = 1,2,…,V), L-Li is used as the LS, and Li 
is used as the TS. The accuracy of DT is the average estimates of all V iterations. 
Define the function X(S) to be 1 if the statement S inside the parentheses is true, 
otherwise zero, as defined by (6.11). 
0 statement is true
X( )




 S  
S
 S  
   (6.11) 
The accuracy of DT can be evaluated by resubstitution estimate, test sample 
estimate, and cross-validation estimate, as defined by (6.12) ~ (6.14), respectively. 
( )1
1
( ) ( )N n nnR d X d x jN =









R d X d x j
N ∈
= ≠    (6.13) 
( )( ) ( )
( , )
1





R d X d x j
N ∈
= ≠    (6.14) 
where NTS is the number of cases in the TS, and NV=N/V is the number of cases in LV. 
Among these three estimation methods, the second one, i.e. test sample estimate, is 
the most popular and acceptable one, which is also been adopted in this research. 
Misclassification cost is used to find the optimal DT, which is defined by the 




( ) ( | ) ( )j n n
i j
C d c i j X d x j
N
 = ⋅ ≠ 
   (6.15) 
where N is the number of test cases, c(i|j) is the cost of misclassifying a class j case as 
a class i case. 
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6.2.3 Pruning of Decision Tree to the Right Size 
As mentioned before, the key criterion of a successful DT is the high accuracy, in 
other word, low misclassification rate/cost for the cases in TS. Too large a tree will 
have a high misclassification rate/cost than the right sized one. The reason is that the 
over-fitting of LS is likely to result in the high misclassification rate/cost of the cases 
in the TS. On the other hand, too small a tree will not use some of the classification 
information available in the LS, again resulting in a higher misclassification rate/cost 
than the one with the right size. 
As shown in Fig 6.4, the pruning process of a tree T consists of deleting a branch Tb 
from T, that is, cutting of all Tb except for its root node t. The pruned substree is 
denoted as Tk = Tmax – Tb and maxkT T , where k is the number of nodes in the pruned 
tree. 
 
Fig. 6.4 The process of pruning a DT. 
There are two criteria to select the optimal DT. The first one is to use the accuracy 
estimates to select the optimal sub-stree Topt with the right size for all a series of 
pruned sub-trees by the rule defined in (6.16). 
[ ]1,max
( ) min . ( )tsopt k
k
R T R T
∈
=     (6.16) 
The second one considers statistical error. The standard error estimate for RTS(Tk) is 
denoted by ΔRTS(Tk) calculated by (6.17). 





R T R T
R T
N
 − Δ =    (6.17) 
Two DTs whose misclassification rate is smaller than the standard error estimate of 
either one have almost the same performance, and the optimal DT is selected as the 
smaller sized one within the range of R(Topt)±ΔR
TS(d), defined in (6.18). 
[ ]1,max
( ) min . ( ) ( )ts TSopt k k
k
R T R T R T
∈
 = ± Δ    (6.18) 
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6.2.4 Prior Probabilities 
In some studies, the cases in the dataset are very unbalanced with classes, so prior 
probabilities are a useful set of parameters to assist in constructing a more reliable DT. 
Prior probabilities can be adjusted to effectively control the splitting rules over the 
tradeoff between the class purity and tree accuracy. Combined with (6.1) and (6.2), 
the probability that any case falls in to node t can be defined by (6.19), 
( ) ( ) ( )j jjp t j N t Nπ =       (6.19) 
where πj, Nj, nj (j = 1,…,J) are the prior probabilities, number of cases in LS, and 
number of cases contained in node t for class i. 
From (6.1) and (6.3), the conditional probability that a case is class j given that it 
falls into node t can be given by (6.20), 
( )( | ) ( ) ( ) ( )j jp j t j N t N p tπ=    (6.20) 
so the probabilities pL(t), pR(t) that the cases in node t going to left descendent node tL 
and right descendent node tR are defined as (6.21) and (6.22) respectively. 
( ) /left parentL t tp t p p=      (6.21) 
( ) /right parentR t tp t p p=      (6.22) 
Therefore, by adjusting prior probabilities πj (j = 1,…,J), one can find the 
overlapping region between classes for each split, as shown in yellow region in Fig. 
6.5. Accordingly, the regions in red and blue are identified for different classes, with 
probabilities of exceptions lower than πb and πr, respectively. 
0.5r bπ π= =
b rπ π>>r bπ π>>
 
Fig. 6.5 Thresholds of DTs with respect to prior probability adjustment. 
 
6.3 Applications of Decision Tree to Power Systems 
6.3.1 Security Assessment 
Among the many other applications of DT in power systems, security assessment is 
the most needed and versatile [2]. With the help of DT, the information regarding 
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scenarios of power system (e.g. operating conditions, contingencies, topologies, 
voltage and power etc.) can be expressed by a DT model to assess and predict the 
security of scenarios from a vector of input attributes. 
DT is first introduced by Wehenkel et al. to assess the transient stability of a simple 
electric power system [3]. Later, transient stability assessment by DT methodology is 
carried out for a real power system, i.e. EDF system in France, with enhanced 
reliability for seen and unseen cases [4]. In [5], a new methodology are proposed to 
reduce the probability of missed alarms by adjusting the prior probabilities and 
misclassification costs of unstable cases, and also to reduce the probability of false 
alarms by incremental tree development scheme. To evaluate the overall transient 
stability assessment for a large scale power system, multi-contingency trees are first 
presented in a more compact and easier fashion compared with single-contingency 
trees. 
In [6], DT is first used by Hatziargyriou et al. to assess the security of a median 
island power system (Lemnos Island system in Greece) with high penetration of 
renewable energy, taking the wind speed and solar radiation as candidate attributes. In 
[7], a DT based method of optimal dispatch of primary reserve services considering 
security margins as constraints is tested on Crete Island system in Greece. 
DT is first adopted for online dynamic security assessment (DSA) for a large scale 
power system (Entergy system in USA) in a practical approach considering by Sun et 
al. [8]. This scheme builds and periodically updates DTs offline to decide critical 
attributes as security indicators. Then DTs provide online DSA and operation 
guidelines based on limited number of PMU measurements from WAMS. The 
security of current scenario is voted by a whole path of DTs instead of just by 
terminal nodes to improve the robustness of DTs. In [9], DT was used especially for 
voltage security assessment for AEP system in USA based on the information of the 
past and forecast 24-h ahead operating conditions. Hourly updated DTs by including 
newly predicted system conditions, and multiple optimal DTs, corrective DTs are 
proposed for robustness improvement. In [10], a real-time security assessment tool 
was proposed to evaluate four post-contingency security issues of SRP system in USA, 
i.e. voltage magnitude, thermal limit, voltage security and transient stability issues. 
DT can also be combined with other algorithms for power system security 
assessment, e.g. fuzzy logic [11] and mathematical morphology [12]. In [11], Kamwa 
et al. propose a fuzzy rule-based DT for rapid stability assessment. The voltage and 
rotor angle curves are proceed in both time and frequency domains to extract the area-
wise and system-wise features for DT training. The created DTs can accurately 
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predict the security of Hydro-Quebec system for decision making as early as 1sec or 
2sec after fault clearing. 
6.3.2 Preventive and Corrective Control 
Continuously growing demand for electricity has forced modern power systems to 
operate closer to secure operating limits. Also, the increasing penetration of large 
scale renewable energy may impact power grids by bringing more uncertainties to 
grid operations. DT is a suitable tool to provide emergency control of power system in 
terms of its high efficiency, interpretability and uncertainty manageability. 
In [13], DT is used to determine the reserves of Crete Island system in Greece. 
Then online preventive control is suggested with optimization on the cost of load 
shedding and the cost of spinning reserves. In [14], the application of DT for online 
steady state security assessment of Hellenic system in Greece is presented. DTs 
extract the relevant information regarding to line loading and voltage level and 
express it in terms of controllable values in the system, i.e. generator bus voltage, 
active power generation and transformer taps. Preventive and corrective control 
strategies are suggested with respect to these controllable values. 
In [15], Guang et al. propose ISGA (integral square generator angle) index to judge 
the severity of contingencies for transient stability assessment. DT is trained by a 
large number of time-domain simulations of contingencies to give guidelines of ISGA, 
so as to trigger one-shot event-based corrective controls to stabilize the transient 
events at any time intervals of 1sec after the disturbance. In [16], one-shot response-
based control is developed by Rovnyak et al. in response to the loss of synchronism 
detection. 
In [17] and [18], DTs are used for preventive control (i.e. generation rescheduling) 
and for corrective control (i.e. load shedding) by determining the dynamic security 
regions. Then the preventive control and corrective control are optimized in terms of 
the fuel cost and the amount of load to be shed, respectively. In [19], a new 
methodology that using two DTs in tandem is proposed for Energinet.dk, which 
manages the Danish power system with large scale of renewables and distributed 
generations. One DT about measurable variables is employed for DSA to identify 
potential security issues, and the other DT about controllable variables provides 
online decision support on preventive control strategies against those issues. 
In addition, DT can also be used for controlled islanding [20], [21], load shedding 




Some early explorations use the DTs to trigger the protection in real time, using a 
short window of post-fault curves (rotor angle, speed and acceleration [24] and R-
Rdot relay [25], [26]) in the process to train a DT model, which can predict whether 
system insecurity/instability or even system collapse is going to occur before it really 
happens. Some uncertainty factors in the network composed of fault duration, fault 
location, system operating conditions and network topology are considered to test the 
robustness of the created DTs, but the reliability still can not meet the standard of 
industrial application. In [27], the sensitivity of prediction accuracy is demonstrated 
for online transient stability assessment. It is found that the prediction accuracy is 
increasing when the power system is getting closer to system collapse. 
In [28], a methodology is proposed to reduce the likelihood of hidden failures and 
potential cascading failures by adjusting the security/dependability of adaptive 
protections. Aided by WAMS, the scheme identifies the prevailing system conditions. 
When the system is in “safe” state, a bias of protection settings toward 
“dependability” is desired; when the system is in “stressed” state, the protection 
settings are altered in favor of “security”. 
6.3.4 Forecasting, Estimation and Identification 
DTs usually combine with unsupervised learning techniques to forecast the load 
consumption, to estimate the variables, and to identify the parameters in power 
systems. 
In [29], Figueiredo et al. deals with the load forecast issue of EDP (Portuguese 
Distribution Company). Firstly, unsupervised learning (clustering) is proposed to 
obtain partitions of historical data into a set of consumer classes, then supervised 
learning (DT) is adopted to describe each class by rule-based classifications and 
create a DT model to assign consumer to the existing classes. The objective is to find 
the relevant knowledge about how and when consumers use electricity. 
In [30], DT is used to estimate the line flows and bus voltage following an outage 
event in an efficient manner. The approach has been successfully tested by Taiwan 
system in China. In [31], a methodology is proposed for southern Spanish generation 
company to estimate the daily load patterns and their associated probability of non-
connected unit. DT is used to recognize the load pattern so as to approximately predict 
when its generating units are connected to alleviate the network constraints. 
Regression tree (RT) can also combine with other algorithms. In [32], a new 
method based on a hybrid technology of optimal regression tree and an artificial 
neural network is proposed to discover the rules in short-term load forecasting. RT 
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contributes to the clustering of input data, while ANN is used to predict the 1-step-
ahead load. The conventional CART regards the midpoint of two learning data as a 
split value. Therefore, CART misclassifies the data close to the splitting values. 
Therefore, Mori et al. combines fuzzy logic with RT to predict the short-term load, in 
which two fuzzy membership functions were assigned to express the left and right 
nodes so as to increase the accuracy of prediction [33]. 
6.3.5 Fault Diagnosis 
DT is one of the strong tools in power system fault diagnosis because of its ability 
to process and analyze the time-series signal. In [34], DT is used in fault diagnosis of 
power distribution lines, both discrete attributes (operating states) and continuous 
attributes (voltage and current) are included in the predictors in order to deal with the 
variance of fault resistance and the noise of measurement. 
In [35], a decision tree-based method is proposed to detect High Impedance Fault in 
distribution feeders using attributes of fundamental and harmonic RMS values of 
current and voltage so as to reduce sampling rate of protection relays. 
6.3.6 Extended Algorithms Based on Decision Tree and Software 
DT is built based on a database, either from simulated data or from historical data, 
which is definitely significant for the quality and practicality of the DT model. There 
is a tradeoff between the information content in the database and the computation cost 
of creating a large database, so many new methods are proposed to maximize 
database information content and minimize computation burden. In [36], Lartin super-
cube sampling is first used for efficiently identifying the security boundary region. In 
[37], bisection methods together with importance sampling are used to efficiently 
prepare the hourly database for online DSA. 
As mentioned before, the algorithm of CART has advantages in terms of 
computation efficiency, uncertainty manageability, interpretability, as well as the 
ability to handle missing values [38], but it also has weakness, for instance, piece-
wise sharp decision boundaries, affected by data interaction, missing the effect of 
weak attributes. Therefore, some extended algorithms based on DTs, such as Fuzzy 
DT [39], ANN DT [40], [41] Random Forest [42]-[45], Tree Net [46], [47] etc. are 
invented to strengthen the original CART algorithm. 
There are two categories of software that provides DT based algorithms. The first 
type is commercialized software, e.g. Salford Predictive Modeler [48], SSPS [49], 
Elefant [50], Lush [51]. The other is open-source software, e.g. RapidMiner [52], 
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Shogun [53], Orange [54], Spider [55], Plearn [56], PyML [57], Weka [58] as well as 
MATLAB/Statistic toolbox. 
6.4 Summary 
The chapter highlights the importance of vast amount of already available data 
from power systems and its potential applications. Firstly, it introduces the principle 
knowledge of decision tree algorithm, followed by the latest state-of-the-art of 
decision tree algorithms applied to power systems. Moreover, advantages and 
weakness of decision tree algorithms are discussed. Finally, many choices of software 
to implement DT based algorithms are suggested. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Preventive Control Scheme Based on Decision Trees 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a decision tree (DT) based systematic approach for cooperative 
online power system dynamic security assessment (DSA) and preventive control is 
proposed. This approach adopts a new methodology that trains two contingency 
oriented DTs on daily basis by the databases generated from power system 
simulations. Fed with real-time wide area measurements, one DT about measurable 
variables is employed for online DSA to identify potential security issues and the 
other DT about controllable variables provides online decision support on preventive 
control strategies against those issues. Then, a cost effective algorithm is adopted in 
this proposed approach to optimize the trajectory of preventive control. An 
importance sampling algorithm on database preparation for efficient DT training for 
power systems with high penetration of wind power and distributed generation is also 
proposed in this chapter. 
Nowadays, continuously increase of electricity consumption has driven power 
systems to be operated closer to their secure operating limits. Meanwhile, integration 
of high level of renewable energy to already burdened power system pushes it to 
highly stressed and unpredictable conditions. It becomes more challenging to protect a 
modern power system from insecurity by relying only on localized protection schemes. 
Hence, a power system should be secured proactively at the system level by advanced 
system protection schemes for online situational awareness and proactive wide area 
coordinating control [1]. For instance, an elaborated proactive system protection 
scheme may integrate both online DSA for identification of potentially insecure 
conditions and system-level optimization and execution of control strategies for 
prevention of identified insecure conditions. Phasor measurement units (PMU) can 
provide high resolution real-time power system measurements synchronized by global 
positioning system (GPS). Based on PMUs, wide area measurement systems (WAMS) 
have been built in many countries and would enable the development of 
aforementioned proactive system protection schemes. 
Pattern recognition techniques, such as Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [2], 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [3] and Decision Trees [4]-[17] can be applied in 
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DSA of power systems. Among them, some DT algorithms [18], have gained 
increasing attraction because they not only provide the results of security assessment 
but also reveal the principles learned by DTs for security assessment. Those principles 
provide useful information required for the remedial actions against recognized 
insecure conditions. With the aid of WAMS and advanced computing resources, DTs 
may be integrated into online DSA tools for large interconnected complex power 
systems. For instance, reference [4] applies DTs in an online DSA method by 
adaptively updating the database to train DTs on daily basis for foreseen system 
conditions. In [5], a method for efficient database generation for DT training is 
introduced to enhance DT accuracy in DSA and decrease the computation burden in 
DT training. In [6], multiple optimal DTs are proposed to increase the accuracy for 
the assessment of static voltage security. In addition, DTs can also be used in adaptive 
protection [7], controlled islanding [8], [9], load shedding [10], loss of 
synchronization detection [11], quick restoration schemes [12] and energy markets 
[13]. 
With the increasing penetration of renewable energy resources and other 
decentralized generation, more uncertainties will be brought to the operation of 
transmission systems, since those resources are not as accessible for direct monitoring 
and control from control centers as conventional central power plants [14]. Thus, a 
significantly increased number of scenarios need to be covered by DTs to address 
these uncertainties. However, it also becomes more important to minimize the 
computation burden with DT based online applications for real-time DSA and the 
associate sensitivity analysis [15]. Most of the existing works apply DTs mainly for 
security assessment, whose predictors to be measured in real time are the system 
variables that are most effective in detecting security problems, e.g. line flows and 
angle differences. However, the DTs focusing on decision support for preventive 
control may employ a different set of variables as predictors that can directly be 
controlled, e.g. generation outputs. Thus it is advisable to build two DTs respectively 
for DSA and preventive control based on two sets of predictors selected separately. 
The DT-based approach proposed in this chapter aims at addressing the 
aforementioned problems. First, it studies the database preparation for training 
accurate DTs for power systems with high penetration of wind generation and other 
DG. Without losing generality, this research focuses on a power system supported by 
three types of generation: traditional central power plant (CPP) generation, wind 
power generation and other DG mainly from combined heat and power plants (CHP). 
An importance sampling technique, considering the random distribution of various 
generation resources, is developed and applied in the proposed approach to enhance 
the information contained in the databases for DT training. Second, the approach is 
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designed to be a systematic integration of cooperative online DSA and preventive 
control. The approach adopts a new methodology that offline trains two contingency 
oriented DTs by databases generated from power system simulations. Fed with real-
time wide-area measurements, one DT is employed for online DSA to identify 
potential security issues and the other DT provides system operators with the online 
decision support on allowed preventive control strategy to guide the operating point 
from a potentially insecure state to a secure state. Then the optimal control trajectory 
is searched out by minimizing the total economic cost incurred by generation 
rescheduling. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents the flowchart 
and stages of the proposed approach. In Section 7.3, database preparation with due 
considerations to power systems with high penetration of wind power generation and 
other DG is described. An importance sampling technique is adopted and presented in 
the approach. Section 7.4 describes in detail the cooperative application of proposed 
two types of DTs to predict and prevent the potential insecure issues with the least 
economic cost implication. Section 7.5 gives the concluding remarks of this approach. 
The performance of this approach will be demonstrated by the operational model of 
western Danish power system in Chapter 9. 
 
7.2 Flowchart of Systematic Approach 
The flowchart of the proposed DT-based systematic approach is shown in Fig. 7.1. 
The proposed approach is executed in the following four stages: 
7.2.1 Stage I: Identification of the Security Boundary 
Since wind forecasts are not highly accurate and DG is unpredictable, the power 
flow pattern in a next period is highly uncertain. However, a security boundary 
separating secure operating conditions (OCs) from insecure ones at each load level 
can be estimated and presented in multiple-dimensional space with coordinates of 
aforementioned stochastic variables, such as CPP generation, CHP generation and 
wind power generation. 
7.2.2 Stage II: Importance Sampling 
Considering the intermittency of wind power generation in wind farms and the 
variation of power generation in CPPs, importance sampling is used to bias a number 




7.2.3 Stage III: Offline Time-Domain Simulation and DT Training 
A large number of T-D simulations for each “N-1” contingencies and selected “N-
k” contingencies are carried out to form a database, from which a series of operating 
guidelines are obtained by DTs. 
7.2.4 Stage IV: Online Optimal Preventive Control 
If online measurements violate pre-formulated guidelines, available preventive 
control schemes can be concluded from DTs and the optimal control trajectory can be 
provided to system operators. 
 
Fig. 7.1 Flowchart of DT-based DSA and preventive control approach. 
 
7.3 Database Preparation Based on Importance Sampling 
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For a two-class classification problem (Secure or Insecure), the concept of entropy, 
commonly accepted in the information theory, is used here to evaluate the information 
content in the database [19], as defined in (7.1). 
2 2( ) log logS S I IEntropy p p p p= − −S    (7.1) 
where S is the training database, pS, pI are the proportions of S classified as secure 
and insecure respectively. Therefore, a general prediction of security boundary is 
required and good representation of sampling OCs on both sides of the boundary is 
desirable. 
Bisection method is adopted to approximately identify a region that contains the 
security boundary. Thus, only OCs adjacent to that region are simulated so as to 
significantly decrease the number of simulations. As illustrated in Fig. 7.2, the 
security boundary region is searched out by repeatedly bisecting the slot over 
Predictor Variable 2. In each iteration, the slot is selected in such a way that one end 
of the selected slot falls in secure region and the other end in insecure region and the 
repeated process should eventually converge at the security boundary. Then a security 
boundary is created by polynomial curve fitting of those points located between a 
secure case and an insecure case. 
 
(a) Bisection method                              (b) Curve fitting of security boundary 
Fig. 7.2 Prediction of the security boundary. 
Through this approach, the security boundary is traced in a multi-dimensional space 
of involved influencing factors. For example, CPPs which have relatively more 
flexible controllability can be used to compensate the uncertainties of wind power 
generation and other DG. During the search of security boundary in the space of CPP 
generation, wind generation and DG generation, other fixed important factors such as 
load and international power exchange should be maintained at their scheduled values. 
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However, it is important to mention that consideration of all possible generation 
uncertainties would result in a huge database. Given that the security boundary lies in 
the rare probability region, a database containing the sampling OCs within this rare 
probability region conveys more information, as the cases closer to the security 
boundary affect the process of making splitting rules much more than the cases away 
from the security boundary. So importance sampling is adopted to select the cases 
containing more information by revising the sampling distribution function f(d) 
towards the security boundary, so as to reduce the computation cost. 
The Gaussian distribution N(0,σ2) with probability function f(d) is adopted to 
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where d is the 2-norm distance from the sampled OC point x to the security boundary 
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As shown in Fig. 7.3, the sampling OCs in the space of involved factors subject to 
Gaussian distribution. The cases close to the security boundary have higher 
probability to be selected for database than that away from the boundary. So a number 
of OCs are selected and biased to the interested region adjacent to the security 
boundary. The parameter σ, the standard deviation of the samplings, controls the 
degree of convergence to the security boundary. 
 
(a) 2-norm distance to the boundary                     (b) Probability density function 
Fig. 7.3 Probability function of sampling OCs. 
As illustrated in Fig. 7.4, on a comparison between two sampling methods, the 
number of cases given by importance sampling is significantly reduced but they still 
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contain the critical information to differentiate insecure cases from secure ones, 
assuming that the splitting of databases created by normal sampling (NS) and that 
created by importance sampling (IS) have the same boundary, i.e. the equally accurate 
results. However, the DT with IS usually suggests a lower value of accuracy due to 
two main reasons: i), a number of secure and insecure cases by IS overlap each other 
in the interested region, which makes clear splits more difficult; ii), a large number of 
apparent secure or insecure cases from NS outside the interested region, have minor 
effect on the final splits but are counted in the denominator of the accuracy ratio. A 


































(a) Normal sampling                              (b) Importance sampling 
Fig. 7.4 Selection of operating conditions. 
 
7.4 Preventive Control Scheme 
When a power system at a given OC is detected to be vulnerable to a specific 
credible contingency, the operators are supposed to take preventive actions to ensure 
its security in post contingency condition. Generation rescheduling which involves 
shifting generation among centralized generators so as to restore the system from 
insecure state to secure state is usually adopted by operators. 
For each OC among NOC initially obtained OCs from importance sampling, detailed 
T-D simulations for all the critical contingencies are executed. Specific security 
criteria such as transient instability, transient voltage dip, insufficient damping on T-D 
simulation results are examined to determine the security classification for each case. 
In this research, two DTs are trained for each contingency. One is for observation of 
insecure condition called as the observation DT (ODT) and the other is for prevention 
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of insecure conditions called as prevention DT (PDT). The security boundary in the 
space of measurements is specified by the ODTs, while the PDTs provide the 
direction of generation shift when the system is identified as an insecure state. 
7.4.1 Observation Decision Tree (ODT) 
In a database of NOC cases, each case includes a vector of measurements to present 
an OC before the disturbance which serves as predictors and the results of T-D 
simulations after the disturbance (Secure or Insecure) which serve as the target for 
aforementioned predictors. For each OC, synchronized data from PMU measurements, 
including voltage, current and power are able to provide accurate predictor values. In 
addition, predictors also can be selected from SCADA system, if the values do not 
change frequently. 
ODT is used to detect the current security state by providing accurate thresholds of 
security boundary and calculating out the security margins of current OC. Since the 
ODT is trained from all measurable values as predictors, the data mining algorithm is 
able to seek out the accurate boundary in the space of dominant observable values. In 
other words, ODT is the subspace of the most dominant measurements before the 
disturbance that is able to accurately predict the post-disturbance security condition. 
7.4.2 Prevention Decision Tree (PDT) 
 
Fig. 7.5 Systematic approach for DSA and preventive control scheme. 
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PDT is the decision tree which selects only the controllable variables as predictors 
from measurements, e.g. outputs of generators, power exchange across HVDC links. 
Although PDT has lower accuracy than ODT due to the fewer number of predicting 
values, it is capable of searching out the most effective controllable variables among 
all the measurable control parameters and providing the potential direction of control 
to draw the system back to a secure state. 
As shown in Fig. 7.5, this systematic approach offline trains two paralleled DTs for 
each critical contingency based on 24-hour horizon system prediction data, such as 
load forecast, weather forecast, unit commitment-based generation plan, network 
topology as well as the unavailability of system elements due to scheduled 
maintenance, etc.. Fed with online measurements, ODT is employed for online DSA 
to identify the margins of predictors against their thresholds determined from DT 
training. If any online measurements of predictors violate the thresholds, ODT would 
provide situational awareness on insecurity if that contingency really happens. At the 
same time, PDT would provide system operators with preventive control schemes to 
drive the state to a new OC without insecurity under that contingency. Therefore, the 
parallel and cooperative utilization of PDT and ODT in the control schemes provides 
both the situational awareness and the preventive control against critical contingencies. 
7.4.3 Control Strategy Based on ODT and PDT 
As illustrated in Fig. 7.6, two 2-dimensional (2-D) nomograms in Fig. 7.6 (c) and in 
Fig. 7.6(d) are adopted to represent the secure operating regions determined by ODT 
in Fig. 7.6(a) and the PDT in Fig 7.6(b) from the predictors and their thresholds, 
respectively. The percentages in both DTs are given as an example, in which the 
percentages of accuracy in the ODT are normally higher than that in PDT. When the 
current OC “O” is in the insecure region shown in Fig. 7.6(c), the direction of 
preventive control can be easily found in Fig. 7.6(d), i.e. to reduce generation in CPP2. 
Moreover, the variation in generators’ outputs will definitely lead to the variation of 
the power flows in transmission lines, so the trajectory in PDT nomogram has its 
corresponding projection in ODT nomogram, for example the dashed lines in both Fig. 
7.6(c) and Fig. 7.6(d). 
Additionally, many constraints on OCs should still apply. For example, in order to 
maintain the international power exchange invariant, the sum of generation from 
involved CPP, CHP generation and wind power generation minus network loss and 
total load consumption must maintain as their scheduled value, as defined by (7.4). 
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where n, p and m are the total number of involved CPP generators, CHP generators 
and wind power plants respectively. Gr, Dr, Wr, Gs, Ds and Ws are real-time values 
and scheduled values of CPP generation, CHP generation and wind power generation 
in each generation unit respectively. 
 










(c) 2-D nomogram of ODT                      (d) 2-D nomogram of PDT 
Fig. 7.6 Illustrations of observation DT and prevention DT. 
Thus, the process-cum-direction of preventive control can be represented by the 
trajectory shown in Fig. 7.6(d) by the solid line in PDT nomogram. “O” and “O’ ” are 
the original insecure OC. “A” and “A’ ”represent the OC on the threshold of PDT, 
while “B” and “B’ ” represent the OC on the threshold of ODT. The thresholds in 
ODT are more accurate than the thresholds in PDT, so the regions below “B” and 
“B’ ” can be deemed as secure regions. 
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The block diagram shown in Fig. 7.7 describes more clearly the detailed procedure 
of how ODT and PDT work in tandem to implement online DSA and preventive 
control scheme. 
 
Fig. 7.7  Block diagram of cooperative scheme with ODT and PDT. 
7.4.4 Prior Probability Adjustment for Higher Reliability 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, prior probability is used to adjust the control guidelines 
over the tradeoff between dependability and security. By adjusting the ratio of prior 
probabilities of secure cases πs and insecure cases πi from 0.5/0.5 to 0.99/0.01, one 
can find the security boundary in 2-D ODT nomogram with higher security. 
Conversely, by adjusting the ratio πs/πi from 0.5/0.5 to 0.01/0.99, the security 
boundary with higher dependability can be found in 2-D ODT nomogram. The patch 
between these two boundaries is the fuzzy region, shown in yellow in Fig. 7.6(c). The 
regions below “C” and “C’ ” stand for the regions with high security in which the 
probability of exception (i.e. insecure case) is below 0.01. 
Therefore, by monitoring the OC in ODT nomogram, the operators are informed of 
the exact amount of generation rescheduling that should be adopted. 
7.4.5 Optimization of Preventive Control 
As mentioned earlier, PDT and ODT are able to provide operators with the allowed 
range of generation rescheduling. Then the optimal control trajectory is searched out 
by minimizing the total economic cost due to generation rescheduling, as f(x,λ,μ) 
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defined in (7.5). A security constrained optimal power flow (OPF) problem can be 
defined as 
min. ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )f x c x p xλ μ λ μ= +    (7.5) 
st. ( , , ) 0g x λ μ =   and ( , , ) 0h x λ μ ≤    (7.6) 
st. λ ∈R   and μ ∉R     (7.7) 
where x represents the variables in power flow, λ and μ are control variables, e.g. 
generation outputs of CPPs involved in preventive control. R in (7.7) is a set 
representing the allowed range of generation rescheduling to maintain international 
power exchange invariant. Two items on right side of (7.5) are respectively the cost of 
generation rescheduling and the penalty on violation of scheduled international power 
exchange, (7.6) gives equality constraints i.e. power flow equations and inequality 
constraints representing operational constraints, i.e. security criteria. 
 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter proposes a importance sampling based methodology to prepare the 
database efficiently for hourly online OC and presents a DSA method based on 
contingency-oriented DTs with high accuracy. Then an online systematic preventive 
control scheme based on cooperative application of parallel DTs, i.e. ODT and PDT, 
is proposed. Moreover, the optimization of preventive control trajectory with 
consideration of domestic generation rescheduling cost and international penalty is 
conducted. The scheme will be demonstrated on the operational model of western 
Danish power system in the Chapter 9. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Online Dynamic Security Assessment Based on Random Forest 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The blackout of 1965 in Northeast America started a major focus on the security 
and reliability of interconnected power systems. Later, especially in the year of 2003, 
several large blackouts occurred in US [1], Italy [2], Southern Sweden and Denmark 
[3], forcing power system analysts and researchers to attach more and more 
importance to the issue of power system security assessment. 
Power system stability is defined by IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force on Stability 
Terms and Definitions as the ability of an electric power system, for a given initial 
operating condition (OC), to regain a state of operating equilibrium after being 
subjected to a physical disturbance, with most system variable bounded so that 
practically the entire system remains intact. Power system security refers to the degree 
of risk in its ability to survive imminent disturbance without interruption of customer 
service, which relates to the robustness of systems to a large disturbance (contingency) 
with respect to a certain security criterion [4]. More specifically, contingency is the 
large disturbance which results in the change of system topology by relay operations 
designed to protect the system by isolating the faulted area or preventing the abnormal 
condition [5]. 
Mathematical analysis of the response and new equilibrium is called security 
assessment. Basically, security assessment is called static security assessment (SSA) 
if it only evaluates the expected post-disturbance equilibrium steady-state condition, 
while it is dynamic security assessment (DSA) if it evaluates the transient response of 
the system after the disturbance. 
This chapter surveys the methods of DSA in Section 8.2. Section 8.3 introduces the 
fundamental knowledge of Random Forest (RF). In Section 8.4, a methodology that 
uses RF for online DSA is proposed, which is capable of not only predicting the 
security states of new OC with high accuracy, but also informing the adaptability of 
the RF model by Outlier Index (OI). Summary of this approach is given in Section 8.5. 
The performance of the approach will be demonstrated on a 400-bus, 200-line 
operational model of the western Danish power system in Chapter 9. 
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8.2 Methods of Dynamic Security Assessment 
DSA is defined by IEEE Power & Energy Society (PES), working group on DSA 
as an evaluation of the ability of a certain power system to withstand a defined set of 
contingencies and to survive the transition to an acceptable steady-state condition [6]. 
Most DSA programs focus on two criteria: 1) short-term voltage security 2) rotor 
angle stability. The criterion of short-term voltage security is to regulate that the 
transient voltage profile after the disturbance must remain in the acceptable limits to 
prevent further damage or loss of element. The criterion of rotor angle stability refers 
to maintain the synchronization of all synchronous generators in transmission power 
system. 
Generally, there are two methods of DSA, i.e. offline DSA and online DSA. Offline 
DSA performs detailed time-domain (T-D) simulations for all credible contingencies 
and a variety of OCs, so as to determine the security thresholds of generation and load 
as well as the limits of power transfer across important system interfaces. These 
thresholds and limits are then added with a margin and used as security 
operation ….guidelines for power system operators. Since the simulations are 
performed offline, there is no severe restriction on computation burden or simulation 
time, but it is difficult to make sure that the current online OCs do not have significant 
difference with the simulated OCs. In other word, even though a large number of 
simulations are conducted for typical OCs and different contingencies, it is impossible 
to cover all OCs in power system operation. 
Online DSA is able to be updated with current OC to supplement offline DSA for 
higher reliability. It involves rapid screening process to rank and select the most 
critical contingencies and intelligent filtering of OCs that should be simulated to 
update the result of offline DSA [7]-[14]. Then only limited numbers of traditional T-
D simulations are carried out to explore the rotor angle swing curves and voltage 
trajectories. Finally, the guidelines of offline DSA are updated dynamically with 
precise prediction of security in case of credible contingencies. An overview of 
methods of DSA is provided below. 
8.2.1 Detailed T-D Simulations 
Detailed T-D simulation is based on the numerical computation of differential 
algebraic equations (DAE). Differential equations in (8.1) are used to describe the 
dynamics of the system model and algebraic equations in (8.2) are applied to 
represent the network topology and network parameters. Numerical integration 
algorithms, such as Runge-Kutta methods and trapezoidal methods, are used to solve 
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the set of first-order differential equations. Theoretically, most elements and control 
mechanisms can be appropriately modeled for T-D simulation, so this approach can 
simulate the details of the system and it is the fundamental approach commonly 
applied in DSA. However, it is generally too computationally intensive for online 
DSA. 
( )( ) ( ), ( ),x t f x t y t t=

,    (8.1) 
( )0 ( ), ( ),g x t y t t= .     (8.2) 
where x(t)∈Rn and y(t)∈Rm. represent state variables and algebraic variables, 
respectively. 
8.2.2 Direct Methods 
Direct methods are adopted to replace the T-D simulation by the evaluation of 
transient energy function (TEF), also named as Lyapunov energy function. The idea 
of this approach is based on the assumption that surplus electromagnetic energy after 
the disturbance will be transformed to mechanic energy to accelerate the speed of 
generators but the total TEF remains invariant. The value of carefully designed TEF V 
is calculated at the instant of the last switching in the system and compared with a 
predetermined critical value Vcr. If V<Vcr, the system is predicted to be stable, and if 
V>Vcr, the system is predicted to be instable. Hence, this method can quickly predict 
the rotor-angle stability of the system at the first instant after the disturbance. 
Nevertheless, currently there are still drawbacks and unsolved problems of this 
approach. The complexity of TEF is highly dependent on the scale of the power 
systems. Moreover, although there are several simplified models to represent the 
power system, such as B-H model [15], N-M model [16] and T-V-A model [17], it is 
still difficult to construct an appropriate form of TEF to reflect the internal 
characteristics of the dynamic system. Besides, this approach is only suitable for 
rotor-angle stability, but helpless for other security issues, e.g. voltage security. 
8.2.3 Pattern Recognition Methods 
Pattern recognition methods are used to establish the relationship between the 
system features and the security state or the security margin relative to the security 
boundary of the system [18]. Generally, a database is necessary for pattern 
recognition methods which contains the system features (before the disturbance or 
system collapse) and the real consequence (i.e. secure/insecure, stable/instable). Then 
machine learning algorithms such as artificial neural networks (ANN) [19]-[21], fuzzy 
techniques [22]-[24], support vector machine (SVM) [25] and decision tree (DT) [26] 
are used to train a model to explore the hidden pattern of the relationship. Then the 
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model can be used to predict the system security and stability before the real 
consequences. The advantage of this method is that it can reflect the actual operation 
of power systems with affordable computation burden. The drawback of this approach 
is that it is difficult to achieve high accurate prediction of system security and stability 
for industrial application (i.e. 99.97%). 
8.2.4 Probabilistic Methods 
In probabilistic methods, DSA is viewed as a probabilistic problem rather than a 
deterministic one. This approach attempts to find out the probabilistic distribution of 
power system security and stability in terms of disturbance factors such as fault type, 
fault location, clearing time and operating factors such as load and generation [27]-
[30]. The advantage of this approach is that it is able to consider a lot of influencing 
factors. The obvious drawback is that the computation burden is high, so it is only 
suitable for offline DSA. However, combined with pattern recognition method, it may 
be of great value for online DSA. 
8.2.5 Real-time or Faster Than Real Time Simulation Methods 
Real time simulation is based on a numerical model of power system that can 
execute the simulation at the same rate as the actual clock. Generally, it involves the 
techniques of task dispatch and parallel computation on multiple CPUs, such as Real 
Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) [31], or field-programmable gate-array (FPGA) chips, 
such as OPAL-RT [32]. In addition, the simulation model and algorithms can be 
optimized to achieve simulations even faster than real time, but it is still in the 
research stage [33]. Since the simulation runs in real time, the power system 
algorithms are calculated quickly enough to continuously produce output conditions 
that realistically represent conditions in a real network. Besides, real time simulation 
provides the Hardware-In-Loop (HIL) environment that can interface numerical 
simulation with physical devices. However, the high cost of full-fledged paralleled 
computers impedes it to be used in the simulation of large power systems. 
 
8.3 Fundamental Knowledge of Random Forest 
Random Forest (RF), also called Ensemble Decision Trees (EDT), was first 
proposed by Tin Kam Ho et al. of Bell Labs in 1995 [34], and further developed by L. 
Breiman et al. in 2001 [35]. It is an ensemble learning method for classification and 
regression that operated by construct a number of decision trees. 
8.3.1 From Decision Tree to Random Forest 
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As introduced in Chapter 6, decision tree is a decision support model expressed as 
single binary tree to predict the possible consequences of the target value by a number 
of “if-then rules”. Random Forest, derived from DT, is composed of a multitude of 
de-correlated DTs such that each node of DTs depends on a sub-vector randomly 
selected from the full-vector predictors. Bootstrap sampling is also used in RF to 
assist in better estimating the distribution of the original dataset so as to enhance the 
accuracy. For each DT in RF, about one thirds of the cases are left out from the 
bootstrap sampling called out-of-bag (OOB) data which can be used as test set (TS) to 
give ongoing estimates of the error. 
 
Fig. 8.1. A simple illustrative single DT. 
 




Given a case represented by a set of predictors (i.e. a1, a2,…, ak), the output of each 
DT is obtained by dropping the measurement of the cases downward from the root 
node to the terminal node of DT.  As shown in Fig. 8.1, K is the splitting threshold of 
the numerical variable ai, while S is a finite set of the categorical variable aj. Different 
from DT, the classification output of RF model is the majority voting result (largest 
fraction) from a large number of DTs. Although each DT is unpruned and over-fitted, 
the overall RF model can benefit from aggregated-base variance reduction. The 
structure of RF is shown in Fig. 8.2. Details of RF algorithm can be found in [36]. 
Assuming we have a database containing N cases, each case is represented by a 
number of M predictors xn={a1,a2,…,aM} representing the measurements for a 
particular operating condition (OC) of case n and a target Cn = {S or I} stands for the 
secure or insecure state for case n which is obtained by T-D simulations, the basic 
idea for RF growing is that for each node in the kth tree (k ≤ Ntree, Ntree is the number 
of trees in the RF), the random sub-vector Θj is selected, independent of the past 
random vector Θ1, Θ2,…, Θj-1 but with the same distribution; and a tree is grown using 
the training set X and Θ={Θ1, Θ2,…, Θj,…,} resulting in a number of classifiers 
hk(X,Θ). Therefore, a RF is a classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured 
classifiers CkDT={hk(X,Θk), k = 1,…, Ntree} and each tree casts a unit vote for the most 
popular class at input xn, defined in (8.3) 
{ }ˆ ˆ( ) majority voting ( ), 1, 2, , ,treeN kRF n DT n tree nC x C x k N x= = ∈ X   (8.3) 
where 
ˆ ( )kDT nC x  is the prediction of the classification of the kth DT in the RF. 
8.3.2 Margins 
Margin is a measure used to evaluate the confidence of a case or distance to the 
classification boundary with respect to the RF model. Margin of a case xn measures 
the extent to which the average proportion of votes by ˆ ( )
treeN
RF nC x  for the true class Cn 
exceeds the average proportion of false votes for any other classes. As defined in (8.4), 
margin of a case is the proportion of votes for true class minus the maximum 
proportion of votes of the remaining false classes. Hence, the larger the margin for 
case xn implies the higher of confidence of the classification by RF model. 
( ) ( )treeNRF ˆ ˆM̂ ( , ) ( ) max ( )k kn n DT n n DT n n
k k
x C avg C x C avg C x C = = − ≠ 
    (8.4) 
Therefore the strength of classifiers in RF can be defined as the average margin of 
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8.3.3 Variable Importance 
Compared with single DT in CART, the ensemble of DTs in RF has the advantage 
that it gives each variable the chance to appear in the different context with different 
covariates, so as to better reflect its potentially effect on the response. The importance 
of variables in RF model is computed to assess the contribution of each variable to 
grow the RF model and the relevance of each variable over all DTs in the RF. 
There are basically two approaches to measure the relative importance of the mth 
variables VI(am) in the prediction vector Xn={a1,a2,…,am,…,aM}. The traditional 
approach is used by default in CART for a single DT, which is calculated by 
aggregating the improvement indices, such as the indices expressed in equations (6.5) 
and (6.6) of splitting variable and the surrogate variables for every node and sort the 
result downwards. Then, the relative value of variable importance is calculated by 
scaling these improvement indices such that the largest value is 100% [35]. 
Although the traditional approach is intrinsic, it is subjected to the over-fitting 
issues in RF. So the novel approach is used to assess the importance of the mth 
variable VI(am), as defined in (8.6): 
a) Assume we already know the OOB performance P0 of a given RF model; 
b) Randomly permute all values of variable m; 
c) Score the data and compute the new OOB performance Pm; 
d) Compute the performance drop P0-Pm; 
e) Sort and scale the performance drop. 
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where NOOB is the number of cases in OOB and PSOOB(xn,Tk) is the one-zero function 
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where X and XΨm in (8.6) are predictor vectors of LS before and after permutation of 
the mth variable am, as defined in (8.8) and (8.9), respectively 
{ }1 1 1, , , , , ,m m m Ma a a a a− +=X      (8.8) 




8.3.4 Proximities and Outliers 
Proximity matrix Prox is introduced by RF to evaluate the Euclidean distance 
between every two cases in the spaces of observations. The proximity between case i 
and case j in the database is the number of times that they occur in the same terminal 
node of trees, then these counts are normalized by dividing the total number of trees 
Ntree, as defined in (8.10). 
( )( ){ } [ ],
1
1
( , ) , 0,1
treeN
i j k k
ntree
i j C T
N =
= ∈Prox X Θ    (8.10) 
where Ci,j(Tk) is the one-zero function for counting the times that xi and xj going to the 
same terminal node, as defined in (8.11). 
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The diagonal elements in the proximity matrix are 1.0 which are self-proximities. 
Cases that are alike will have proximity close to 1.0; while dissimilar will have 
proximities close to 0.0. 
Outliers are able to be detected as cases having small proximities to all other cases 
belonging to the same target class. The outlier index (OI) of case i is calculated by 
Average Euclidean Distance (AED) of case i to all the cases existed in the database, 
as defined in (8.12), in which Nk is the number of cases that the classification is the 
same with case i. 
( )2
1
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8.4 Random Forest Based Online DSA 
The flowchart of the proposed RF-based online DSA is shown in Fig. 8.3. The 
proposed approach is executed in the following stages. 
8.4.1 Stage I: Offline Random Forest Building 
The original database is prepared offline by detailed T-D simulations of Nc×Noc 
cases for Nc critical contingencies and Noc OCs based on 24-hour horizon forecasted 
data of the system, such as load forecast, wind forecast, unit-commitment-based 
generation plan, network topology as well as the unavailability of system elements 
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due to scheduled maintenance, etc. Then, the original contingency-oriented RF model 
is trained based on the prepared database. 
Generate original NOC OCs 
Generate a database of Nc×Noc
cases with security/stability states 
by T-D simulations under specified 
security criteria
Build a RF model from the 
database
Verify the security of current OC by Final 






Nc contingencies & 
Forecasted data for 
24-h ahead OCs
Offline RF Building
Database Update for RF
Outlier Index of predicted OC 
> Threshold A?
Prediction data for 
1-min ahead OC
Verify predicted OC by T-D 
simulation
Create a new case for predicted OC
Update the case to the database and 





Proximity between current OC and 
predicted OC < Threshold B?





Fig. 8.3 Flowchart of RF-based online DSA. 
8.4.2 Stage II: Database Update for Random Forest 
System OC of 1 minute ahead can be predicted with much higher accuracy by 
short-term power flow prediction algorithms, such as short-term load forecast and 
short-term wind forecast, etc. Then Outlier Index of 1-min ahead OC is calculated 
113 
 
according to (8.12) to evaluate the Average Euclidean Distance of the predicted OC to 
all the cases already existed in the database. Given a threshold of OI, the predicted OC 
with OI larger than the specified threshold will be filtered out as unsure case for 
immediate verification by T-D simulation. Then the original database will be updated 
by the new case of predicted OC together with the existed cases. Finally, an upgraded 
RF model will be built straightaway with strengthened information of the updated 
database. 
8.4.3 Stage III: Online Dynamic Security Assessment 
Fed by online measurement from WAMS and SCADA system, the proximity 
between current OC and predicted OC is calculated by (8.10). If the proximity is 
smaller than the specified proximity threshold, which implies that the current OC 
matches the predicted OC, then the security of the current OC is decided by detailed 
T-D simulation conducted 1-min before. If the proximity is larger than the specified 
proximity threshold, the security of the current OC is judged by final RF model built 
in Stage II and security margin for current OC is calculated by the equation in (8.4). 
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter gives an overview of dynamic security assessment methods. Among 
those methodologies, pattern recognition methods combined with probabilistic and 
statistic concepts are of great value. An approach of online DSA based on RF is 
proposed which can not only provide a RF model to predict of power system security 
with high accuracy, but also indicate the degree of dependence of the created model. 
Based on the calculation of outlier index and proximity, the database can be 
periodically updated and strengthened with new OCs, and the misclassified cases are 
filtered out as unsure cases for further verification 1 minute in advance. Performance 
of the approach will be demonstrated on western Danish power system in Chapter 9. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Case Study of Online DSA and Corresponding Preventive 
Control in Danish Power System 
 
9.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Danish power system has a high penetration of onshore 
wind generation and other DG units, which are mostly integrated to the distribution 
system, but Danish TSO can not fully access or control these types of DG units. In 
addition, although the technologies of wind forecast in meteorology have significant 
progress in recent years, the prediction of wind generation and dispersed generation 
are not highly accurate, which may result in considerable mismatch between the 
predicted power flow and the actual power flow patterns in real time (e.g. in the case 
of large scale wind turbine shut down), so the online DSA and wide-area preventive 
control scheme in Danish grid is of great importance. 
The key aspect of online DSA is the reliability of the prediction. The US electric 
power system is designed and operated to meet a ‘3-nines’ reliability standard, which 
means that the electric grid power should be 99.97% reliable [1]. 
In Chapter 7, a decision tree based systematic approach for cooperative online 
power system DSA and optimal preventive control is proposed. In Chapter 8, random 
forest (RF) based approach for online DSA to improve the reliability is proposed. In 
this chapter, the performance of the proposed approaches is demonstrated on a 400-
bus, 200-line operational model of western Danish power system. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 introduces the used 
tools for the development and the verification of proposed approaches. Section 9.3 
presents the criteria of security assessment and the creation process of decision trees. 
Section 9.4 presents the implementation of preventive control scheme in western 
Danish power system based on paralleled decision trees. Section 9.5 gives the 
optimized preventive control trajectory with the lowest economic cost. Section 9.6 
evaluates the overall reliability of proposed approach by considering other critical 
contingencies in western Danish power systems. Section 9.7 demonstrates the 
implementation of RF based high reliable online DSA followed by the concluding 
remarks in Section 9.8. 
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9.2 Analysis Tools 
In this research, five tools have been used to develop the proposed approach: 
DIgSILENT/PowerFactory is used to create system OCs and conduct power flow 
calculations and T-D simulations; Excel is interfaced with DIgSILENT via 
DIgSILENT Programming Language (DPL) to manage simulations and record the 
results; Salford Predictive Miner  including CART and RF sub-packages is used for 
data mining [2]; Microsoft Visual C++ is interfaced with Salford Predictive Miner to 
calculate margins, proximities, outlier indices, etc. of RF. MATLAB is used for data 
collection, database creation, surface fitting. 
 
9.3 Creation of Decision Trees 
As mentioned in Section 7, the training of DTs should be based on a database 
which is built offline by screening NC “N-1” contingencies and “N-k” typical 
contingencies from Danish transmission system operator’s (Energinet.dk) historical 
record and experience on each OC. The “N-1” contingencies are the three-phase faults 
at the terminals of 400/150kV transmission lines with clearing time of 0.12 sec (6 
cycles). The database contains not only the predictor values such as active power, 
reactive power, phase, voltage and current before the disturbances calculated by 
power flow, but also the target values which are the results of T-D simulation secure 
(S) or insecure (I) based on criteria as given below: 
 Transient stability: The system is considered as transient instable for a given 
contingency, if the systems transient stability index (TSI) defined by (9.1) is 
lower than 10%, in which Δδmax is the maximum angle separation of any two 











+ Δ     (9.1) 
 Short-term voltage security: The system is considered to be insecure if the 
duration of any bus voltage going out of range from 0.8pu to 1.1pu is longer 
than 0.5sec. 
Other criteria, e.g. frequency drop, reactive power starvation, oscillation damping, 
etc. can also be included in this approach by simple modification in the programming. 
However, due to the severity status and special requirement of Danish power system, 
other specific criteria are not included for examination. Out of all possible 
contingencies, only a small proportion can result in the insecurity of power system 
and only those corresponding critical OCs violate the security criteria. Hence, only 
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those critical contingencies will be selected to generate the contingency-oriented DTs. 
To demonstrate the proposed approach, the maximum load scenario is selected as the 
candidate scenario and the contingency selected is short circuit in 400kV 
KAS_400_LAG overhead line close to the substation of KAS, as tagged in Fig. 9.1. 
 
Fig. 9.1 Geographical map of western Danish power system. 
Based on bisection search technique programmed by DIgSILENT/DPL, the 
approximate security boundary for contingency near 400kV substation KAS under 
maximum loading scenario is drawn by MATLAB surface fitting toolbox, shown in Fig. 
9.2, in which the upper side is predicted to be the insecure region and the lower side is 
predicted to be the secure region. 
Then, importance sampling is utilized to bias the sampling towards this security 
boundary so that the cases closer to the security boundary would have higher 
probability to be selected for final refined database. Additionally, the number of cases 
in insecure region and secure region are controlled to be generally the same to 
maximize the entropy of the database. As shown in Fig. 9.3, given the standard 
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deviation σ = 0.1, 330 OCs each in secure region (green spots) and insecure region 
(red spots) for offline study are generated by importance sampling respectively, in 
which each spot represents an OC for the corresponding percentages of total CPP 
generation. Moreover, the outputs in each generation units are subjected to random 
distribution and the outputs of each wind farms are based on the probability 
distribution density of forecast error with respect to forecasted wind power generation 
in Danish power system [3]. The process which consider the randomization on output 
of each generation unit and simultaneously maintain the total generation can assist 
























































































































































































(b) Level 4~6 of ODT under 
Node E
(c) Level 4~6 of ODT under 
Node C
(d) Level 4~6 of ODT under 
Node J
(e) Level 4~6 of ODT under 
Node H  
Fig. 9.6 The 2-D nomogram of ODT .    Fig. 9.7 The 2-D nomogram of PDT. 
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It is assumed that measurements are available from entire 400kV transmission 
system including all CPPs’ generation outputs (G_CPPx). 660 power flow 
calculations (P_x_y, Q_x_y) before the disturbance are conducted to create the 
predictors of the database and 660 T-D simulations are carried out for the results of 
security after the disturbance. 80% of the cases are randomly selected as the LS, and 
the rest 20% of the cases are selected as TS. Finally, a PDT and an ODT are created 
by CART algorithm in Salford Predictive Miner v6.6 [2], shown in Fig. 9.4 and Fig. 
9.5, where “A”~“L” are the serial numbers of inner nodes, “1”~“13” are the serial 
numbers of terminal nodes. 
TABLE 9.1 THE PERFORMANCE OF DECISION TREES AND RANDOM FOREST 
Datasets Insecure (I/S) Secure (S/I) Average (%) Overall (%)
LS of ODT w/o A_x_y by DT 257/12 252/6 96.61 96.58 
TS of ODT w/o A_x_y by DT 73/4 51/5 92.94 93.23 
LS of ODT w/ A_x_y by DT 255/14 256/2 97.01 96.96 
TS of ODT w/ A_x_y by DT 76/1 52/4 95.78 96.24 
OOB test of ODT w/ A_x_y by RF 299/15 338/8 96.61 96.58 
TS of ODT w/ A_x_y by RF 76/1 53/3 96.67 96.99 
 
It is worth to mention that by considering phase angle differences between any two 
buses (A_x_y). The accuracy of DSA is improved. The comparison of accuracy 
between the measurement vectors with and without A_x_y shows the superiority of 
WAMS over SCADA by increasing the accuracy of about 3%, as shown in Table 9.1. 
However, it is imperative to mention that in a small power system with relative less 
line loading, the angle differences are relatively small which may result in erroneous 
judgment if it is not taken carefully during practical implementation. Some other 
advanced algorithms such as RF can also be used to predict the security with higher 
accuracy, as shown in Table 9.1. However, the model trained by RF contains a large 
number of deep-grown DTs, which are difficult to be interpreted for preventive 
control. The combination of RF and preventive control is currently being pursued. As 
mentioned in Chapter 7, the values of accuracy seem still lower than the industrial 
requirement. It is because of the implementation of importance sampling method, 
which is analyzed in Appendix B. Besides, one can easily adjust prior probability in 
the process of DT training to find the fuzzy region so as to significantly increase the 
reliability to achieve ‘3 nines’ reliability standard [1]. 
In Fig. 9.4, ODT has five critical attributes of transmission lines, i.e. 
P_FKNA_KAS1, P_FGD_FVO, P_FER_TJE, P_EDR_REV, P_ASR_REV, and one 
critical attributes of generator output G_CPP1_ENVB3, which have been highlighted 
in Fig. 9.1. In Fig. 9.5, PDT has three critical attributes from three CPPs, i.e. 
G_CPP1_ENVB3, G_CPP3_ESVB3, G_CPP7_FYVB7. Most critical attributes 
selected by ODT for transmission lines belong to one backbone on Jylland Peninsula 
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and one for the key transmission line on Fyn Island. All the critical attributes selected 
by PDT are generators in the southern part, close to the selected contingency. 
P_FKNA_KAS1 is one of the paralleled key transmission lines connecting German 
power system. 
 
9.4 Preventive Control Based on Decision Trees 
The ODT and PDT in Fig. 9.4 and Fig. 9.5 can be reproduced to 2-D nomograms to 
depict the space and its regions, as shown in Fig. 9.6 and Fig. 9.7. In each region the 
percentage of correctness and the serial numbers of the corresponding nodes are 
indicated. The red regions are insecure regions tagged by (I), while the green regions 
are secure regions tagged by (S). The thresholds in ODT in Fig. 9.4 are highlighted by 
solid lines and blue figures in 2-D nomograms in Fig. 9.6. The yellow regions 
between dashed lines are the fuzzy regions, in which the prior probability of insecure 
cases is between 0.01 and 0.99. As shown in Table 9.2, the ODT has higher 
classification accuracy than that of PDT because fewer variables are selected as 
predictors of PDT. However, the lower accuracy of PDT does not affect the reliability 
of preventive control because PDT can successfully search out the most effective 
controllable variables and provide the control directions. As shown in Fig. 9.7, the 
PDT nomogram is capable of informing the most influential CPPs (ENVB3, FYVB7 
and ESVB3) that need to be controlled and their control direction, i.e. to reduce 
generation in ENVB3 and FYVB7 and simultaneously to increase generation in ESVB3. 
TABLE 9.2 THE PERFORMANCE OF ODT AND PDT 
Datasets Insecure (I/S) Secure (S/I) Average (%) Overall (%) 
LS of ODT 257/12 252/6 96.61 96.58 
TS of ODT 73/4 51/5 92.94 93.23 
LS of PDT 184/85 199/59 72.77 72.68 
TS of PDT 53/24 32/24 62.99 63.91 
 
Fig 9.8 shows the annual data of total CPP generation, total CHP generation and 
total wind generation represented by percentages based on their installed capacities 
[4]. At 09:00am, February 2nd, 2011, the OC is detected to be in the insecure region, 
shown by the black point tagged with “OC” in Fig. 9.9. 
In order to maintain the constant value of total generation in Denmark, the equation 
(9.2) must be respected. 
G_CPP1_ 3 G_CPP3 _ 3 G_CPP4 _ 7 Const.ENVB ESVB FYVB+ + =  (9.2) 
Other constraints such as PQ-capacity limits of each generator and individual limits 
of CPP generation rescheduling should also be applied, which are given in Table 9.3. 
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Hence, for this particular case as defined by (9.2), a surface boundary can be found, 
within which the total generation is maintained constant, respecting the 
abovementioned constraints, as shown in Fig. 9.9. The trajectories “A”, “B” and “C” 
are some of the feasible control directions on the surface which would lead the system 
to the secure region. 
 
Fig. 9.8 Annual data of generation. 
 
 



































 (c) Rotor angle on Trajectory B     (d) Rotor angle on Trajectory C 
Fig. 9.10 Rotor angles curves of involved generators in Trajectories A~C. 
 
As shown in Fig. 9.9, the surface of generation rescheduling in the 3-D space of 
involved generators can be reproduced by its corresponding surface in 2-D ODT 
nomogram, which shows the effect of generation rescheduling with more clarity in the 
feasible region as shown in Fig. 9.10(a) which is the enlarged version of Fig. 9.6(e). 
The green spots on the surface represent the secure cases, while the red spots 
represent the insecure cases. It can be observed that the trajectories “A”, “B” and “C” 
are the control directions which are able to reliably draw the system to the secure 
region. 
The prediction of DT is followed by its verification through T-D simulations. Only 
the criterion of transient stability is violated in this case, so Fig. 9.10(b) (c) and (d) 
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show the rotor angle curves of the involved generators for OCs tagged with “0” to “6” 
on the control trajectories “A”, “B” and “C” respectively, in which the disturbance 
near KAS takes place at 0sec, and lasts for 0.12sec. 
The results successfully verified the prediction of power system security as well as 
the guidelines of preventive control scheme. By rescheduling the generators instructed 
by this systematic preventive control scheme, the power system insecurity can be 
averted. 
 
9.5 Optimal Preventive Control Trajectories 
According to the actual regulations of Danish power system, (giving considerations 
to the prices of domestic reserve services and the penalty in cases of international 
exchange mismatch) further optimization on the trajectory of preventive control is 
conducted to minimize the total cost incurred by generation rescheduling, as defined 
in (9.3). 
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As defined in (9.4)~(9.6), the cost of reserve services is composed of fixed cost CFi 
and variable cost depending on the actual quantity of generation rescheduling in effect, 
either upward ΔGUPi or downward ΔGDNi. In (9.4), G is the set of CPP generators 
participating in the preventive control, and PUPi and PDNi are the prices of upward and 
downward generation rescheduling in CPP i. In (9.5) and (9.6), Gri and Gsi are real-
time and scheduled generation of CPP i. The amount of generation rescheduling in 
each generator should also subject to the P-Q capacity (i.e. Gi
min and Gi
max) and the 
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limitations of the maximum available generation reserves in both directions (i.e. 
ΔGUPi
max and ΔGDNi
max), as defined in (9.7) and (9.8). 
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Assuming that the network loss is invariant during preventive control, the 
imbalance between generation and load introduced by generation rescheduling in 
Denmark is compensated by German power system, as defined by (9.9). In (9.10), 
P<50, P<100 and P≥50 are unit prices of international power exchange mismatch below 
50MW, between 50MW and 100MW, large than 100MW, respectively. For mismatch 
between actual and scheduled power exchange larger than 50MW or 100MW, 
penalties CPEN1 or CPEN2 are applicable respectively. As given in Table 9.3, the prices 
of reserve services from participating generators in Denmark and the cost of 
international power exchange between Denmark and Germany are assumed based on 
the typical data. 
TABLE 9.3 THE PRICES OF RESERVE SERVICES AND INTERNATIONAL POWER EXCHANGE 
Price CPP1_ENVB3 CPP3_ESVB3 CPP4_FYVB4 
Gi
max  (MW) 626 378 372 
Gi
min  (MW) 188 98 110 
ΔPUPi
max (MW) +39 +113 +32 
ΔPDNi
max (MW) -75 -64 -38 
CFi  (DKK) 2230 1940 1880 
CUPi  (DKK/MW) 535 390 450 
CDNi  (DKK/MW) 328 208 236 
Price International Power Exchange with Germany 
P<50 (DKK/MW) 400 
P<100 (DKK/MW) 450 
P≥100 (DKK/MW) 500 
CPEN1 (DKK) 100,000 
CPEN2 (DKK) 500,000 
 
Fig. 9.11 shows the cost of preventive control along trajectories A, B and C in Fig. 
9.10(a). Trajectory A is to shift generation from CPP1_ENVB3 to CPP4_FYVB4. 
Trajectories B and C are to shift generation from CPP1_ENVB3 to CPP4_FYVB4 and 
CPP3_ESVB3. In this case, the preventive control does not violate the scheduled 
international power exchange, so it is a linear optimization problem. However, if the 
preventive control violate the scheduled international power exchange and subject to 
the international penalty, the case becomes a piecewise linear optimization problem. 
After the optimization in MATLAB, trajectory A is found to be the most economical 
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trajectory and the optimal objective OC after generation rescheduling is below the 
threshold of reliable security boundary between “3” and “4” on trajectory A. The 
minimum cost is 42,392 Danish Kroners (DKK). 
 
Fig. 9.11 Cost of preventive control along Trajectories A, B and C. 
 
9.6 Overall Evaluation of Other Contingencies 









of LS (%) 
Ove. Accuracy 
of TS (%) 
Suc. 
Rate 
1 KAS KAS_400_LAG 13 96.58 93.23 20/20 
2 KAS KAS_400_REV 14 97.54 94.66 19/20 
3 LAG LAG_400_SVS 18 96.03 93.13 19/20 
4 LAG LAG_400_MAL 17 96.39 95.52 20/20 
5 TRI FER_400_TRI n/a n/a n/a n/a 
6 TRI MAL_400_TRI 21 97.87 96.52 20/20 
7 NVV NVV_400_VHA n/a n/a n/a n/a 
8 NVV FER_400_NVV n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tot.      98.0% 
 
To evaluate the overall reliability of this approach, multiple contingency-oriented 
DTs are created for eight most critical N-1 contingencies which have been screened 
out by critical clearing time (CCT) calculations of western Danish power system in 
[5]. The size, overall accuracies of LS and TS of these DTs are shown in Table 9.4. 
Among these contingencies, only five events violate the transient stability or short-
term voltage security criteria. For each contingency, 20 insecure OCs are randomly 
generated. 98% of the random generated insecure OCs can be controlled and guided 
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back to the secure region (across the fuzzy region), if international power exchange is 
maintained as invariant. The remaining 2% OCs can certainly be controlled by 
varying the international exchange power with Germany, however at the cost of 
penalty. 
 
9.7 Online DSA Based on Random Forest 
As discussed in Section 9.3, RF can be adopted to improve the accuracy of 
classification in the application of power system online DSA [7], [8]. Besides, the 
unsure cases can be filtered out by RF model using Outlier Index (OI) in (8.12) for 
immediate verification by T-D simulation to improve the accuracy. 
 
Fig. 9.12 Cases in the test set with respect to their outlier index. 
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The same 660 cases are used for the training of RF model, which are composed of 
power flow patterns (including 202 variables of P_x_y, Q_x_y and A_x_y) before the 
disturbance serving as predictors and 660 T-D simulations of security after the 
disturbance serving as the target. The RF model contains 500 deep-grown DTs, and 
10 out of 202 predictors are randomly selected as the predictors within each node of 
every DTs. After the training process of RF model, 440 cases are generated to test the 
created RF model, which are independent from with the 660 cases used to train the RF.  
Fig. 9.12(a) shows the 440 cases in the test set with respect their OI, which is then 
sorted in a descendent order. As shown in Fig. 9.12(b), the misclassified cases are all 
within the 30 cases with the highest OI. The blue cases are the correct ones, while the 
green and red cases are the misclassified ones. 
Outlier Index Threshold






































Fig. 9.13 Accuracy and verification percentage with respect to outlier index threshold. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 8, given a threshold of OI, the predicted OC with OI 
larger than the specified threshold will be filtered out as unsure case for immediate 
verification by T-D simulation. As shown in Fig. 9.13(a), the original accuracy of RF 
model is tested as 92.73%. If the OI threshold is given as 6.21, and all the cases with 
OI larger then 6.21 are verified by further T-D simulation, the accuracy can be 
increased to 95.90%. Whilst, if stricter threshold is given (i.e. 1.37), the accuracy can 
reach to even 100%. Fig 9.13(b) shows the percentage of cases that need for further 
verification. Only a percentage of 3.86% out of 440 cases are needed to be verified if 
the threshold is given as 6.21. Nevertheless, a percentage of 11.82% out of 440 cases 
are needed to be verified if stricter threshold is given as 1.37, and within these cases, a 
percentage of 7.50% are the mismatched cases. 
Afterward, the database can be periodically updated by the new cases together with 
the existed cases. Finally, a stronger RF model can be created straight away with 
strengthened information of the updated database. Therefore, the percentage of 
filtered out cases for verification should be significantly decreased if more cases are 
added into the database for upgrading the RF model. 
 
9.8 Summary 
This chapter presents a DSA method based on contingency-oriented DTs with high 
accuracy and proposes an online systematic preventive control scheme based on 
cooperative application of parallel DTs, i.e. ODT and PDT. The scheme was 
demonstrated on the operational model of western Danish power system. The verified 
results have shown that the generation rescheduling guided by DTs is able to reliably 
control and bring the system back to security region hence prevent the possible power 
system insecurity. The proposed cost effective optimization for preventive control is 
capable of finding the optimal control trajectory. Additionally, the outlier index of RF 
model is able to improve the accuracy of online DSA to 100%. 
During this control strategy, the cost of generation rescheduling adopted 
domestically is significantly less compared to the penalty on violating the 
prescheduled exchange across international tie lines. However, in some specific cases, 
especially for peak load OCs where local generators might be operating close to their 
limits, and for large exchange to neighboring countries, curtailment on power 
exchange across international tie lines becomes inevitable to maintain system security. 
The main content of this chapter has also been reported in the author’s previous 
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Identification of Load Characteristics and the Corresponding 
Adaptive Corrective Scheme 
 
10.1 Introduction 
In the past decades, voltage instability has become a major threat of power system 
operation. Voltage instability usually takes on the form of drop of power system 
voltage, which may lead to wide area power system voltage collapse. It is caused by 
unavailability of reactive power support in some nodes of the network, where the 
voltage uncontrollably falls [1]. For this reason, more and more TSO have installed 
WAMS in order to prevent cascading voltage drop by estimating the proximity of 
voltage collapse point [2]. As mentioned in previous chapters, WAMS is based on 
widely installed PMUs, which opens a window to observe the dynamic behavior of 
power system in real time [3], [4]. This technology is attractive, since the high 
frequency samples of real-time voltage and current, the accurate frames of magnitudes 
and phasors and the availability of data synchronization by GPS time stamps can offer 
a better anticipation function by detecting the inception of instability instead of its 
consequences [5]. 
There are two defense strategies against voltage instability: preventive and 
corrective. For preventive aspects, PMUs help to make sure the voltage is in the 
regulated limits and to optimize the active and reactive power flow [6]. However, for 
corrective defense, PMU assists to detect the onset of voltage instability to implement 
the emergency scheme to save the voltage from collapse and avoid wide area 
blackouts and cascading trips by the following countermeasures: 
 Control of generator excitation, e.g. Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR); 
 Control of reactive power compensation, e.g. Static Var Compensator (SVC); 
 Blocking of on-load tap changer (OLTC); 
 Load Shedding, etc. [7], [8]. 
Most research concentrates on the steady-state voltage stability problem by 
continuous load flow calculation [9]-[11]. On the contrary, this research focuses on 
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corrective voltage control based upon the detection of the onset of voltage collapse 
triggered by large disturbances rather than by scenarios such as smooth load increase. 
In [12] and [13], sensitivity function is used to early detect the voltage collapse. 
However, the effect of different load characteristics is not considered. In this chapter, 
the identification of load and power source by PMU is implemented. P0-V curve 
instead of P-V curve is proposed to predict the voltage collapse. The adaptive 
corrective scheme is implemented in cases of large disturbances. 
 
10.2 Theoretical Background 





Q P tgϕ= ⋅
 
Fig. 10.1 Single-load infinite-bus system. 
The analysis of voltage stability usually begins with a simple single-load infinite-
bus system, which enables easy analytical derivations and provides insight into the 
voltage stability problem. As shown in Fig. 10.1, the infinite bus is represented by an 
ideal voltage source⎯E=E∠0 as well as a series resistance R and reactance X, so the 
transmission impedance is⎯Z=R+jX. Alternatively, ⎯Z can be also considered as the 
impedance of Thevenin equivalent circuit to represent the external power system as 
seen from a load bus. For the sake of simplicity, the transmission resistance R is 
neglected and the voltage of the load bus is denoted as⎯V=V∠θ, so (10.1) can be 
easily obtained. 
V E jX I= −      (10.1) 
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θ= − +      (10.4) 
By eliminate θ from (10.3) and (10.4), a quartic equation about V is obtained as 
(10.5). 
4 2 2 2 2 2(2 ) ( ) 0V QX E V X P Q+ − + + =   (10.5) 
which can be simplified to (10.6). 
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2 2
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   (10.6) 
The condition to have at least one solution for (10.6) is denoted in (10.7), 
2 2 2 2 2(2 ) 4 ( ) 0QX E X P Q− − + ≥    (10.7) 
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     (10.8) 
As shown in Fig. 10.2, the expressions provided in (10.6) and (10.8) can be used to 
visualize the relationship between P, Q and V as a three dimensional surface, with the 
normalized coordinates of PX/E2, QX/E2 and V/E, respectively. On the P-Q-V surface, 
the green line represents the maximum deliverable active power with conditions of 
constant power factor, where 0P V∂ ∂ = . By projecting the green line to the P-Q plane, 
the condition of at least one solution is obtained, as defined in (10.8). A few red lines 
on the P-Q-V surface represent the conditions of constant load power factor cosφ, 
where tgφ=Q/P with φ varying from -π/8 to π/3. A projection of these red lines onto 
the P-V plane results in the traditional nose curves (P-V curves), as shown in Fig. 10.3. 
As shown in Fig. 10.4, the contour on the P-Q-V surface represents the conditions 
of constant normalized active power PX/E2 at the receiving end, where PX/E2 varies 
from 0.1 to 1.0 with 0.1 intervals. A projection of these black contours results in the 























































































Fig. 10.2 P-Q-V surface and the curves of constant power factor. 
















































































































































































































































Fig. 10.5 Q-V curves. 
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10.2.2 Identification of Thevenin Equivalent Parameters 
In previous section, variables of P, Q and V on the P-Q-V surface are normalized, 
providing that voltage source E and reactance X of Thevenin equivalent circuit are 
fixed and the resistance R of the Thevenin equivalent circuit is neglected. However, 
these assumptions are not accurate for real power systems, where the parameters of 
Thevenin equivalent circuit are fluctuating. In order to deal with this issue, PMUs 
with intelligent algorithms can be used to identify the parameters of Thevenin 
equivalent circuit online, due to its high sampling frequency and high resolution. 
WAMS with hierarchical architecture is widely applied in modern power systems. 
Most of the PMU applications are based on measuring the local electrical variables, 
and then directly transmitting these electrical variables to the upper level without 
further processing. In this application, apart from the conventional measuring and 
transmitting functions, PMU also takes the responsibilities of identifying the 
parameters of Thevenin equivalent circuit and estimating the load characteristics. The 
deployment of PMU in this application aims at monitoring the voltage stability of 
load bus where it is installed, as shown in Fig. 10.6. A PMU having sufficient current 
channels may measure the current in all of the ingoing lines and outgoing lines of one 
substation, so the active and reactive power P+jQ in the outgoing lines can be 


































Fig. 10.6 Deployment of PMU in the application of local voltage stability monitoring. 
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The voltage stability monitoring is based on the simplification of the external 
power system to a time-dependent single-load infinite-bus equivalent circuit, which is 
composed of a voltage source⎯Ek that supplies local load PL,k+jQL,k over a branch⎯Zk 
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Fig. 10.7 Two-bus equivalent circuit and phasor diagram of voltage. 
The phasor of voltage⎯Vk and current⎯Ik can help to online identify the parameters 
of Thevenin equivalent circuit (⎯Ek and⎯Zk) to represent the external power grid in 
real time. At the time instant t=tk, the voltage of local bus is given as (10.9), 
k k k kV E Z I= −     (10.9) 
where⎯Vk = VRk + jVXk,⎯Ik = IRk + jIXk and⎯Zk = Rk + jXk. 
The equation in (10.9) can also be written in (10.10)~(10.13) by dividing⎯Vk,⎯Ik 
and⎯Zk the to real part and imaginary part 
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    (10.13) 
Equation (10.10) is a group of two linear equations with four unknown values, i.e. 
ERk, EIk, Rk and Xk, so multiple samples of y and H in different time instants from 
PMU should be used to identify these four parameters of Thevenin equivalent circuit 
in (10.12). Besides, it is assumed that parameters of external grid have no significant 
variation during the sampling window. Therefore, the unknown vector xk in time 
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where λ is the forgetting factor assigning lower weight to old measurements in the 
sampling window. 
10.2.3 Identification of Load Characteristic Parameters 
The voltage magnitude Vk, active power Pk and reactive power Qk, measured and 
calculated by PMU, can also be used to estimate important parameters in the load side. 
Although other systems such as SCADA, fault recorder can also identify the load 
characteristics, PMU/WAMS has advantages over these systems in terms of higher 
accuracy, since its high sampling speed and synchronization function realize the 
capture of the dynamic variation of active and reactive power in response to the 
change of voltage. 
Based on practical assumption that the load consumption is dependent on the 
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where the exponents pu and qu are equal to the slope of dP/dV and dQ/dV at nominal 
voltage V=V0, respectively. 
For static load model, the PMU measures a series of voltage and power {Vk, Pk, Qk}, 
k = 1, 2,…, N. A number of samples on Vk and Pk can help to identify the parameters 





k kP P V V=     (10.16) 
To increase the accuracy of parameters identification, (10.16) can be simplified to 
(10.17) by using logarithmic function in both sides. 
  
0 0ln ln ln lnk ku uP P p V p V= + −    (10.17) 
where V0 is the nominal voltage of the load bus which can be given as 1.0pu, and P0 is 
the active power consumption at the nominal voltage V0. A series of measurements in 
the sampling window from k = 1 to k = N can be used to estimate the parameters of 

0P  and up , based on Least Square Estimation (LSE) method, where the voltage Vk (k 





pθ  to be estimated is defined in (10.18) and vectors of measured value /P  and 
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Therefore, 0P  and up  in vector 
/
pθ  can be calculated by LSE, as defined in (10.21). 
 ( )/ 1/ / / /T Tp p p p Pθ φ φ φ−=     (10.21) 
For the sake of succinctness, only load characteristic of active power is introduced 
here, for load characteristic of reactive power, the algorithm is the same. 
10.2.4 Analysis of Voltage Collapse Point 
In Section 10.2.2 and Section 10.2.3, parameters of Thevenin equivalent circuit (i.e. 
Ek,⎯Zk) and major parameters of load characteristics (i.e. pu, qu) can be identified by 
PMU installed in the substations in the load area. In the following sections, a novel 
approach is proposed to predict the voltage collapse point. 
It is worthy to mention here that load characteristic has significant impact on 
voltage stability. Assuming that power system is working in two identical steady state 
power flow patterns but with different load characteristics, the ability of enduring the 
disturbance is entirely different, because they have different nonlinear behaviors after 
disturbance. In fact, after the disturbance, the dynamic response and the non-linear 
behaviors of power system are excited. The variation of voltage definitely has impact 
on power consumption of the load. Conversely, the change of load consumption also 
has effect on the distribution of power flow. The following analysis is able to 
mathematically find out the voltage collapse point based on aforementioned 
parameters identified by PMU. In addition, by generalizing the problem to any load 
characteristics, the author proposes the P0-V curve instead of traditional P-V curve to 
eliminate the interaction impact incurred by the non-linearity of load. 
As shown in Fig. 10.7, PMU can accurately identify the parameters, such as⎯Ek,⎯Zk, 
pu and qu, so nonlinear power flow model to represent the relationship between power 
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a) Constant Power Load 
For constant power load (pu=qu=0), the power consumption of the load at time 












 =     (10.23) 
Critical point of P0-V curve (PL0,m, Vk,cr) meets equation defined in (10.24), where 
PL0,m is maximum power consumption in the nominal voltage V0, Vk,cr is the voltage 
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Knowing power factor cosϕk at time t=tk, the critical point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) in (10.24) 
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where Ek, Zk, αk are identified by PMU, and angle of power factor ϕk is measured by 
PMU. Proof of (10.24) and (10.25) can be found in Appendix C.1. 
b) Constant Current Load 
For constant current load (pu=qu=1), the power consumption at time instant tk (PL,k 
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Critical point of P0-V curve (PL0,m, Vk,cr) meets the equation defined in (10.27). 
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Knowing the power factor cosϕk at time t=tk, the critical point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) in 
(10.27) can be expressed in (10.28). Proof of (10.27) and (10.28) can be found in 
Appendix C.2 
( )
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c) Constant Impedance Load 
For constant impedance load (pu=qu=2), the power consumption at time instant tk 
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Critical point of P0-V curve (PL0,m, Vk,cr) meets the equation defined in (10.30) 
( )2, 0k k k crE Z V =      (10.30) 
Because Ek>0 and Zk>0, so the critical voltage point is Vk,cr = ±∞, which proves 
that the voltage of bus connected with constant impedance load is always stable (will 
not collapse). Proof of (10.29) and (10.30) can be found in Appendix C.3 
c) General Static Load 
For general exponential voltage load (pu=m, qu=r) the power consumption at time 
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Critical voltage collapse point (Vk,cr, θcr) meets the equation defined in (10.32), 
where θcr is the voltage phase angle of load bus. Proof of (10.32) can be found in 
Appendix C.4. 
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The analytical solution of the critical point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) is difficult, however, when 
Vk, θk can be measured by PMU, Thevenin equivalent circuit parameters Ek, Zk and αk 
can be estimated, PL0, QL0, pu and qu can be identified by PMU measurements, so one 
can judge the voltage stability based on the following theorem: 
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If F(Vk, θk) > F(Vk,cr, θcr), the system is stable, there is no voltage collapse point. 
If F(Vk, θk) ≤ F(Vk,cr, θcr), the system is unstable, the voltage will collapse. 
However, it is pertinent to mention that this theorem is based on the precondition 
that the dynamic effect of the load can be neglected. 
The expression in (10.32) for constant power load (pu=qu=0), constant current load  
(pu=qu=1) and constant impedance load (pu=qu=2) can be visualized as three 
dimensional surfaces in P0-Q0-V space, with the scaled coordinates of P0X, Q0X and 
V, as shown in Fig. 10.8, Fig. 10.9 and Fig. 10.10, respectively. In Fig. 10.8 and Fig. 
10.9, green lines represent the maximum deliverable normalized power P0 with 
respect to the voltage collapse point. Nevertheless, there is no voltage collapse point 
in Fig. 10.10. A few red lines on the P0-Q0-V surface represent the conditions of 


















































































































































Fig. 10.10 P0-Q0-V surface in constant impedance load. 
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10.2.5 Adaptive Corrective Scheme to Prevent Voltage Collapse 
A number of power system blackouts due to voltage collapse derive from single or 
multiple concurrent disturbances followed by trips of important transmission lines in 
the scenario that power system is heavily loaded. The regulating mechanisms, such as 
AVR, SVC and OLTC etc., try to restore the voltage of power system within the 
required range. However, the voltage restoration further stresses the already 
overloaded power system, resulting in voltage instability or even voltage collapse. For 
example, the extremely low voltage would result in motor stalling within a few 
seconds. These stalled motors would absorb large amount of reactive power and 
impede fast voltage recovery after short-circuit clearing. 
An adaptive corrective scheme is proposed to prevent voltage collapse more 
intelligently. PMU takes the responsibility of predicting the voltage collapse point 
based on the identification of system parameters so as to classify the upcoming 
voltage instability issue to short-time or long-term categories. 
a) Short-term Voltage Stability  
When the load exponent parameters are less than 1.0 (min. [pu, qu] < 1.0), it can be 
predicted to be the short-term voltage stability problem. Control mechanisms of 
synchronous generators increase their reactive power to restore the voltage after the 
voltage drop triggered by disturbances. In this situation, the reactive generation 
reserve of synchronous generators and shunt capacitors take actions promptly after the 
disturbance. If the excitation current of synchronous generators increases to its over 
excitation limit (OEL), the voltage will collapse very soon. Therefore, the only 
solution is to trigger the under voltage load shedding (UVLS) immediately to meet 
reactive power balance without delay. The load shedding performs the predefined 
actions. 
b) Long-term Voltage Stability  
When the load exponent parameters are larger than 1.0 (min. [pu, qu] ≥ 1.0), the 
voltage will not collapse immediately, so it is classified to long-term voltage stability 
problem. In this circumstance, the scheme is to block the OLTC if the bus voltage 
continues to decrease. Then, multi-step load shedding with different time delays is 
activated to restore the voltage of load bus so as to minimize the total amount of load 
shedding. 
 
10.3 Test Power Systems 
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The proposed methodology is implemented in a detailed model of 4-Bus test 
system. 4-Bus test system is built in Power System Analysis Toolbox (PSAT) 
integrated in MATLAB [13], [14]. 
 
Fig. 10.11 Single-line diagram of 4-Bus test system. 
The single-line diagram of the test system is shown in Fig. 10.11. The load at Bus3 
is fed though a transformer equipped with OLTC. The remote power system 
connected to Bus1 provides most of the power though long paralleled double-circuit 
transmission lines, while the local generator connected to Bus2 supplies the remaining 
load demand. 
The detailed data of the test system is given in Appendix D. OLTC has different 
delays on its first and subsequent tap changers with 5% dead zone. The generator at 
Bus2 uses 6-th order model, together with a simple representation of its governor, 
AVR and OEL. The OEL has an inverse-time characteristic to limit the field current 
of excitation. The overall base power is 100MVA, and the base voltage is the rated 
voltage of each voltage level. This model is simple but it is sufficient to analyze main 
mechanisms of voltage instability issue, both long-term voltage instability and short-
term voltage instability [15]. 
As mentioned before, PMU placed on high voltage load bus (Bus4) can identify the 
parameters of load and Thevenin equivalent circuit in normal operation states. 
Therefore, the intelligent unit of PMU can identify the accurate model of both load 
and power source and update the parameters continuously based on the measurements. 
During dynamic response after disturbances, it is feasible to assume that load 
characteristics of aggregated load identified by PMU change slightly. However, this is 
not the case for parameters in the Thevenin equivalent circuit in the power resource 
side, since non-linear behavior and associated control mechanisms of generators will 
definitely change the parameters of power resources. Therefore, PMU only modifies 
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the parameters of Thevenin circuit in short time-slot after disturbance to model the 
external part of the power system. 
The intelligent unit of PMU implements the adaptive corrective scheme based on 
the algorithm proposed in Section 10.2. The settings of OLTC and load shedding, 
such as threshold value and time delay, are usually predefined, but in this approach, 
they can be online configured by PMU with adaptive schemes. As analyzed before, 
voltage instability mechanism highly relies on the load characteristics, so the 
proposed adaptive corrective scheme to prevent voltage instability adopts different 
corrective schemes in terms of different scenarios.  
The disturbance to be analyzed is a 3-phase bolted fault in the middle (50%) of one 
of paralleled transmission lines between Bus1 and Bus4, followed by tripping of the 
faulted line. 
PMU calculates the voltage collapse point based on different load characteristics. 
The P0-V curves with respect to different load characteristics are shown in Fig. 10.12. 
Moreover, collapse point can be predicted on the load bus considering the impact of 
load characteristics. Table 10.1 lists the collapse points in each load model. Fig. 
10.13(a)~(c) show the P0-V curves in the scenarios of constant power load, constant 
current load and constant impedance load with respect to different power factors. 
TABLE 10.1 VOLTAGE COLLAPSE POINTS WITH RESPECT TO LOAD EXPONENTS 
pu=qu 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 15 2.0 2.5 
Vk,cr(pu) 0.7071 0.5774 0.4328 0.0116 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Pm0 (pu) 3.3331 4.3157 4.9275 6.6664 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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(b) P0-V curves with pu=qu=1. 
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(b) P0-V curves with pu=qu=2. 
Fig. 10.13 P0-V curves with respect to power factors. 
 
10.4 Simulation Results and Discussion 
PMU identifies the load model regularly in normal conditions. Fig. 10.14 and Table 
10.2 show the results of load identification of the following two cases: Case A is the 
case with high load exponents, and Case B is the case with low load exponents. If the 
power consumption is the same in Case A and Case B in nominal voltage (i.e. 1.0pu), 
the load absorbs lower power in Case A than that in Case B, if it is subjected to a 
voltage drop, due to its higher exponents. 
152 
 
TABLE 10.2  RESULT OF LOAD PARAMETER IDENTIFICATION 
Load Parameter P0 Q0 pu qu 
Case A 16.17 3.27 1.245 1.502 
Case B 15.51 3.09 0.802 0.603 
  
Fig 10.14 Load characteristics in Case A and Case B. 
As mentioned in Section 2, if the load exponents represent low values (less than 
1.0), the main aim of emergency control strategy is to maintain the power balance in a 
short-term. The conventional scheme should be implemented since there is not 
enough time to perform the optimization of control scheme. When the load exponents 
are higher than 1.0, no voltage collapse point exists, the time scale of voltage 
instability is identified to be the mid-term or long-term. 
Case A: High load exponents 
Before the disturbance, remote power system and local generator support the heavy 
load on Bus3 (PL=1500MW QL=300MVar). The disturbance takes place at t = 1sec. 
After the disturbance, the power flow transferred to the other transmission line, the 
control mechanism of local generator increased its output to restore the voltage and 
tried to maintain the voltage stability. If there was no emergency measure (e.g. OLTC 
blocking), the voltage at Bus4 will collapse, as shown in Fig. 10.15. The P-V 
trajectory is plotted in Fig. 10.16 to illustrate the evolution of voltage collapse at Bus4. 
 The disturbance takes place at t = 1sec. 
 Shunt capacitors are automatically connected at t = 1.2sec. 
 Oscillations are quickly damped out. 
 OEL of generator is activated at t = 32.6sec. 
 OLTC of transformer starts to act at t = 19.4sec, trying to restore the voltage of 
Bus3. 
 OLTC arrives at the lowest ratio at t = 120sec. 





Fig. 10.15 Voltage of Bus 4 in Case A without adaptive corrective scheme. 
 



















Fig. 10.16 P-V trajectory of Bus4 in Case A without adaptive corrective scheme. 
If the adaptive corrective scheme is implemented, PMU can predict the voltage 
trajectory based on the parameters of load and power source. Since the load exponents 
are higher than 1.0, it is predicted that the voltage will not collapse soon. The 
countermeasure is OLTC blocking if the bus voltage continues decreasing. If the 
voltage is still lower than the lower limit, the cascading multi-step load shedding is 
activated with different time delays. Fig. 10.17 shows the voltage of Bus4. The OLTC 
blocked at t = 60.2sec, the voltage is stable but still lower than required value (0.9pu), 
so 2 steps of load shedding (each with 5%) draw the voltage back to normal condition 





Fig. 10.17 Voltage of Bus4 in Case A with adaptive corrective scheme. 
Case B: Low load exponents 
The load in Case B is the same with Case A but with low load exponents as 0.802 
and 0.603, respectively. The voltage would collapse immediately after the disturbance 
due to the load imbalance, unless the prearranged 5% load shedding took action at t = 














Fig. 10.19 P-V trajectory of Bus 4 in Case B with corrective scheme. 
 
10.5 Summary 
This chapter analyzes the principles of voltage stability problem and explores the 
relationship between voltage collapse points and the load characteristics. An adaptive 
voltage corrective scheme based on the identification of load characteristic and power 
source parameters using PMU measurements is proposed. The proposed methodology 
can predict and classify the long-term and short-term voltage instability and minimize 
the amount of load shedding in the circumstance of mid-term or long-term voltage 
instability. The test is demonstrated on a 4-Bus small-scale power system. However, 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
 
11.1 Conclusions 
The main objective of this research is to develop adaptive and intelligent control 
and protection schemes based on WAMS to ensure the secure operation of western 
Danish power system. This dissertation has assessed the structural and dynamic 
vulnerability of western Danish power system with large scale wind power generation 
and other dispersed generation, addressed various technical issues in the wide-area 
control and protection of the transmission power system in western Denmark under 
the help of WAMS/PMU, such as dynamic security assessment, preventive control 
and corrective control schemes. 
Since the invention of PMU in the 1990s, the installation of PMUs has increased 
considerably all over the world and applications of WAMS have undergone a rapid 
expansion. Danish power system is also paying effort to the development of WAMS, 
and many PMUs have been commissioned in recent years. However, the full 
utilization of these PMUs has extraordinary significance for Danish power system. 
More specifically, the WAMS in Danish power system should not only be used in 
power system monitoring as the current application but also in the system-level 
control and protection to maintain the secure operation of power system, to improve 
the system stability, to reduce the risk of blackouts, etc. as future applications. 
Many advanced WAMPAC techniques have been developed worldwide so far, but 
they should be based on the fully understanding of the vulnerable areas and 
thoroughly evaluation of power systems characteristics. In terms of the characteristics 
of current Danish power system and the challenges of future Danish power system, 
the vulnerability of Danish power system has been assessed based on two aspects: 
structural vulnerability and dynamic vulnerability.  
For the aspect of structural vulnerability, several vulnerability indices have been 
evaluated to assess the impact of DG on power systems. The assessment shows that 
DG units are able to shorten the electrical distance between power sources and power 
loads, alleviate long-distance large-capacity transmission, improve the reliability of 
power system after contingencies, and increase transmission efficiency. 
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For the aspect of dynamic vulnerability, CCT is computed by the screening of a 
number of contingencies in various OCs in western Danish power system. It has been 
concluded that the transient stability is highly dependent on the power flow patterns. 
The outputs of CPPs are the most dominant factor of transient stability. Besides, 
under the same load of CPP, the less load consumption and the higher wind power 
generation are generally harmful to the transient stability of western Danish power 
system. 
It has been observed that the critical contingencies identified by both aspects of 
vulnerability assessment are different due to different evaluation criteria. In Chapter 4, 
structural vulnerability assessment is to evaluate the ability of a network in 
transmitting the electric power from the power sources nodes to the load consumption 
nodes from statistical point of view, which is related to the steady-state operation of 
the power grid, so power flow calculation is sufficient for the study of structural 
vulnerability assessment. Whilst, dynamic vulnerability assessment in Chapter 5, 
mainly focuses on the transient stability considering the dynamic behavior of power 
system, so T-D simulation is necessary for the study of dynamic vulnerability 
assessment. Especially, the recognized critical contingencies by dynamic vulnerability 
assessment can also provide the reference (credible contingency set) for the study of 
online DSA in Chapter 9. 
Since power system is a non-linear dynamic system and integrated with a large 
number of renewable energy generation units, the dynamic behavior of such a 
complex system after the disturbance is complicated. In addition, a huge number of 
OCs together with a lot of credible contingencies bring more challenges to the DSA of 
power systems, especially considering the generation from a large number of wind 
farms and DG units. Therefore, data mining is a suitable solution to this complex 
issue. Superior to other data mining techniques, DT and its associated algorithms have 
been adopted for western Danish power system, because they can not only provide the 
results of DSA with high accuracy but also reveal the principles learned by DTs for 
preventive control scheme. 
Then, importance sampling method has been adopted to prepare the database of 
data mining in order to reduce the computation burden of online DSA. A cooperative 
strategy based on the application of paralleled DTs has been used in preventive 
control to draw the operating point to the secure region in the case of the insecure 
operation of power system. Later on, the optimization of preventive control trajectory 
with consideration of domestic generation rescheduling cost and international penalty 
has been carried out for western Danish power system. According to the verification 
by a set of critical contingencies, 98% of the random generated extreme insecure OCs 
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can be controlled and guided back to the secure region without violation of 
international power exchange. If the practical data from industry can be obtained and 
considered, the result will indicate much higher reliability rate than 98%. 
Furthermore, RF has been implemented for the online DSA of western Danish 
power system, which is capable of not only predicting the security of power system 
with higher accuracy, but also telling the adaptability of the created RF model in 
terms of outlier index. The utilization of outlier index has successfully filtered out the 
unsure cases and improved the accuracy of online DSA to 100%. 
Other applications of PMU have also been proposed. The PMU has been used to 
identify the load characteristics and parameters of the Thevenin equivalent circuit of 
external grid. Since the load characteristic has close relationship with the voltage 
collapse pioint, P0-V curve instead of P-V curve has been proposed to predict the 
voltage collapse. Then online adaptive corrective scheme based on different load 
characteristics has been used to successfully minimize the load shedding for 
preventing the mid-term and long-term voltage instability. 
As concluded above, this PhD dissertation has addressed some of the major issues 
regarding wide-area control and protection of Danish transmission power system. 
Issues with online DSA, preventive control, corrective control have been covered. 
Simulation results have showed that these proposed methodologies are able to 
successfully address these issues. 
 
11.2 Future Work 
Although many aspects regarding adaptive and intelligent control and protection of 
power systems based on WAMS have been covered by this dissertation, several other 
issues are interesting for future investigation. Some of the issues that are deemed 
valuable are listed as follows: 
1. This research concentrates on the issues of transient stability and voltage 
stability due to the severity status and the requirement of Danish power system. 
Other stability issues, such as frequency stability and small signal stability 
have not been included in this research, but some of the approaches can deal 
with these stability issues by simple modification in the programming. 
2. The issues of bit error and communication delay of WAMS have not 
considered and the observability redundancy has not been taken into account in 
this research. For the future research, the issue of missing data and the backup 
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strategy for the malfunction of PMU or the malfunction of communication 
channels should be explored. 
3. In the online DSA of Danish power system, wind farm outputs are based on the 
probability distribution density of forecast error with respect to the forecasted 
wind power generation level of whole Danish power system. However, in the 
future research, the wind farm outputs should be associated with their 
geographical information, and the portfolio effect of wind speed to power 
system stability should be investigated. 
4. The model of dynamic elements in Danish power system is of crucial 
importance because the effectiveness of online DSA and preventive control 
scheme is dependent on the accuracy of power system model. Some dynamic 
models are not accurate (e.g. HVDC model), the dynamic support from HVDC 
control, especially VSC-HVDC links connecting Norway and Netherlands for 
future Danish power system can be investigated. 
5.  The wind farms are modeled according to current Danish grid codes 
(discussed in Chapter 5). The impact of wind farms’ dynamic control (e.g. 
LVRT and virtual inertia) on system security can be considered and evaluated 
for the future research. 
6. In Chapter 9, the reliability of online DSA and preventive control scheme for 
Danish power system are of great significance for industrial application. 
However, due to the limited time and the lack of real operational data from 
industry, the reliability of the proposed approach still stays in the estimated 
values. After further cooperation with Danish TSO, the author is confident that 
the proposed approach can be used for Danish TSO one day. However, there 
will be a lot of work regarding field-test and verification, as well as the 
visualization and man-machine interface of the proposed approach. 
7. In Chapter 10, the research of corrective scheme based on load characteristics 
identification, the dynamic load, such as induction motors, has not been 
considered. An adaptive load shedding scheme also considering dynamic 










Appendix A –Map of Danish Power System in 2010 
 
 
Fig. A.1 Geographical map of Danish transmission system in 2011. 
Reference: Dansk elforsyning 2009, statistik, pp. 9. danskenergi, 2009, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.danskenergi.dk/~/media/Energi_i_tal/Dansk_Elforsyning_Statistik_2009.pdf.ashx 
assessed on 21-Sep-2013. 
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Appendix B – Analysis of Accuracy of Decision Trees 
 
 
(a) Conventional sampling                              (b) Importance sampling 
Fig. B.1 Selection of operating conditions. 
Assuming that all cases by importance sampling are within the overlapping region, 
as shown in Fig B.1., the accuracy percentages calculated by different sampling 
methods are expressed by equations in Table B.1, where mI and mN are the numbers of 
misclassified cases by importance sampling (IS) and normal sampling (NS) 
respectively; N1 and N2 are the numbers of cases sampled inside the overlapping 
region and outside the overlapping region, respectively; δ is the rare-event probability 
that OCs locates in the overlapping region, which is from the statistical data of 
industry. Normally, mI>mN, N1<N2, and δ<<1, so the accuracy percentage with 
database prepared by IS indicates lower values, as shown in (B.1). 
1 1 2 1 2
1 1 1
(1 )
N NI m mm
N N N N N
δ
δ δ
− < − < −
+ + −
  (B.1) 
 
TABLE B.1  EXPRESSIONS OF ACCURACY 
Sampling methods Accuracy (%) 
Internal test with N1 samples by IS (1-mI/N1)*100 
Internal test with N1+N2 samples by NS [1-mN/(N1+N2)]*100 




Appendix C – Proof of Equations of P0-V Curve 
 
The proof of equations to represent P0-V curve is based on Bifurcation Theory, 
most commonly applied to mathematical study of dynamic systems. A bifurcation 
occurs when a small variation in parameter values of a system causes a sudden 
structural or topological change in the qualitative behavior of the dynamic system. A 
power system is also a dynamic non-linear physical system which can be represented 
by a group of differential equations and algebraic equations, as defined in (C.1) 
( , , )










     (C.1) 
where x is the vector of state variables, y is the vector of output variables, μ is the 
control parameter. When the non-linear system is in equilibrium state, the system can 
be defined as equations in (C.2), 
0 0 0
0 0 0
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    (C.2) 
where (x0, y0, μ0) is the equilibrium state. Assuming the input parameter is static, 
dμ=0, non-linear system can be linearized by Jacobian Matrix at (x0, y0, μ0), as 
expressed in (C.3). 
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(C.3) can be transformed to (C.4), 
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J J J J dx
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− = −      (C.4) 
where 0 0 01































From (C.4), it is easy to find out that when |J1-J4
-1J3|=0, there is no solution for the 
next step of x, the system approaches to the static bifurcation point, which is shwon in 
(C.5). 
1
1 2 4 3 4 1 4 2 30 0, and 0J J J J J J J J J
−− =  ≠ − =   (C.4) 
As shown in Fig. C.1, for a 2-bus single load power system, power flow equation is 
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Appendix C.1 Constant Power Load 
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In (C.7), Vk and θk are state variables, and PL0 and QL0 are considered as control 
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Based on the bifurcation theory, the collapse point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) must satisfy the 
equation in (C.4). 
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a) 4 0J ≠ , so that k cr nα θ π+ ≠ . 
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   (C.13) 
Substituting (C.12) and (C.13) to (C.7), the power flow equations can be 
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Fig. C.2. Phasor vector diagram of 2-bus power system in critical point. 
Assuming the power factor angle ϕk at time t=tk is measured and calculated by 
PMU according to ϕk=arcctg(Qk/Pk), the collapse point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) in (C.14) can be 
expressed (C.15). Please note that (C.15) can also be calculated by Law of Cosines, 
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Appendix C.2 Constant Current Load 
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In (C.17), Vk and θk are state variables, and PL0 and QL0 are considered as control 
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Based on the bifurcation theory, the collapse point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) must satisfy the 
equation in (C.4).  
a) 4 0J ≠ , so that k cr nα θ π+ ≠ . 
b) 1 4 2 3 0J J J J− = , one can obtain the equation in (C.22) 
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  (C.22) 
(C.22) can be simplified to (C.23) 
cos 0k crE θ =    (C.23) 
where / 2crθ π= − . Assuming the power factor angle ϕk at time t=tk is measured and 
calculated by PMU according to ϕk=arcctg(Qk/Pk), the collapse point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) in 
(C.23) can be expressed (C.24). 
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Appendix C.3 Constant Impedance Load 
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In (C.17), Vk and θk are state variables, and PL0 and QL0 are considered as control 
parameters, so Jacobian Matrix of (C.26) is expressed by the following equations 
(C.27)-(C.30) 
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Based on the bifurcation theory, the collapse point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) must satisfy the 
equation in (C.4).  
a) 4 0J ≠ , so that k cr nα θ π+ ≠ . 
b) 1 4 2 3 0J J J J− = , one can obtain the equation in (C.31) 
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The collapse point must meet (C.32) 
( )2 2 3,/ 0k k k crE Z V =    (C.32) 
where Ek>0 and Zk>0, so the critical voltage point is Vk,cr = ±∞. 
 
Appendix C.4 General Static Load 
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In (C.34), Vk and θk are state variables, and PL0 and QL0 are considered as control 
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Based on the bifurcation theory, the collapse point (PL0,m, Vk,cr) can be expressed in 
(C.39). 
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where k cr nα θ π+ ≠ . Finally, critical voltage point (Vk,cr, θcr) is expressed as (C.40), 
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where k cr nα θ π+ ≠  and 2
k k
cr
ϕ αθ −= .
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Appendix D – Data of 4-Bus Test Power System 
 
TABLE D.1  PARAMETERS OF 4-BUS TEST SYSTEM 
System structure parameters (in pu. on 100MVA base) 
Reactance bus1-bus4 X14 (pu) 0.035 
Reactance bus2-bus4 X24 (pu) 0.016 
Reactance bus3-bus4 X34 (pu) 0.004 
Generator parameters (in pu on 500MVA base) 
Generator step-up transformer ratio n 1.04 
d-axis reactance Xd (pu), Xd
/ (pu), Xd
// (pu) 2.1, 0.4, 0.204 
q-axis reactance Xq (pu), Xq
/ (pu), Xq
// (pu) 2.1, 0.5, 0.3 
d-axis time constant Td0
/ (s), Td0
// (s) 8, 0.04 
q-axis time constant Tq0
/ (s), Tq0
// (s) 1.8, 0.03 
Inertia H (s) 3.5 
Damping G (pu) 4 
AVR parameters 
Regulator Gain G 50 
Time Constant of Field Circuit Tf 0.7 
Maximum Regulator Voltage Vfdmax 3 
Minimum Regulator Voltage Vfdmin 0 
OEL parameters 
Integrator time constant T0 5 
Maximum field current ifdmin 0.825 
OLTC parameters 
Maximum tap ratio rmax 1.1 
Minimum tap ratio rmin 0.8 
Tap ratio step △r 0.02 
Dead zone d% 5% 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS) and Wide 
Area Monitoring, Protection and Control Systems 
(WAMPACS) have evolved rapidly over the last two 
decades [1]. This fast emerging technology enables real 
time synchronized monitoring of power systems. Presently, 
WAMS are mainly used for real time visualisation and post 
event analysis of power systems. It is expected however, 
that through integration with traditional Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, closed loop 
control applications will be possible. Phasor Measurement 
Units (PMUs) are fundamental components of WAMS. 
Large WAMS may support PMUs from multiple 
manufacturers and therefore it is important that there is a 
way of standardising the measurement performance of these 
devices. Currently the IEEE Standard C37.118 is used to 
quantify the measurement performance of PMUs. 
While standard specifications are also available for the 
testing of PMUs [2] there is a lack of specialised test 
equipment for performing such testing efficiently [3]. 
 In this paper, RTDS based steady state and dynamic 
testing of the ALSTOM MiCOM P847 PMU using 
hardware in the loop is demonstrated. A correction 
algorithm supported by promising results is also proposed to 
realize highly precise phasor measurements. Further a 
comparative study based on features of PMUs from 
different major manufacturers is presented. The selection of 
optimal parameters, such as phasor format and filter length 
is also discussed for various applications. 
 
Index Terms— IEEE C37.118, Phasor Measurement 





Since the beginning of PMU development which was 
initiated by Dr. Arun G. Phadke and Dr. James S. Thorp at 
Virginia Tech in 1988, the WAMS and WAMPACS have 
gained acceptance widely and developed rapidly around the 
world. Following several power system blackouts caused by 
system instability especially in 2003, WAMS and 
WAMPAC technologies have been pushed to the front of 
power system research. The PMU is capable of sampling 
voltage and current signals, processing these signals and 
transmitting them to a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC). 
The sampling clock of the PMU is synchronized to the 
Universal Time Coordinated (UTC) signal to enable 
synchronized phase angle measurement from the 
instantaneous values of voltage and current. 
WAMS help to monitor power system dynamics in real 
time, identify system stability related weakness and design 
and implement wide area control and protection schemes. A 
variety of online and offline applications such as voltage 
stability assessment [4], power system oscillation damping 
[5], online dynamic security assessment [6], system integrity 
protection schemes (SIPS) [7] and dynamic state estimation 
[8] have been achieved by using WAMS and WAMPAC 
technologies. 
In contrast to standalone devices in a power system, the 
performance of WAMS is affected by the compatibility and 
consistency of PMUs. Some power system operators have 
been developing their WAMS in multiple stages over 
multiple time spans, so it is very possible that their final 
WAMS consists of PMUs with various algorithms and from 
various vendors. There is also a trend today that more and 
more Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) such as digital 
fault recorders, revenue meters, power quality recorders, 
event recorders and measurements products are integrated 
with PMU functionality. As the compatibility and 
consistency among PMUs becomes more of an issue; the 
standard for PMU testing and performance analysis 
becomes more important for the development of WAMS 
and WAMPACS [7]. 
IEEE Standard C37.118-2005 “IEEE Standard for 
Synchrophasors for Power Systems” [10] was  published in 
2006 to replace IEEE Standard 1344-1995 [11], which  
mainly defined the message format interchanged between 
PMU devices and PDC 
Although the accuracy of PMU measurements is high, 
there is a need for improvement, particularly under dynamic 
system conditions, for satisfactory operation of WAMPACS.  
There have been ongoing activities for PMU testing and 
calibration. In [12], a comparative test was conducted 
among four PMUs from different manufacturers by Virginia 
Tech at both nominal and off-nominal frequencies. They 
have concluded that these PMUs responded differently in 
most of the situations, particularly in special conditions like 
off-nominal frequency. In [13], the author presented the 
progress of PMU testing and calibration in US and Brazil. 
In [14], a test setup for steady state testing of the PMU with 
Doble F6150 amplifier is developed. In [15], standardised 
testing of PMUs is proposed by Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA), composed of steady-states tests, step 
tests, structured signal tests and noise, latency and 
environmental tests.  
 In this research work, a comparative study based on 
features of PMUs from various major manufacturers is 
discussed followed by a performance evaluation of the 
Alstom MiCOM P847 PMU using RTDS. Based on these 
tests a correction algorithm is also presented to realize high 
precision WAMS. 
 
2. COMPARISON OF PMU 
 
Since the development of PMUs various market players 
have evolved mainly due to rapid development of WAMS 
technology. However because of different design techniques 
and algorithms used by different PMU manufacturers, 
PMUs from different vendors do not show identical 
characteristics. WAMS which involve different no. of 
PMUs depending on the size of the targeted area and 
network topology, demand identical characteristics from all 
involved PMUs. Most WAMS projects are implemented in 
stages over a period of years, so it is likely that PMUs from 
different manufacturers will be installed in the same 
WAMS. Due to a lack of absolute standards and the 
requirement for innovation the possibility of different 
behaviors from PMUs from different manufacturers is to be 
expected.  
We have made a comparative analysis of PMUs from 
major PMU manufacturers to highlight the differences in 
features provided by their devices. This comparative 
analysis is tabulated in the Appendix. It can be observed 
that features like frequency resolution, phasor resolution etc. 
are different for PMUs from different manufacturers. The  
difference in this characteristic behavior from these PMUs 
is bound to affect the accuracy of WAMS. The purpose of 
this comparative analysis is to reinforce the need for 
standards which can ensure the identical or close to identical 
measurement characteristics from all PMUs irrespective of 
the manufacturer.   
 
3. RTDS BASED PMU TEST SETUP 
 
The hardware in loop setup based on RTDS has been 
used to carry out the testing and performance analysis of the 
PMU. The architecture of the test set up is shown in Fig. 1 
where the RTDS is the main source of power system signal 
generation (voltage and current) and these signals are fed to 
the PMU.  Measured signals from the PMU are 
communicated to a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) 
through the Ethernet based TCP (Transmission Control 
Protocol) mode of communication.  The PMU used in this 
experimental setup is a MiCOM P847 PMU from ALSTOM 
which is synchronized to the Global Positioning System 
(GPS) through a GPS receiver and antenna. The main 
features of the MiCOM P847 PMU are given in Table-I. 
Output signals with the desired parameters are generated 




Table I: Main features of the PMU used in the test setup 
Model P847-B 
Voltage Inputs 3 (1 x 3-phase set or 3 x 
individual) 
Current Inputs 4 x 3-phase set, or 12 
individual 
Relay Outputs 8 
Digital Inputs 16 
Redundant Ethernet Yes 
 
 
Fig. 1 Architecture of RTDS based Test Set up 
 
Fig. 2 shows the pictorial view of the hardware setup 
with two rack based RTDS showing different connection 
details. From the GTAO card fixed in rack-1 of the RTDS, 
voltage and current signals are sent to the P847 PMU.  The 
PMU is also connected to a PDC through serial port 
communication for configuration and data verification of 
Ethernet based communication. The Personal Computer (PC) 
is used to run and operate the RTDS software. The 
Oscilloscope is used to measure the input signal to the PMU. 
 
 
Fig.2 Hardware setup of the RTDS based PMU testing platform. 
 
3. STEADY STATE TESTING 
 
     The steady state testing is the fundamental part of PMU 
performance estimation. For the steady state testing, steady 
state power system signals (voltage and current) are fed to 
the PMU from the RTDS via the GTAO card. In our 
experimental setup the following tests were performed to 
assess the impact of changing different parameters on the 
measurement performance of the PMU. 
 
3.1 Effect of frequency on magnitude measurement 
 
A voltage signal of 99.905 Volts at variable frequency 
was generated from the RTDS and supplied to the PMU. 
The corresponding measurement recorded by the PDC is 
plotted in Fig.3. It can be observed that for frequencies 
below the nominal value (50Hz) the measured voltage is 
below the actual value of input signal and with the increase 
in signal frequency from 45Hz to 50Hz the error in voltage 
magnitude decreases until it reaches a minimum at the 
nominal value. Further increases in frequency beyond the 
nominal value again increases the error in the measured 
value, however now the measured value is higher than the 
input signal value.  Fig. 4 shows the effect of system 
frequency on the magnitude error confirming the least error 
at nominal frequency. 
It can be concluded that the value of the magnitude error 
increases with the increase in variation of the signal 
frequency from the nominal value. 
In order to realize high precision reliable WAMS, each 
PMU measurement can be corrected using a correction  
 
       Fig.3 Effect of signal frequency on the measured magnitude  
               of  99.905V input signal. 
 
 
    Fig.4 Variation of percentage magnitude error versus signal frequency. 
 
signal based on appropriate test results for that specific 
PMU. For example in the case of this particular PMU, the 
percentage of magnitude error on different operating 
frequencies can be used to obtain the corrected value from 
the actual measured one. 
 
3.2 Effect of signal frequency on phase and frequency 
Measurement. 
 
Due to the PMU filter length and other design parameters, 
PMUs are relatively more precise at nominal frequency. The 
power system frequency however, often differs from the 
nominal value due to small perturbations in the system, both 
from the load as well as from the generation side. Moreover 
during disturbances in the power system, when higher 
measurement accuracy is of utmost need, measurements 
from PMU show an error depending on the offset from 
nominal frequency. In order to assess the effect of the signal 
frequency on the phase and frequency measurement error, 
two separate tests were performed on the ALSTOM 
MiCOM P847 PMU. Fig 5 and Fig 6 shows the phase error 
and frequency error at different signal frequencies. In order 
to achieve the smallest degree of measurement error, a 
correction factor for all measured variables could be 
implemented in the PDC. Therefore, in a similar way, tests 
showing the impact of different parameters on the 
measurement of PMUs could be performed through a 
reliable testing platform which eventually could be used to 
formulate a correction algorithm to process the measured 




        Fig. 5 Percentage of phase error at different operating frequencies. 
 
 
      Fig. 6 Error in frequency measurement w.r.t signal frequency. 
 
3.3 Total Vector Error 
 
In order to assess PMU performance, the IEEE C37 118-
2005 standard for synchrophasors has defined a 
performance index known as Total Vector Error (TVE). If a 
signal represented in the phasor domain n nr if x jx  , 
where nrx and 
n
ix  are real and imaginary components of a 
signal being sent to the PMU, then for the measured value 
of r ig x jx   corresponding to signal ‘f’, the TVE is 




( ) ( )n nr r i i
r i







The value of the TVE under various conditions should be 
under 1% as given in Table II.  In our experimental study 
the effect of the signal frequency on the TVE was observed 
as shown in Fig.7. 
Since TVE involves aggregated error in the magnitude and 
phase of the measured signal, the TVE is expected to vary, 
similar to the variation of the magnitude and phase value of 
a particular signal. For this particular PMU, the maximum  
 
 
Fig. 7. Effect of Signal frequency on TVE. 
 
TVE is 0.035% at the off nominal frequencies of 45Hz and 
55Hz, however the minimum TVE is at nominal frequency 
as expected from the magnitude and phasor plots described 
earlier. 
 






Range Influence quantity with respect to 
reference and maximum allowable TVE in 
percent(%) for each compliance level 







Fnominal +/- 0.5Hz 1 +/- .5Hz 1 
Signal 
Magnitude 
100% rated 80% to 
120% rated 
1 10% to 
120% rated 
1 
Phase angle 0 radians +/- pi 
radians 









up to 50th 
1 10% any 
harmonic 


























3.4 Realization of Least Erroneous WAMS 
 
As demonstrated in section 3.1-3.3 the error in 
measurements from PMUs varies with variation of signal 
parameters. The least error is observed at nominal values of 
parameters for which PMUs are designed. Since WAMS 
generally comprise of PMUs from different manufacturers 
or different models from the same manufacturer, the error in 
measurement will vary accordingly. Notwithstanding the 
difference in characteristics, even WAMS having identical 
PMUs will exhibit errors in measurements depending on the 
values of signal parameters like frequency. From our 
experimental study, it was observed that the behaviour of 
measurement errors with the variation in signal parameter is 
identical irrespective of the value of measured quantity. For 
example, the variation of voltage magnitude error at a 
particular frequency is almost same irrespective of the value 
of voltage magnitude. Therefore based on the test 
characteristics obtained from the PMU, a correction 
algorithm can be formulated and implemented in the PDC to 
minimize the net error of the measurements received. It is 
important to mention here that this proposed correction 
algorithm will be different for each PMU depending on its 
characteristic curves obtained from testing before its 
installation in the power system. 
To demonstrate the proposed correction algorithm we 
have applied the correction factors for magnitude error 
obtained from the magnitude error characteristics for the 
voltage signal of 99.905V shown in Fig. 4. This correction 
factor was then applied to another signal of 89.919V and the 
measured data from the PMU was processed in the PDC 
using the correction algorithm. Actual measured and PDC 
corrected measurement data is plotted in Fig.8. Relative 
errors of actual PMU measurement and PDC corrected data 
is plotted in Fig. 9. The impact of the correction algorithm is 
clear as the relative error has reduced by around 83% at the 
maximum offset of 45Hz and 55Hz.  
This correction algorithm can be extended to every 
measured variable like current, frequency and rate of change 
of frequency (ROCOF) to realize the minimum possible 
measurement error which shall help the effective 
implementation of WAMPACS in an online control 
application. It is pertinent to mention here that the 
correction algorithm shall be applicable for both steady state 
and dynamic conditions because of the fact that correction 
factor depends on the signal parameter instead of state of 
the system. Implementation of the correction algorithm will 
also allow flexibility in having PMUs with different 
characteristics from different manufacturers as the 
correction algorithm will take care of the error of each PMU 
separately. 
   It is worth to mention here that currently the main 
potential applications of WAMS include real-time 
measurement of power system states, power system 
operation & control, real time monitoring of power system 
dynamics and fault detection/event recording, however for 
real time protection, WAMS would be preferred for 
secondary defence instead of fast primary protection mainly 
due to relatively slow sampling rate of measurement by 
PMU which is one sample per cycle. 
Further the error introduced in measurement by PMUs is 
relatively insignificant compared to the errors introduced by 
instrument transformers. The error introduced by current 
transformer (CT) can be as high as 5 % for ratio error and 
60 minutes for phase error, similarly the allowed error limit 
for voltage by voltage transformer (VT) is as high as 3% for 
ratio error and 40 minutes for phase displacement [16-17]. 
However in case of PMU, the allowed TVE which includes 
both magnitude and phasor error is maximum of 1 % and  as 
shown above in section 3.3, TVE for ALSTOM MiCOM 
P847 is 0.035%. The proposed least erroneous method is 
expected to reduce TVE to the extent where error 
introduced by PMU can be neglected compared to the errors 
introduced by instrument transformers.    
 It is also pertinent to mention that the burden provided by 
PMU is also low compared to traditional measuring devices 
where burden can be as high as 25 volt-amperes (VA), 
however in case of PMU corresponding value is relatively 
very low, 0.66VA for ALSTOM MiCOM P847. 
 
 
   Fig.8 PMU measurement of voltage magnitude with and without   
             correction factor. 
 
 
      Fig. 9 Magnitude relative error with and without correction factor. 
 
4.  DYNAMIC TESTING 
 
Although the performance of PMUs under dynamic 
conditions has improved since the introduction of PMUs in 
real power system applications, there is a need for further 
improvements in the dynamic performance of PMUs. 
WAMPACS can be used to improve the performance, 
control, protection, stability and hence reliability of power 
systems provided the WAMS is highly precise and reliable 
during steady state as well as dynamic conditions. For the 
verification of the satisfactory performance of PMUs during 
dynamic conditions, dynamic tests are performed. 
Using the RTDS, dynamic response tests for step 
changes in magnitude, phase and frequency have been 
performed. Since the dynamic response depends on many 
factors like the measurement filter, measurement window 
and the decimation of the output data, the effect of the filter 
implementation is also investigated. 
A step change of 10% was introduced in the voltage 
signal from RTDS to PMU and the response in the 
measured value was recorded from the PDC as shown in 
Fig. 10. It can be observed the response is over damped, 
however close to critical damping, therefore a very small 
overshoot can be seen in the magnitude step response. The 
ALSTOM MiCOM P847 PMU is provided with three filter 
lengths, 5 cycles, 7 cycles and 13 cycles. The affects of all 
three filter lengths were observed and as expected, for 
higher filter lengths the response time is higher. Response 
times of 0.11s, 0.18s and 0.2 s were noted for filter lengths 
of 5 cycles, 7 cycles and 13 cycles respectively. 
The response to step changes in the phase value and 
frequency yields similar results as shown in Fig. 11 and Fig. 
12 respectively. A step change of 75% in phase and 0.5Hz 

























































  APPENDIX 
Manufacture Alstom[18] ABB[19] Siemens[20] Satang[21] SEL[22] Arbiter 
[23] 
CEPRI[24] 
Product Name/  
Model 




SEL 421 1123A PAC-2000 
























once per 1/2/4 
cycle 











Outputs V, I, P, Q, f, Phasor V, I, P, Q, f, 
Phasor 
V, I, P, Q, f, Phasor V, I, P, Q, 
f, Phasor 
V, I, P, Q, 
f, Phasor 
V, I, P, Q, 
f, Phasor 
V, I, P, Q, 
f, Phasor 
Resolution of Volt. 
and Curr. 
±1% ±0.5% ±0.25% Volt. 
/±0.5% Curr. 
±0.2% ±1% ±0.5% ±0.1% 
Resolution of Phasor 0.5deg 0.1deg - 0.1deg 0.1deg 0.1deg 0.1deg 
Resolution of Freq. 0.025Hz 0.005Hz - 0.001Hz 0.005Hz 0.005Hz 0.001Hz 
Resolution of Sync. 
Time 
±1us ±0.5us ±5us ±1us ±1us ±1us ±100ns 
Min. GPS Satellites 4 3 - 3 3 3 1 
A/D Resolution 16 bit 12 bit - 14/16 bit 12 bit 12 bit 16 bit 
Max. PMU Storage  No storage.  No storage 
 
1GByte For 2 
weeks 




Over Freq. Trig. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Differential Freq. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Over Curr. Over 
Volt. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Over Zero-Sequence Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Over Neg-Sequence Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Max. Offset Power 
Angle 
Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Manual/Remote 
Trigger 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Real-time Monitor Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Real-time Record Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Waveform Record Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Harmonic Analysis No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
1. Analog input(AI), 2.Digital input(DI), 3. Analog to Digital(AD) 
 
 
The effect of the filter length on the phase and frequency 
step change response is similar to that of the magnitude 
response. Lower filter lengths improve the response time at 
the cost of steady state accuracy and vice versa. Therefore 
the choice of filter length will be mainly decided by the 
WAMS application. For control applications a lower filter 
length with a fast response is preferred and for state 
estimation, a longer filter length with a slower response. 
Nevertheless for a multipurpose application an optimal 
value of filter length can be chosen. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The application of a RTDS for PMU testing including 
both steady state and dynamic tests was demonstrated in this 
paper.  
The need for universal well defined standards was 
reinforced through a comparative analysis of PMUs 
available from different manufacturers. 
A correction algorithm to realize a WAMS with the 
highest possible accuracy was proposed and supported by 
promising results from a RTDS and PMU based 
experimental setup. This proposed correction algorithm will 
ensure that the least erroneous measurement can be 
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Abstract—The increasing penetration of distributed generation 
(DG) in distribution systems has resulted in a challenge for the 
conventional protection methods, due to the bi-directional power 
flow and the variation of fault current contribution. Moreover, 
the operation of distribution system in islanded mode is still an 
issue due to the difference between the short circuit current in 
islanded mode and grid-connected mode. This paper proposed a 
novel adaptive protection method, measuring only the local 
information rather than using the communication, to adapt the 
protection settings to the states, such as the change of operation 
mode (grid-connected or islanded), the change of network 
topology (radial or meshed) as well as the disconnection of some 
DG. The directional overcurrent relays (DOCR) is adopted in the 
distributed system to shorten the tripping time in order to 
maintain the DG’s connection. The relay settings are calculated 
offline and modified online according to the state detection, 
including the islanding detection, the power flow detection and 
the fault section detection. This protection method is verified by 
simulating a distribution system of Denmark in DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory. 
Keywords- Adaptive protection, communication-less directional 
overcurrent relay, distributed generation, DIgSILENT 
PowerFactory.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, various types of small generation sources, better 
known as distributed generation (DG), are connected to the 
distribution power systems. Due to the CO2 reduction goals, 
many of the small units integrated in the distribution systems 
are renewable energy sources, such as wind turbines, 
photovoltaic panels, and small scale hydro plants. Also, high 
efficient non-renewable energy resources, such as small 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants have been 
implemented. In Denmark, about 40% of the total generation 
capacity is based on distributed generation units, which are 
connected to the electrical distribution systems from 400V to 
60kV. 
A large scale integration of DG units would play significant 
roles as power sources in modern power systems, which makes 
the protection of the power system more complicated. One of 
the major challenges is the bi-directional power flow in such 
electrical distribution system and the need for short time 
tripping. When there is a fault in the distribution system, not 
only the transmission system but also the DG units contribute 
to the fault current. Some DG units have low voltage ride 
through (LVRT) ability, remaining connected to the power 
system only for a short time. However, the conventional 3-
sectional definite time over-current protection would be too 
slow to clear the fault [1].  Hence, the protection relays are 
necessary to achieve features of both directional sensitive and 
short tripping time. The time directional overcurrent relay is 
suitable for these requirements. 
The other challenge is the variation of the short circuit 
current. On one hand, due to the change of the power system 
topology, such as losing some DGs and meshing the distributed 
feeder, the short circuit current would vary significantly. So the 
settings of the relays and the coordination of them should be 
adapted to the variation accordingly. On the other hand, the 
higher DG penetration makes it possible to operate the 
distribution system in an islanded mode, in which the 
distribution system works as a microgrid which is electrically 
isolated from the transmission system. When a distribution 
system is islanded, the fault current is lower than the fault 
current when the distribution system is connected to the 
transmission system. 
In [2], a single setting for islanded mode is used for relays, 
but it is likely to island the system frequently. In [3], the author 
presents the principle of adaptive protection in distribution 
network, using digital relay and advanced communication. 
Whereas, when the fault current is low, this protection would 
lose coordination. Some researchers focus on using storage 
units to increase the short-circuit power to make the fault 
detection possible [4,5]. In [6], a high-speed communication-
based protection method is proposed to cooperate with energy 
storage units to achieve fast, selective and reliable operation. 
However, implementing a communication between the relays is 
expensive and unreliable. 
A protection method based on local information is 
proposed in [7], which uses current traveling wave to identify 
the faulted feeder, but it is not suitable for small scale 
This work was supported by the Danske Strategiske Forskningscentre
under DSF 09-067255.  
distribution system. In [8], a simple adaptive protection for 
overcurrent relays without communication is invented as well. 
However, all the relays assume that the current they have 
measured is the actual fault current, but this may not be 
accurate, because the downstream DG also contributes to the 
fault current. 
This paper proposes a novel adaptive protection method, in 
which the trip characteristic is based on offline analysis and 
online selection. For normal operation states, this method is 
able to adapt to the state changes, such as change of operation 
mode (grid-connected or islanded) and changing of the 
topology (radial or meshed).  For abnormal operation states, 
such as some DGs are lost after a fault, this method can also 
detect the faulted section based on auto-reclosure time 
detection and then adapt to the new state. All the detections of 
the system state use only the local information. 
II. TEST DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
Fig.1 shows the one-line model of the test distribution 
system, which is originally from a part of a distribution system 
owned by Himmerlands Elforsyning (HEF), in Aalborg, 
Denmark. The test system consists of 6 loads and 7 buses 
(from Bus1 to Bus7). ‘R12’ stands for the relay, and the 
following 2 numbers represent the beginning bus and the end 
bus of its protection zone. The system is integrated with five 
gas turbine generators (GTG) and one variable speed wind 
turbine generator (WTG). The WTG is a 2MW doubly fed 
induction generator (DFIG) with power electronic converters. 
The data for the WTG are given in Table I. The GTG are 
3.3MVA with governor and excitation control, given in Table 
II. 
The distributed generation has the ability to support all the 
local loads. The distribution system is able to be meshed by 
Line67 to achieve higher reliability. R67 and R76 are 
normally open circuit breakers (CB). The line data and load 
data for this test distribution system is given in Table III. 
TABLE I.  DATA OF WIND TURBINE GENERATORS 
Parameters Value 
Rated power (MW) 2 
Stator rated voltage (kV) 0.69 
Stator resistance (p.u.) 0.0108 
Stator reactance (p.u.) 0.0121 
Magnetic reactance (p.u.) 3.362 
Rotor resistance (p.u) 0.004. 
Rotor reactance (p.u.) 0.05 
Crowbar resistance (p.u.) 0.5 
Crowbar reactance (p.u.) 0.1 
Generator inertia (kgm2) 255.105 
Rotor inertia (kgm2) 6.1×106  
Drive train stiffness (Nms/rad) 8.3×107  
Drive train damping (Nm/rad) 1.4×106  
Nominal turbine speed (rpm) 18 
Rotor radius (m) 50 
Max. current for crowbar insertion (kA) 5 
TABLE II.  DATA OF GAS TURBINE GENERATORS 
Parameters Value 
Rated power (MW) 2 
Rated voltage (kV) 3.3 
Stator resistance and reactance(p.u.) 0.0108, 0.0121 




dX (p.u.) 1.5, 0.256, 0.168 
q-axis reactance qX , 
//
qX (p.u.) 0.75, 0.184 




0dT (sec) 0.53, 0.03 
q-axis time constant 
//
0qT (sec) 0.03 
Inertia time constant (sec) 0.54 









Load PL(MW) QL(MVar) SLmax(MVA) 
Load1 0.4523 0.2003 1.0000 
Load2 0.7124 0.3115 2.0000 
Load3 1.1131 0.0501 2.0000 
Load4 1.1131 0.0501 3.0000 
Load5 1.1131 0.0501 3.0000 
Load6 7.6471 1.1607 10.0000 
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
A. Fault Current Analysis 
The fault current depends on the short circuit power. The 
transmission system generally has higher short circuit power 
compared to distribution system integrated with DG. The 
maximum short circuit current of three-phase short circuit 
faults at the end of each line for grid-connected and islanded 
mode are shown in Fig.2. One can notice that there should be a 
significant difference in the protection settings of the forward 
relays (R12, R23, R34, R45, R56 and R17) for these two 
modes. 
 
Figure 1.  Test Distribution System 
 
 
Figure 2.  Maximum 3-ph fault current. 
On the other hand, the short circuit power can also be 
reduced when losing some of the DG. The maximum short 
circuit current of three-phase short circuit faults at the 
beginning of each line for normal condition and a condition 
when GTG5 is disconnected are shown in Fig.3. One can 
notice that there should be a variation in the protection settings 












Figure 3.  Maximum 3-ph fault current. 
Furthermore, when the system is meshed by closing the 
circuit breakers of Line67, all the power sources could 
contribute the short circuit power from two directions. So 
meshing the distribution system changes the short circuit 
current seen by most of the relays, no matter grid-connected 
mode or islanded mode. Fig.4 and Fig.5 compare the 
maximum short circuit current in radial and meshed topology 























Figure 5.  Maximum 3-ph fault current in islanded mode 
B. Time Directional Overcurrent Protection (DOCR) 
The time DOCR consists of two parts, instantaneous part 
and inverse-time part, shown in Fig.6. For higher fault current, 
the relay pick time is fixed to the instantaneous one, similar to 
Zone I overcurrent protection. For lower fault current, the 
operating time is inversely changed with the current. So, 
higher current will operate the relay faster than lower ones. 
The advantage over definite time relays is that much shorter 
tripping times can be achieved without any risk to protection 
selection process, as illustrated in Fig.7. 
 
Figure 6.  Block diagram of directional overcurrent relay 
 
Figure 7.  The pickup time of definite time OCR and the inverse time OCR. 
The operating time of inverse-time OCR is based on IEC 













  (1) 
where Ip, I and Tp are pick up current, fault current and 
time dial setting of the relay, respectively. Ip is set to 1.5 times 
the maximum load current. The instantaneous pick up time 
Tins is set as 50ms, the instantaneous pick up current Ii is set 
to 1.2 times the maximum short circuit current at the end of 
the protection zone to assure the selectivity. 
The time dialing setting of each relay is designed in such a 
way that the upstream relay provides a backup function for its 
downstream relays. The backup function is based on the 
difference of the inverse-time characteristic. R1 is the backup 
relay for R2 and R3, so the shortest pickup time Tinv of 
inverse DOCR should be high than R2 and R3. The figure 
shown in Fig.8 is the protection coordination for the simple 




Figure 8.  The characteristic of time overcurrent relay. 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3)inv inv invT R T R T R> >   (2) 
C. Protection Coordination of Different States 
As mentioned earlier, one of the major advantages of high 
DG penetrated distribution system is the possibility of 
operating it in the islanded mode, which may be due to a fault 
in transmission system or any other disturbances. Although 
currently almost all utilities require DG to shut down once a 
distribution system is islanded, implementation of islanding 
operation of DG is one of the promising task for future 
consideration [9]. 
Let us consider the protection coordination of four normal 
operation states of the distribution system.  
Normal State 1: The distribution system is grid-connected 
with radial topology (CB=Closed, R67=R76=Open). The 
forward and backward relays should coordinate with its 
downstream relays respectively. For example, R45 should be 
the backup protection of R56. In case of R56 dose not trip 
instantaneously, R45 should trip after a delay time, 
thus ( 45) ( 56)inv invT R T R> . The protection coordination should 
follow (3) and (4). 
( 12) ( 23) ( 34) ( 45) ( 56)inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R> > > >  (3) 
( 65) ( 54) ( 43) ( 32) ( 21)inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R> > > >  (4) 
Normal State 2: The distribution system is grid-connected 
with meshed topology (CB=Closed, R67=R76=Closed). Since 
the distribution system is a loop network, the protection 
coordination should follow (5) and (6). 
( 12) ( 23) ( 34) ( 45) ( 56) ( 67) ( 71)inv inv inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R T R T R> > > > > > (5) 
( 17) ( 76) ( 65) ( 54) ( 43) ( 32) ( 21)inv inv inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R T R T R> > > > > > (6) 
Normal State 3: The distribution system is islanded with 
radial topology (CB=Open, R67=R76=Open). The protection 
coordination should follow (7) and (8). 
 ( 71) ( 12) ( 23) ( 34) ( 45) ( 56)inv inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R T R> > > > > (7) 
( 65) ( 54) ( 43) ( 32) ( 21) ( 17)inv inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R T R> > > > > (8) 
Normal State 4: The distribution system is islanded with 
meshed topology (CB=Open, R67=R76=Closed). Considering 
the power flow direction, the protection coordination should 
follow (9) and (10). 
( 71) ( 12) ( 23) ( 34) ( 45) ( 56) ( 67)inv inv inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R T R T R> > > > > > (9) 
( 76) ( 65) ( 54) ( 43) ( 32) ( 21) ( 17)inv inv inv inv inv inv invT R T R T R T R T R T R T R> > > > > > (10) 
D. Normal Operation State Detection 
Adaptive protection is “an online activity that modifies the 
preferred protective response by means of externally generated 
signals or control action” [10]. Therefore this protection 
method should be able to detect the operation state and then 
modify the protection settings according to the operation state. 
All the protection settings are calculated offline and activated 
online. 
The states flow for the states detection is shown in Fig.9. 
The relays measure the voltage and frequency to detect that the 
distribution system is connected to transmission system or 
islanded, as presented in [11,12]. A lot of other islanding 
detection technologies can also be used. Fig.10 shows the 
voltage and frequency variation when changing from grid-
connected states to islanded states at t = 1sec. 
 
Figure 9.  State flow of distribution system. 
 
Figure 10.  Voltage and frequency variation when the system is islanded. 
When changing the system topology, i.e. meshing the 
feeders, the power flow changes evidently. Thus all the relays 
would measure a step change in their current due to the 
distribution system changing from radial topology to meshed 
topology. Fig.11 shows the current in each transmission line 































(d) Line 45                           (e) Line 56                            (f) Line 67 
Figure 11.  Current variation when the system is meshed. 
E. Abnormal Operation State Detection 
As presented earlier, if some generators are lost after a fault, 
relays may not see the same amount of fault current as 
compared to the normal operation states. The adaptive relays 
detect the faulted section by using fault section detection 
algorithm and select the right characteristics accordingly.  
The fault section detection algorithm is based on the auto-
reclosure time detection. For example, if there is a 3 phase fault 
in the beginning of Line45 in Normal State 1, as shown in 
Fig.12, the forward relays R12, R23, R34 and R45 see the fault 
current. R45 should be tripped by its time over current 
protection. As most of the faults are temporary faults, a three-
phase auto-reclosure should be set to restore the system. If we 
set the auto-reclosure time differently, the upstream relays 
could accurately identify which relay has tripped. After 
successfully identifying the faulted section, the upstream 
forward relays R23 and R34 would know which distributed 
generation has lost, and update the new protection settings to 
their adjacent backward relays R21 and R32. 
However, not all the fault will lead to losing distributed 
generation. We assume that the distribution system can not be 
split and operate as 2 isolated areas. For example, when the 
R65 detects there would be islanded due to a fault in the 
distribution system rather than intentional islanding, GTG5 
would be tripped immediately after the islanding. Now we 
consider the following 4 abnormal states. 
Abnormal State 1: The distribution system is grid-connected 
with radial topology. Line45 has tripped, shown in Fig.12. 
GTG5 will be disconnected to avoid the splitting operation. No 
matter whether the fault is unrecoverable fault or temporary 
fault restored by auto-reclosure, GTG5 would be disconnected 
and the R21, R32 and R43 should change their protection 
settings. 
 
Figure 12.  The distribution system in Abnormal State 1. 
Abnormal State 2: The distribution system is grid-connected 
with meshed topology, Line45 has tripped, shown in Fig.13. 
All the DG can be connected, because there is no splitting area. 
If the fault is temporary fault and restored by auto-reclosure, 
the distribution system would recover to meshed topology. No 
protection settings would be changed. Whereas, if the fault is 
unrecoverable fault, the distribution system changes to radial 
topology with 2 feeders, all the protection settings and their 
coordination should be changed. 
 
Figure 13.  The distribution system in Abnormal State 2. 
Abnormal State 3: The distribution system is islanded with 
radial topology, Line45 has tripped, shown in Fig.14. It is 
similar to Abnormal State 1, except for R17 should also change 
its setting to adapt to the disconnection of GTG5. 
 
Figure 14.  The distribution system in Abnormal State 3. 
Abnormal State 4: The distribution system is islanded with 
meshed topology, Line45 has tripped, shown in Fig.15. The 
adaptive protection scheme is the same as Abnormal State 2. 
The relay shown in blue are the ones should be modified. 
 
Figure 15.  The distribution system in Abnormal State 4. 
IV. DESIGN OF THE OVERCURRENT PROTECTION 
Although the islanding operation is a promising way of 
improving the reliability in the future, currently, Danish grid 
code requires the islanding operation up to 25MW is avoided 
[9,13]. So, in this paper, only Normal State 1 and 2 are 
designed and tested. The time dial settings, pickup current and 
instantaneous pickup current in Normal State 1 and 2 are listed 
in Table IV and Table V. The time-distance diagrams are 
shown in Fig.16 and Fig17, in which the pickup time for each 
relay is dependent on the location of fault in the lines. 
TABLE IV.  TIME OVERCURRENT SETTINGS IN NORMAL STATE 1 
Relay Ip(A) Tp Ii(A) Relay Ip(A) Tp Ii(A)
R12 440 0.1669 5532 R21 350 0.0243 1075
R23 350 0.1275 4210 R32 350 0.0427 1140
R34 260 0.0848 2646 R43 260 0.0629 900
R45 130 0.0649 2465 R54 130 0.0862 488
R56 130 0.0208 2208 R65 130 0.1073 500
R67 - - - R76 - - -
R71 390 0.1232 1426 R17 350 0.0183 4746
TABLE V.  TIME OVERCURRENT SETTINGS IN NORMAL STATE 2 
Relay Ip(A) Tp Ii(A) Relay Ip(A) Tp Ii(A)
R12 260 0.2808 4900 R21 200 0.0090 694
R23 170 0.2403 3310 R32 200 0.0390 1194
R34 90 0.1964 1746 R43 200 0.0739 1521
R45 60 0.1696 1597 R54 60 0.1911 2388
R56 60 0.1111 1228 R65 90 0.2358 3100
R67 140 0.0474 1220 R76 180 0.2462 3760
R71 480 0.0100 1918 R17 180 0.2922 3806
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Figure 17.  The time-distance of protection settings in Normal State 2. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In the simulation, we assume the relay takes 10ms to close 
its trip contacts and the circuit breaker takes 60ms to clear the 
fault, the instantaneous pickup time is 50ms to detect the fault. 
So the minimum tripping time is 120ms after a fault.  
The wind turbine generator should satisfy the Danish grid 
code demands for fault right through below 100kV, as shown 
in Fig.18. 
 
Figure 18.  The Danish grid code for low voltage ride through at below 
100kV[9]. 
A. Adaptive Protection Settings in Normal States 
Scenario A is the grid-connected mode with radial topology, 
a three phase short circuit with 0.05Ω fault resistance takes 
place in the middle (50%) of Line34 at t=1sec. 
The protection setting is shown as Table IV. Fig.19 shows the 
actual states of the circuit breakers. CB34 and CB43 trip at 
t=1.12secc to clear the fault, 120ms after the fault. The wind 
turbine generator should still connect to the distribution system 
because of the LVRT ability. 
 
Figure 19.  The states of CB in Scenario A with protection settings in Table IV. 
Scenario B is the grid-connected mode with meshed 
topology, a three phase short circuit with 0.05 Ω  fault 
resistance takes place in the middle (50%) of Line34 at t=1sec.  
If the protection settings do not change, shown in Table V, 
the CB 34 would trip at t=1.291sec. It is too slow because the 
WTG would be disconnected at t=1.262sec, shown in Fig.20.  
As discussed in Section III, the relays have the ability to 
detect the islanding and select the protection settings, shown in 
Table IV. Fig.21 shows the actual states of the circuit breakers. 
One can see that after modifying the relay settings to the 
meshed mode. The circuit breakers clear the fault in time and 
the wind turbine generator still connects to the distribution 
system. 
 
Figure 20.  The states of CB in Scenario B with protection settings in Table IV. 
 
Figure 21.  The states of CB in Scenario B with protection settings in Table V. 
B. Fault Section Detection for Abnormal States 
As mentioned earlier, the fault section detection can be 
easily achieved by setting different auto-reclosure time delay, 
as shown in Table VI. 
TABLE VI.  TIME OVERCURRENT SETTINGS IN NORMAL STATE 2 
Relay Reclosure Time (ms) Relay Reclosure Time (ms)
R12 500 R21 500
R23 1000 R32 1000
R34 1500 R43 1500
R45 2000 R54 2000
Relay Reclosure Time (ms) Relay Reclosure Time (ms)
R56 2500 R65 2500
R67 3000 R76 3000
R71 3500 R17 3500
Scenario C is the grid-connected mode with radial topology, 
a unrecoverable three phase short circuit with 5 Ω  fault 
resistance takes place at the end of Line34 (90%). 
As shown in Fig.22, R12 and R23 can measure the fault 
current and detect that the fault clears at t=1.458sec. Then, at 
t=3.028sec, 1570ms after the fault clearing time, the fault 
current occurs again, since the fault is permanent fault. Based 
on the different reclosure time delay shown in Table VI, R12 
and R23 are able to detect that R34 has tripped. So, R12 and 
R23 can detect GTG4 and GTG5 have been lost and should 
modify the protection settings. 
 
Figure 22.  The current measured by R12 and R23 in Scenario C. 
Scenario D is the grid-connected mode with radial topology, 
a unrecoverable three phase short circuit with 5 Ω  fault 
resistance takes place at the beginning of Line45 (10%). 
As shown in Fig.23, R12 and R23 can measure the fault 
current and detect that the fault clears at t=1.219sec. Then, at 
t=3.289sec, 2070ms after the fault clearing time, the fault 
current occurs again. By looking for the reclosure time delay 
shown in Table VI, R12 and R23 are able to detect that R45 
has tripped. So, R12 and R23 can detect that GTG5 has been 
lost and should modify the protection settings. 
Based on this methodology, all the relays are able to detect 
the fault section and modify their proper protection settings 
only using local information. Thus, the adaptive protection 
scheme can be achieved without communication. 
 
Figure 23.  The current measured by R12 and R23 in Scenario D. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An accurate adaptive protection can be achieved only using 
the local information. This methodology is able to detect not 
only the normal states (grid-connected or islanded, radial or 
meshed) but also the abnormal states (losing some DG) based 
on the reclosure time delay detection. Then, all the relays 
modify their protection settings to adapt to the new states. The 
simulation results based on DIgSILENT ProwerFactory show 
that this protection scheme is effective for distribution system 
integrated with DG. 
Although this paper only considered the symmetrical fault, 
for the unsymmetrical fault, this methodology can also be 
useful, if the grounding of the neutral point can be assured. 
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Abstract 
The increasing penetration of dispersed generation (DG) brings challenges to conventional protection approaches of 
distribution system, mainly due to bi-directional power flow and variable fault current contribution from different 
generation technology-based DG units. Moreover, the trend of allowing islanded operation of distribution systems 
necessitates the adoption of adaptive protection methods for distribution systems. In order to improve the reliability 
and selectivity of protection for such kind of distribution systems, a coordinative adaptive protection based on multi 
agent system (MAS) is proposed. The adaptive protection intelligently adopts suitable settings for the variation of 
fault current from diversified DG units. Furthermore, the structure of mobile MAS with additional flexibility is 
capable of adapting the changes of system topology in a short period, e.g. radial/meshed, grid-connected/islanded. 
The protection method is tested on a simplified distribution system model of Denmark in DIgSILENT/PowerFactory. 
 
Keywords: Adaptive protection, dispersed generation, distribution protection, multi agent system 
1. Introduction 
Due to scarcity of fossil fuel reserves and the energy policy of CO2 emission reduction, various types 
of renewable energy (RE) are being integrated into power systems at tremendous pace. Because of the 
decentralized characteristics of these natural resources, significant part of these RE-based generating units 
is connected to distribution systems. In Denmark, currently more than 40% of today’s installed capacity is 
from DG units, which are mostly connected to grid at the distribution level (60/20/10/0.4 kV). Large scale 
RE-based and other DG units would play significant roles as power resources in the modernized power 
systems, which make the protection of power systems more complicated than that of traditional systems. 
At distribution voltage level, one of the major challenges is the variability and uncertainty of short 
circuit current from these flexible DG resources. The operating conditions of renewable generation are 
highly unpredictable. Moreover, low voltage ride through (LVRT) capability mandates DG units’ 
connectivity to the network only for a short period. Therefore, the protection settings of distribution 
system are of crucial importance, because it should be able to not only isolate the faulted part of the 
system in a short time to prevent large scale tripping of DG units, but also immediately adapt to the new 
scenarios to achieve high reliability and selectivity [1]. 
The other challenge is the change of network topology, such as disconnecting some DG units and 
meshing the distribution feeders. In future, the increasing penetration of DG is expected to support all 
loads in the distribution system and hence be possible for islanded operation. Compared with grid 
connected mode, the fault current seen by protection relays in islanded mode is relatively much less. 
Adaptive protection is defined as “an online activity that modifies the preferred protection settings in 
response to changes in system condition or requirements in a timely manner by means of external 
generated signals or control actions” [2]. Many researchers have proposed both communication-based 
adaptive protection methods [3]-[8] and communication-less adaptive protection methods [9]-[14] for DG 
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integrated distribution systems. In this paper, multi agent system (MAS) is proposed for adaptive 
protection schemes to deal with these variable scenarios after analyzing the impact of DG units on 
protection coordination. The mobile structure of MAS with more flexibility is capable of adapting the 
variation of renewable generation and the changes of system topologies in a short time, so as to correctly 
protect the system from multiple instantaneous faults. 
2. Test Distribution System 
Fig. 1 shows the single-line model of the test distribution system, which is a part of distribution system 
owned by Danish Distribution System Operator (DSO), Himmerland Elforsyning (HEF) in Aalborg, 
Denmark. The test system consists of 6 loads (numbered from Load1 to Load6) and 7 buses (numbered 
from Bus1 to Bus7). Relays are represented by symbols “Rij”, where numbers i and j represent the 
beginning bus and the ending bus of its protection zone, respectively. Five Gas Turbine Generators 
(GTGs) and one variable speed wind turbine generator (WTG) are connected to the system. The WTG is 
a detailed model of 2 MW doubly-fed induction generator (DFIG) based wind turbine with power 
electronic converters and other control models, e.g. aerodynamic model, mechanical model, etc.. The 
GTGs are 3.3 MVA with governor and excitation control. The penetration level of DG units is sufficient 
to support all local loads across the distribution network in islanded operation mode. Meanwhile, the 
distribution system is capable of forming a ring type topology by Line 67 equipped with circuit breakers 
(CBs) to support the important load, (i.e. Load 5). R67 and R76 control normally open CBs. The data of 
WTG, GTGs, distribution lines and loads are given in [13]. 
 
Fig. 1. Test distribution system. 
3. Proposed Methodology 
3.1. Fault Current Analysis 
Future distribution systems trend to have ability to be operated in islanded mode for higher reliability. 
Compared with the grid-connected mode, in which the transmission system provides significant part of 
the short-circuit power, the short-circuit current in islanded mode is significantly less. The maximum 3-
phase bolted fault current at the end of each protection zone for grid connected mode and islanded mode 
are shown in Fig. 2. The difference of short-circuit current only has impacts on the protection settings of 
forward relays in distribution feeders, (i.e. R12, R23, R34, R45, R56 and R17). 
The short circuit current reduces when some of the DG units are disconnected. Fig. 3 compares the 
maximum short circuit current of 3-phase faults at the beginning of each protection zone when some of 
DG units are disconnected. The difference of short-circuit current only have impacts on the protection 
settings of the backward relays in the distribution feeders, (i.e. R17, R21, R32, R43, R54 and R65). 
Furthermore, in order to support important load (i.e. Load 5) in the end of distribution feeder, the 
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network can be meshed by closing the normally open CBs of Line 67. In these cases, all power resources 
can contribute the short circuit power from two directions. Therefore, meshing of the network changes the 
short circuit current seen by most of the forward and backward relays, irrespective of grid-connected 
mode or islanded mode, as shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. 
            
Fig. 2. Max. 3-ph fault current of radial topology.            Fig. 3. Max. 3-ph fault current with/without DG integrated. 
         
Fig. 4. Max. 3-ph fault current in grid connected mode.     Fig. 5. Max. 3-ph fault current in islanded mode. 
3.2. Inverse-time Directional Over Current Relay (DOCR) Protection  
Inverse-time directional overccurent relay (DOCR) protection is adopted in the distribution system, 
which consists of two parts, instantaneous part and inverse-time part. For higher fault current (I>>), the 
relay pick-up time is fixed to tins. While for lower fault current (I>), the operation time is inversely 
changed with the fault current. Compared with traditional definite time DOCR, inverse-time DOCR has 
much shorter tripping time to reduce the risk of large scale DG disconnections. In this study, the operating 













  (1) 
where I, Ip and Tp are fault current, pick-up current, and time dial settings. The instantaneous pick-up 
current Iins is set as 1.05 times of the max short circuit current at the end of protection zones. Therefore, Ip, 
Tp, Iinc are the three configurable setting values for an adaptive DOCR to fit for current operating mode. 
3.3. Architecture of Multi Agent System 
Multi Agent System (MAS), also known as “self-organization system” is defined as a computerized 
system composed of many intelligent agents cooperatively adapting to the environment. Each 
autonomous agent can freely participate in or leave a group to cooperate with other agents with the help 
of communication [16]. The proposed MAS based adaptive protection scheme adopts three-level 
hierarchical architecture, which is built up with centralized control level, cooperation society level and 
distributed agent level, as shown in Fig. 6. These agents are geographically distributed in a number of 
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), which have basic functions, such as computation, I/O interface, 
communications features, and decision making capability. 
MAS in the distribution network consist of Relay Agents Society (RAS), DG Agents Society (DGAS) 
as well as Equipment Agents Society (EAS). Agents in the MAS can communicate with each other not 
only within the same agent society, but also between different agent societies.  
Each relay is regarded as one relay agent (RA), which searches for relevant information from the 
communication bus and interacts with other agents. With the help of MAS, RAs not only fulfill the 
primary protection and back up protection with better performance than conventional methods, but also 
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detect events, such as CB failures, CB mal-operations and DG connection status, etc.. 
Every DG unit is considered as a DG agent (DGA). In MAS environment, DG units not only 
communicate with the local RA to provide the message of connection status, but also transmit important 
information, such as status and power generation, to DGAS.  
The equipment agent (EA) includes CB agents, current transformer (CT) agents, voltage transformer 
(VT) agents, etc. These agents can send local important information, such as mal-function, mis-operation, 
alarm signals etc. to local RAs, and also can communicate with other EAs in the EAS to provide back up 




Fig. 6. Architecture of MAS based adaptive protection system.  
3.4. Mobile Multi Agent System 


             
Fig. 7. Structure of MAS in the test distribution system.                      Fig. 8. Block diagram of mobile MAS. 
Fig. 7 shows MAS in the test distribution system. Based on geographical distribution of agents in the 
distribution system, the communication can be divided into local communication and remote 
communication. Mobile MAS is adopted in this approach. As shown in Fig. 8, intelligent electric devices 
e.g. PMU, located in the substation of transmission system, can serve as the control center of the 
distribution system. The control center collects the states of CBs from EAS to detect the topology of the 
network, then to correctly change the classification of relays in Forward Relay Agent Society (FRAS) and 
Backward Relay Agent Society (BRAS). The protection settings of relays are calculated and stored 
offline in RAs. Then RAs receive the requests to adopt correct settings to adapt to current operating states. 
The protection settings must coordinate with each other in the same society, as shown in Table 1, in 
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which “” means the back-up relationship between protection relays, e.g. “R12R23” means R12 is the 
back up protection for R23. The adoption of mobile MAS aims at reducing the communication delay for 
transmitting the request of setting adjustment. 
Table 1. Coordination of FRAS and BRAS with respect to different topologies 
Topology Coordination of FRAS Coordination of BRAS 
Radial Grid-connected R12R23R34R45R56 R65R54R43R32R21 
Radial Islanded R71R12R23R34R45R56 R65R54R43R32R21R17 
Meshed Grid-connected R12R23R34R45R56R67R71 R17R76R65R54R43R32R21 
Meshed Islanded R12R23R34R45R56R67R71 R17R76R65R54R43R32R21 
4. Case Study 
According to Danish grid code, WTG should withstand faults for at least 100ms without disconnection 
[17]. In this case study, it is assumed that the instantaneous pick-up time Tins is 10ms to detect the fault 
and relays take another 10ms to close its trip contacts. CBs take 60ms to clear the fault. So the minimum 
tripping time is 80ms after short-circuit. The communication is simulated by DIgSILENT Simulation 
Language (DSL) in the DIgSILENT. An Ethernet LAN communication network with ring topology is 
considered in the distribution system, so that communication delay between any adjacent agents can be 
assumed to be the typical value of 3.707ms [8]. The connection status of DG units will definitely decide 
the protection settings of its downstream relays and the request signal is transmitted along the feeders in 
the distribution network. Table 2 shows communication delay of transmitting the new settings throughout 
the network after the change of DG connection status. 
The change of connection status of GTG5 is demonstrated in this study. The instantaneous pick-up 
current Iins, reverse-time pick-up current Ip, time dial setting Tp of all relays with GTG5 connected and 
disconnected are listed in Table 3. Accordingly, the time-overcurrent plot of forward relays and backward 
relays are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. The time over-current curves of the BRAS in the Fig. 9 (b) and Fig. 
10 (b) cross each other but they do not lack of selectivity, owing to the in-feed current from WTG, GTG4 
and GTG5 along the distribution feeder. 
Table 2. Communication delay for transmitting new protection settings throughout the network. 
DG connection states (network topology) 
Msg. of protection settings 
communicate in FRAS of MAS
Delay
(ms)
Msg. of Protection Settings 
communicate in BRAS of MAS 
Delay
(ms)
WTG disconnected (meshed) R34,R45,R56,R67,R71,R12,R23 11.121 R32,R21,R17,R76,R65,R54,R43 11.121
GTG4 disconnected (meshed) R45,R56,R67,R71,R12,R23,R34 11.121 R43,R32,R21,R17,R76,R65,R54 11.121
GTG5 disconnected (meshed) R56,R67,R71,R12,R23,R34,R45 11.121 R32,R21,R17,R76,R65,R54, R43 11.121
WTG disconnected (radial, islanded) R34,R45,R56 7.414 R32,R21,R17 7.414
GTG4 disconnected (radial, islanded) R45,R56 3.707 R43,R32,R21,R17 11.121
GTG5 disconnected (radial, islanded) n/a n/a R65,R54,R43,R32,R21,R17 11.121
WTG disconnected (radial, grid-connected) R34,R45,R56 7.414 R32,R21 3.707
GTG4 disconnected (radial, grid-connected) R45,R56 3.707 R43,R32,R21 7.414
GTG5 disconnected (radial, grid-connected) n/a n/a R65,R54,R43,R32,R21 11.121
Table 3. Time overcurrent settings with and without GTG5. 
Protection Settings of Grid-connected & Radial w GTG5 Protection Settings of Grid-connected & Radial w/o GTG5
Relay Ip(A) Tp(sec) Iins(A) Relay Ip(A) Tp(sec) Iins(A) Relay Ip(A) Tp(sec) Iins(A) Relay Ip(A) Tp(sec) Iins(A)
R12 440 0.1669 5532 R21 350 0.0243 1075 R12 440 0.1669 5532 R21 210 0.0356 945 
R23 350 0.1275 4210 R32 350 0.0427 1140 R23 350 0.1275 4210 R32 210 0.0615 987 
R34 260 0.0848 2646 R43 260 0.0629 900 R34 260 0.0848 2646 R43 130 0.0986 682 
R45 130 0.0649 2465 R54 130 0.0862 488 R45 130 0.0649 2465 R54 - - - 
R56 130 0.0208 2208 R65 130 0.1073 500 R56 130 0.0208 2208 R65 - - - 
R71 390 0.1232 1426 R17 390 0.0183 4746 R71 390 0.1232 1426 R17 390 0.0183 4606
The operating state is the grid-connected mode with radial topology. The extreme scenario is two 3-ph 
faults with resistance of 0.05Ω close to the end (90%) of Line43 and Line56, taking place at the same 
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time t=1000 ms. The protection settings are restored for adaptive adjustment for DG disconnection, as 
listed in Table 3. Fig. 11 shows actual states of CBs for conventional pilot protection, in which WTG is 
tripped at t=1262 ms. However, with the help of MAS-based adaptive protection, WTG still remains 
connected to the network, due to quick change of protection settings to adapt to the new operating states 
with the help of MAS, as shown in Fig. 12. The sequences of events in the case of conventional pilot 
protection and MAS-based adaptive protection are compared in Table 4 and the signals transmitted in 
both of communication-based protections are shown in Fig.13 and Fig. 14. 
               
Fig. 9. Time-overcurrent plot with GTG5 connected.            Fig. 10. Time-overcurrent plot with GTG5 disconnected. 
                
Fig. 11. States of CBs in conventional pilot protection.        Fig. 12. States of CBs in MAS-based adaptive protection. 
Table 4. Sequence of events of the conventional pilot protection and MAS-based adaptive protection 
Conventional pilot protection Time (ms) MAS-based adaptive protection Time (ms)
3-ph short circuit fault at Line34 and Line56 1000 3-ph short circuit fault at Line34 and Line56 1000 
R65 is picked up by instantaneous DOCR 1010 R65 is picked up by instantaneous DOCR 1010 
R65 sends tripping signal to R56 1010 R65 sends tripping signal to R56, and requests 
for adjusting protection setting in BRAS 
1010 
R56 receives the tripping signal from R65 1013.7 R56 receives the tripping signal from R65 1013.7 
CB65 trips, GTG5 trips 1080 R54 receives the request for adjust settings 1013.7 
CB56 trips 1083.7 R43 receives the request for adjust settings 1017.4 
WTG trips 1262 R43 is picked up by instantaneous DOCR 1027.4 
R34 is picked up by reverse-time DOCR 1289 R43 sends tripping signal to R34 1027.4 
R34 sends tripping signal to R43 1289 R34 receives the tripping signal from R43 1031.1 
R43 receives the tripping signal from R34 1292.7 CB65 trips, GTG5 trips 1080 
CB34 trips 1359 CB56 trips 1083.7 
CB43 trips 1362.7 CB43 trips 1087.4 
  CB34 trips 1091.1 
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Fig. 13. Signals in conventional pilot protection.                   Fig. 14. Signals in MAS-based adaptive protection. 
5. Conclusion 
A coordinative adaptive protection based on MAS is proposed, which adapts itself for multiple 
variations, i.e. operating states of DG units, network topology, in DG integrated distribution system. The 
cooperative nature of proposed MAS based protection scheme adjusts settings of protection equipments to 
fits for current states at high speed. The proposed protection scheme has been applied to a real 
distributions system and the results have demonstrated the effectiveness of MAS based protection scheme. 
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